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Three Essays on Firms Financial Distress
Abstract
Financial and output market decisions are crucial to the success or failure of an or-
ganization. These decisions are inuenced by the dynamic and competitive economic
environment in which rms operate and, in turn, a¤ect the ability of rms to meet their
debt obligations.
This thesis is constituted by three separate but interrelated essays which explore the
impact of nancial and operating decisions on the default risk. The rst two essays study
the equilibrium default probability, in a two-stage di¤erentiated product duopoly model
with uncertainty, where rms decide their nancial structure in the rst stage and their
quantities in the second stage. These two essays analyze the impact of changes in the
parameters of the model, on the equilibrium default probability (the rst essay uses com-
parative statics tools while the second uses numerical simulation). The impact of changes
in the uncertainty level, in the degree of product substitutability, in the marginal costs
and in the default cost on the nancing and output decisions and on the default risk are
analyzed. The third essay tests empirical the relationship between market structure and
capital structure decisions and their relationship with the default probability using a sam-
ple of eleven members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).
The three essays reach a coherent set of conclusions. In particular, they show that
uncertainty, market structure and default costs inuence nancial and product market de-
cisions and the probability of default. Moreover, they show that the default probability is
inuenced directly by the parameters, but it is also inuenced by the way rms optimally
adjust their nancial and product market decisions when the parameters change. There-
fore a less favorable environment does not necessarily imply higher default probability, as
rms may respond by nancing less with debt.
Keywords: Market Structure, Default Costs, Default Risk, Financial Structure, Prod-
uct Market Decisions
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Três Ensaios sobre as Diculdades
Financeiras das Empresas
Resumo
Decisões nanceiras e no mercado do produto são cruciais para o sucesso ou falência de
uma organização. Estas decisões são inuenciadas pelo ambiente econômico, dinâmico e
competitivo em que as empresas operam e, por sua vez, afetam a capacidade das empresas
cumprirem suas obrigações.
Esta tese é constituída por três ensaios distintos, mas interrelacionados que exploram
o impacto das decisões nanceiras e operacionais sobre o risco de incumprimento. Os dois
primeiros ensaios estudam a probabilidade de incumprimento de equilíbrio, num modelo
duopólio, com produtos diferenciados, com dois estágios e com incerteza, onde as em-
presas no primeiro estágio decidem a sua estrutura nanceira, e no segundo estágio as
suas quantidades. Estes dois ensaios analisam o impacto de alterações dos parâmetros
do modelo na probabilidade de incumprimento de equilíbrio (o primeiro ensaio usa ferra-
mentas de estática comparada, enquanto o segundo usa simulação numérica). É analisado
o impacto de mudanças no nível de incerteza, no grau de substituibilidade do produto,
nos custos marginais e no custo de incumprimento sobre as decisões de nanciamento e
de produção, e sobre o risco de incumprimento. O terceiro ensaio testa empíricamente a
relação entre estrutura de mercado e as decisões da estrutura de capital e a sua relação
com a probabilidade de incumprimento, utilizando uma amostra de onze membros da
Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Económico (OCDE).
Os três ensaios chegam a um conjunto coerente de conclusões. Nomeadamente, mostram
que a incerteza, a estrutura de mercado e custos de incumprimento inuenciam as decisões
nanceiras e no mercado do produto e a probabilidade de incumprimento. Além disso,
mostram que a probabilidade de incumprimento é inuenciada diretamente pelos parâmet-
ros, mas também é inuenciada pela forma como as empresas ajustam de forma ótima as
suas decisões nanceiras e no mercado do produto quando os parâmetros alteram. Por
conseguinte, um ambiente menos favorável não signica necessariamente maior probabil-
idade de incumprimento, uma vez que as empresas podem responder nanciando-se com
menos dívida.
Palavras-chave: Estrutura de mercado, Custos de incumprimento, Risco de incumpri-
mento, Estrutura de capital, Decisões no mercado do produto.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last decades, the nancial literature has addressed the issue of nancial distress
and default risk. Considering its negative social and economic impact on the economy, it
is not surprising that the existing literature has focused mainly on the best form to predict
nancial distress and default risk. However, in spite of the vast empirical literature, there
is a lack of theoretical models aimed at understanding the structural factors that inuence
the default probability. The main objective of this thesis is to make a contribution in
this direction. The thesis is divided into three separate but interrelated essays with the
common aim of understanding how the market structure, nancing decisions and product
market decisions inuence the default risk. The rst two essays are the backbone of the
thesis as they provide a theoretical framework to study the equilibrium default probability.
The conclusions derived in these two essays, are then used in the third essay, to formulate
the hypotheses which are tested empirically in this essay.
The rst two essays study a two-stage di¤erentiated product duopoly model with an
uncertainty environment, where rms decide their nancial structure in the rst stage
and their quantities in the second stage. In the rst essay we consider a very general
framework, where the demand and cost functions are not specied. In this framework, we
analyze the impact of changing the parameters of the model (level of demand uncertainty,
parameters that a¤ect both rms and rm specic parameters) on the equilibrium default
probabilities. To do this, we use analytic comparative statistics tools (in particular,
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the implicit function theorem is used throughout). This analysis is done both for the
second stage Nash equilibrium (considering the nancial structure as given but taking into
account the impact on the output market decisions) as well as for the subgame perfect
equilibrium (i.e., taking into account the impact on the nancial structure decisions as
well as on the product market decisions). We believe that both analyses are interesting
as the two e¤ects may not have the same sign and their distinction may be important
for empirical work. The results, in this essay, show that both direct and indirect e¤ects
(through changes in the equilibrium capital structure and product market decisions) need
to be considered and that, in some cases, the total impact of parameters changes on the
default risk may be counterintuitive.
The second essay explores a more specic two-stage model that assumes linear de-
mands and constant marginal production costs. A novelty in this model is that it incor-
porates default costs into the analysis, something which has been almost unexplored in
theoretical models. The literature on default costs distinguishes between direct default
costs (administrative costs and legal costs) and indirect default costs (reputation e¤ect
on prot). However, to the best of our knowledge, the indirect default costs had never
been incorporated in a theoretical model. Therefore, one of the main contributions of the
second essay is the way it models the indirect default costs. Using numerical simulations,
we then analyze the impact of changes in the level of demand uncertainty, in degree of
product substitutability, in the asymmetry between the two rms marginal production
costs and in the direct (ex-post) and indirect (ex-ante) default costs parameters on the
equilibrium default risk of the two rms. Furthermore we also analyze if the impact
of the various parameters is the same when rms have equal marginal production costs
(symmetric duopoly) and when they have di¤erent marginal costs (asymmetric duopoly).
The results in this essay conrm the importance of considering both direct and indirect
impacts (through the changes in the equilibrium nancing and output decisions) on the
default probability.
Finally, the third essay tests empirically the e¤ect of a set of variables, that appear
in theoretical studies on the subject and in the two previous essays but which have been
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rarely tested, on the capital structure decision and on the default risk. In particular, we
evaluate the impact of the demand uncertainty, the degree of market concentration and
the direct and indirect default costs. The inclusion of the indirect default cost should be
noted as, due to the di¢culty in their estimation, they were rarely considered in previous
empirical studies. Moreover, the third essay explores the e¤ect of the capital structure
on the default risk, considering that the capital structure is endogenously determined,
as shown in the rst two essays. Therefore, this essay provides important contributions
both to the literature on the determinants of the capital structure as well as to liter-
ature on the determinants of default risk. The rst contribution is the analysis of the
e¤ect of uncertainty, degree of market concentration, direct and indirect default cost on
the leverage ratio and on the default probability. The second main contribution is the
methodology used in the estimation of the default probability where debt is considered
as an endogenous variable. A nal contribution is related to the fact that the sample
includes 11 OECD countries, and we consider a year before and year after the nancial
crisis.
The remainder of the thesis is organized into four chapters. The next three chapters
correspond to three aforementioned independent essays (each essay has its own intro-
duction, main analysis, conclusion and bibliography). The nal chapter, summarizes the
main conclusions of the thesis and presents some of its limitations and suggestions for
future research.
3
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Chapter 2
Capital Structure, Product Market
Competition and Default Risk
2.1 Introduction
Bankruptcy has negative social and economic consequences which explains why many
researchers are interested in nding the best form to predict the default risk. Although
there exists a proliferation of models to predict nancial distress risk (for a survey of the
empirical literature see Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006), there is a lack of theoretical models
for explaining default probability. However, the development of theoretical models aimed
at deriving the equilibrium default probability may provide important insights and guide
future empirical work on nancial distress. The main objective of this chapter is to provide
a contribution in this direction.
The essay derives the equilibrium default probabilities in a model with an uncertain
environment where rms rst take their nancing decisions and later take their product
market decisions. In addition, we analyze the impact of changing certain parameters on
the default probabilities. This analysis is done both for the second stage Nash equilibrium
(considering the nancial structure as given but taking into account the impact on the
output market decisions) as well as for the subgame perfect equilibrium (i.e., taking into
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account the impact on the nancial structure decisions as well as on the product market
decisions). We believe that both analyses are interesting as the two e¤ects may not have
the same sign and their distinction may be important for empirical work.
The link between the nancial structure and output market decisions has been high-
lighted both on the Corporate Finance literature and on the Industrial Organization
literature.1 Brander and Lewis (1986) were the rst to examine the relationship between
nancial decisions and output market competition. They consider a two stage Cournot
duopoly model with an uncertain environment. In the rst stage, each rm decides the
capital structure. In the second stage, taking into account their previously chosen -
nancial structure, rms take their decisions in the output market.2 Brander and Lewis
(1986) conclude that debt tends to encourage a more aggressive behavior in the output
market. Thus rms have an incentive to use their nancial structure for strategic pur-
poses. Maksimovic (1988) conrms the ndings of Brander and Lewis (1986) regarding
the aggressiveness of indebted rms in the output market, which is due, according to the
authors, to the existence of limited liability.3
While Brander and Lewis (1986) present a general model, without specifying whether
1Riordan (2003) presents a critical survey that summarizes the existing literature on the interaction
between capital structure and output market. The author argues that the capital market restrictions
depend on the output market competition.
2Like Brander and Lewis (1986), we ignore the physical investment decision. This is equivalent to
assume that the investment decision is taken before the capital structure decision. If this assumption was
not made, the debt-equity mix choice would inuence the investment which would have further e¤ects on
the output market. This happens in Clayton (2009) where the investment is made to reduce the marginal
cost of production. As pointed out by Brander and Lewis (1986) one possible interpretation of the capital
structure choice is that the rm is initially equity nanced, when the loan is taken the borrowed money
is fully distributed to shareholders.
3It should be highlighted that the existing empirical work relating nancial and output market deci-
sions clearly conrms the strategic role of debt on the output market. However the sign of the impact
of greater leverage on the output market is not so clear-cut. For instance, Chevalier (1995b) examines
the impact of supermarket Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) in the product market. She concludes that the
announcement of a LBO leads to an increase in the expected prot of rival rms and to a less aggressive
behavior in the output market, a conclusion that goes against the results of Brander and Lewis (1986).
Nishihara and Shibata (2014) support this result and conclude that high leverage leads to a "competitive
disadvantage and mitigates product market competition". On the contrary, the results of Guney, Li and
Fairchild (2011) support the theory of aggressive behavior by most indebted rms. Interestingly, Campos
(2000) shows that limited liability rms which have higher short-term debt behave more aggressively in
the output market but the long-term debt has the opposite e¤ect, suggesting that the output market
reaction may depend on the type of debt. Using a sample of Indian rms, Bandyopadhyay (2005) reaches
the same conclusion.
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products are homogenous or di¤erentiated and whether uncertainty a¤ects demand or
costs, other authors have explored more specic models and analyzed the impact of
changes in parameters such as the level of uncertainty and the level of substitutabil-
ity among products, on the equilibrium output and debt levels. This type of approach
is followed by Wanzenried (2003), Franck and Le Pape (2008) and Haan and Toolsema
(2008) who analyze a two-stage di¤erentiated goods duopoly model with demand uncer-
tainty.4 Franck and Le Pape (2008) only analyze Cournot competition whereas Haan and
Toolsema (2008) use numerical analysis to study how the equilibrium is a¤ected by de-
mand uncertainty and the substitutability of products both under Cournot and Bertrand
competition.5
Our study extends Brander and Lewis (1986) by analyzing the implications of nancial
structure decisions and output market decisions on the default probability and also by
studying the impact, at a very general level, of changes in the parameters on the equilib-
rium. There are two important contributions of our work. The rst is that while Brander
and Lewis focus on the implications on the output market of nancial structure deci-
sions, our emphasis is in showing that the default risk depends both on nancial structure
and output market decisions. The second contribution is that we analyze the impact of
changes in the level of demand uncertainty, changes in parameters that are common to
the two rms (such as the average dimension of the market and the degree of product
di¤erentiation) and changes in parameters that are rm specic (such as the marginal
costs) on the equilibrium default probabilities.
It should be noted that the default risk has been addressed in the work of Franck and
Le Pape (2008) and Haan and Toolsema (2008) using numerical simulations. However,
these authors only analyzed the impact of demand uncertainty and the degree of product
4As pointed out by Franck and Le Pape (2008) and Haan and Toolsema (2008), the work of Wanzenried
(2003) has a technical mistake when, in the second stage of the game, considers the default risk as given
instead of considering the debt levels as given. In fact, the default risk depends on the output market
decisions and therefore it should be endogenously determined in the second stage of the game.
5Socorro (2007) analyzes merger protability in a Cournot oligopoly with linear and uncertain demand,
xed costs and constant marginal costs. She concludes that demand uncertainty and the limited liability
e¤ect lead merged rms to compete more aggressively and increase their prot.
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di¤erentiation on the probability of default risk in a symmetric duopoly model with linear
demands and constant marginal costs. The aim of this essay is the generalization of the
previous work by analyzing the explicit impact of parameters that a¤ect all the rms
and the impact of parameters that only a¤ect one rm. The aim is to analyze how these
parameters a¤ect the equilibrium nancial structure, the equilibrium level of output, and
the corresponding default risk.6
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we present
the model. Section 2.3 analyzes the second stage of the game. In this section we also study
how changes in the parameters inuence the equilibrium default risk in the second stage
of the game, assuming xed debt levels. The next section derives the subgame perfect
equilibrium and studies how changes in the parameters a¤ect the equilibrium nancial and
output market decisions and the equilibrium default risk. Finally, section 3.6 summarizes
the main conclusions of the study. The Appendix contains the proofs of all lemmas and
propositions.
2.2 Model
Based on the formalization presented by Brander and Lewis (1986), we consider a two
stage duopoly Cournot model.7 In the rst stage each rm (rm i and rm j) decides the
nancial structure, i.e., the level of debt and equity in the capital structure. In the second
stage each rm takes its decision in the output market. Figure 2.1 shows the timing of
the game.
Let qi and qj be the output of rms i and j, respectively and Ri(qi; qj; zi; ; i) be the
operating prot for rm i. Ri(qi; qj; zi; ; i) is dened as the di¤erence between revenue
and variable cost and depends on the random variable zi , parameter  which a¤ects both
6Most of the previously mentioned works consider quantity competition (strategic substitutes). With
regard to price competition (strategic complements) we highlight the work of Showalter (1995) and Haan
and Toolsema (2008). Showalter (1995) argues that the strategic use of debt is advantageous only if
there is uncertainty in demand. Haan and Toolsema (2008) conclude that the increase in debt leads to
an increase on equilibrium prices.
7We consider a Cournot duopoly model for the sake of simplicity. In our general context, extending
the results for n rms would be possible but complex.
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1st
2nd
3rd
4th
Figure 2.1: Timing of the game: rst nancial decisions are taken, next output decisions
are taken. Output decisions are taken before the uncertainty is resolved.
rms (such as the degree of product di¤erentiation or the average dimension of the market)
and parameter i which a¤ects only rm i (such as the rms marginal cost).8 It should
be highlighted that our formalization considers explicitly the impact of the parameters on
Ri so as to allow us to analyze the impact of changes in these parameters, an issue which
was not explored by Brander and Lewis (1986).
The random variable zi represents the uncertainty in the output market demand, i.e.,
the deviation from the average market demand (this deviation can be positive or negative).
It is assumed that this variable is distributed on the interval [ z; z] according to density
function f(zi), which we assume to be positive for all zi 2 [ z; z]. We assume that zi and
zj are independent and identically distributed.
We assume thatRi(qi; qj; zi; ; i) follows some standard proprieties: Riii(qi; qj; zi; ; i) <
0 and Riij(qi; qj; zi; ; i) < 0. Condition R
i
ii(qi; qj; zi; ; i) < 0 indicates that the mar-
ginal prot function is negatively sloped or, equivalently, the prot function of the rm
is concave on its own quantity. Condition Riij(qi; qj; zi; ; i) < 0 implies that we have
strategic substitutes, that is, when rm j increases its quantity the optimal quantity of
rm i decreases. In addition, we assume that Rizi > 0 and R
i
izi
> 0. The assumption
Rizi > 0 means that high values of zi contribute to higher operating prot. That is, higher
values of zi correspond to better states of the world. Condition Riizi > 0 indicates that
8We could consider a more general formalization where  and i are vectors of parameters. However
the qualitative results would be the same and thus, to simplify notation, we consider the case where 
and i are scalars.
9
the marginal prot is higher in better states of the world. The two last assumptions are
consistent with considering zi as the deviation from the average market demand, where
higher values of zi correspond to higher demand.
In the rst stage of the game each rm chooses the nancial structure that maximizes
the value of the rm, taking into account that this choice will a¤ect the equilibrium in the
second stage of the game. While the nancial structure choice is done so as to maximize
the sum of the equity value and the debt value, the quantity choice in the second stage
of the game is done so as to maximize the expected value of equity.9
In order to nd the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game we solve the game
backwards. We start by computing the Nash equilibrium of the second stage game as a
function of the debt level chosen by the rms in the rst stage. Next we solve the rst
stage game. In this stage rms take their nancing decisions considering their impact on
the output market equilibrium.
To better follow the model resolution, table 2.1 summarizes the variables used.
2.3 Nash equilibrium in the second stage game
This section examines the second stage of the game, considering the debt levels Di and
Dj chosen by the rms in the rst stage of the game. In the second stage of the game,
each rm chooses the output level that maximizes the expected value of the rm to the
shareholders. We start by analyzing the equilibrium in the output market and investigate
how the output market decisions change with the debt levels Di and Dj chosen by the
rms in the rst stage of the game as well as with changes on the parameters of the
model. Next, we determine the second stage equilibrium default probabilities and again
investigate how they change with the debt levels Di and Dj chosen by the rms in the
9It is assumed that appropriate incentive schemes guarantee that management acts so as to maximize
shareholderss value.
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Table 2.1: Variables of the model
Variables Meaning
qi; qj Output of rms i and j
Di; Dj Debt obligation of rms i and j
Ri Operating prots of rm i
Rii Marginal operating prots of rm i
zi Random variable that represents the uncertaintybzi Critical value of zi
i Parameter which a¤ect only rm i
i; j Default probability of rms i and j
 Parameter which a¤ect both rms
Y i; Y j Firm value of rms i and j
V i; V j Expected equity value of rms i and j
W i;W j Expected value of debt of rms i and j
Wel Welfare
rst stage of the game as well as with changes in the uncertainty level and the other
parameters of the model.
2.3.1 Output Market Equilibrium
In the second stage of the game the manager maximizes the expected equity value which
is given by:
V i(qi; qj; Di;z; ; i) =
zZ
bzi(qi;qj;Di;;i)
(Ri(qi; qj; zi; ; i) Di)f(zi)dzi (2.1)
where Di represents the debt obligation of rm i, and bzi(qi;qj;Di;; i) is the critical value
of zi such that the operating prot of rm i is just enough for the rm to meet its debt
obligations. This critical state of the world is implicitly dened by:
Ri(qi; qj; bzi; ; i) Di = 0 for   z  bzi  z: (2.2)
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Hence V i(qi; qj; Di;z; ; i) corresponds to expected prot net of debt obligations in
good states of the world (zi  bzi). In bad states of the world, zi < bzi, shareholders earn
zero as all operating prot is paid to debtholders.10 The existence of limited liability
means that, if there are nancial di¢culties, only the assets and their returns, will serve
as collateral for the debt fulllment. So, when we are dealing with the bad states of
nature, equityholders will not receive any income, but they do not have to pay their debt
obligations with personal property.
Brander and Lewis (1986) showed that the critical state of nature, bzi, is increasing with
rm is debt, Di, and with rm js quantity, qj. Moreover, the critical state of nature, bzi,
is increasing with qi if and only if Rii(bzi) < 0 (which holds under our assumptions as we
will show later).
Similarly, it is useful to determine how the critical state of nature, bzi, changes with
parameters  and i:
Lemma 2.1 The impact of  and i on bzi has the opposite sign of Ri(bzi) and Rii(bzi),
respectively.
Consider, for instance, the impact of an increase in the marginal costs of rm i. Since
increasing the marginal costs has a negative impact on rm is prot in all states of nature,
Rii < 0. By the previous lemma, this implies that the critical state of nature increases,
which means that there are fewer states of nature where the rm is able to meet its debt
obligations.
The optimal output for rm i is given by the rst order condition that the partial
derivative of V i with respect to qi is equal to zero. By Leibniz rule this is equal to:
V ii (qi; qj; Di;z; ; i) =
zZ
bzi(qi;qj;Di;;i)
Rii(qi; qj; zi; ; i)f(zi)dzi (R
i(qi; qj; bzi; ; i) Di)f(bzi)@bzi
@qi
= 0
10If condition (2.2) does not hold for any  z  bzi  z that means that either the rm is always able
to meet its debt obligations or that it is never able to do so, which is equivalent to consider bzi =  z orbzi = z, respectively. In the remaining of the paper we focus on the case where the critical state is in the
interior of [ z; z].
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Where V ii denotes the partial derivative of V
i with respect to qi. However, by denition
of bzi, the second term is equal to zero. Thus the rst order condition is given by:
V ii (qi; qj; Di;z; ; i) =
zZ
bzi(qi;qj;Di;;i)
Rii(qi; qj; zi; ; i)f(zi)dzi = 0 (2.3)
It should be noted that the previous condition takes into account the endogeneity ofbzi which depends on the quantities chosen by the two rms. Condition (2.3) tells us that,
the optimal quantity is such that the expected marginal prot in good states of the world
is equal to zero. Note that since Riizi > 0, marginal prot (R
i
i) is increasing with zi, thus
marginal prot is negative at bzi but positive at z. Figure 2.2 shows the expected marginal
prot in good states of the world for the optimal quantity.
ziz
R
i
i
zi
^
Figure 2.2: Marginal prot of rm i in good states of the world when Riizi > 0. For the
optimal quantity, the expected marginal prot in good states of the world is equal to zero
(the area with negative marginal prot is equal to the area with positive marginal prot).
The second order conditions are satised if (using Leibniz rule again):
V iii =
zZ
bzi
Riii(qi; qj; zi; ; i)f(zi)dzi  R
i
i(qi; qj; bzi; ; i)f(bzi)@bzi@qi < 0
It should be noted that, under the assumption thatRiizi > 0, the term R
i
i(qi; qj; bzi; ; i)f(bzi)@bzi@qi
is positive since Rii(bzi) < 0 and @bzi@qi =   Rii(bzi)Rizi (bzi) > 0. This implies that the previous con-
dition is harder to satisfy than in traditional games where imposing the concavity of the
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prot function is enough. In what follows we assume V iii < 0. In addition we assume that
V iij < 0, which means that quantities are strategic substitutes. Finally we assume that
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji > 0, which guarantees that the Nash equilibrium of the quantities game is
unique.
The Nash equilibrium is given by the solution of the system of rst order conditions:
8<: V ii (qi; qj; Di;z; ; i) = 0V jj (qi; qj; Dj;z; ; ;j) = 0 ,
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
zZ
bzi(qi;qj;Di;;i)
Rii(qi; qj; zi; ; i)f(zi)dzi = 0
zZ
bzj(qi;qj;Dj;;j)
R
j
j(qi; qj; zj; ;j)f(zj)dzj = 0
(2.4)
where bzi and bzj are implicitly dened byRi(qi; qj; bzi; ; i) Di = 0 andRj(qi; qj; bzj; ;j) 
Dj = 0, respectively. Let qi (Di;Dj; ; i; j; z) and q

j (Di;Dj; ; i; j; z) be the solution
of this system. In other words, qi and q

j are the equilibrium quantities in the output
market.
Brander and Lewis (1986) analyzed the change in the equilibrium quantities when
there is a unilateral increase in rm i0s debt, Di. They proved that when Riizi > 0, a
unilateral increase in rm i0s debt, Di, leads to an increase in the equilibrium quantity of
rm i, qi , and to a decrease in the equilibrium quantity of rm j, q

j . This means that debt
nancing leads the rm to behave more aggressively in the output market. Intuitively,
when a rm has a higher debt level, the rm will be able to repay its obligations in a
smaller set of states of the world (bzi increases). Since equityholders only care about good
states of the world, zi > bzi, an increase in the rms debt increases the expected marginal
prots conditional on zi > bzi, which leads to an increase in the optimal quantity. A
graphical explanation for this result is given by gure 2.3.
It is also interesting to know how the equilibrium quantities change when the level of
uncertainty (measured by z) increases or with changes in parameters  and i, for given
levels of Di and Dj. This analysis was not done by Brander and Lewis (1986). However it
is helpful to have a more complete characterization of the output market decisions when
14
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Figure 2.3: When Di increases, bzi increases, which increases the expected marginal equity
of rm i (grey area on left panel), leading to an increase in rm i optimal quantity. This
implies that the best response function of rm i shifts to the right. Thus, qi increases
and qj decreases.
the nancial structure is xed.
Let us start by analyzing the impact of changes in the level of uncertainty. One inter-
pretation of this exercise, would be to consider a change in the uncertainty level occurring
after the rst period nancing decisions were taken but before the output decisions.
Lemma 2.2 If Riizi > 0, for xed debt levels, an increase in the level of uncertainty, z,
causes an increase in rm is equilibrium quantity, qi , if and only if V
j
jjV
i
iz   V
i
ijV
j
jz < 0.
Moreover, if rms are symmetric
 
V iiz = V
j
jz

an increase in the level of uncertainty leads
to an increase in the symmetric Nash equilibrium quantities.
This means that when rms are symmetric, for xed debt values, the higher is the
level of uncertainty, the more aggressive will rms be in the output market. Intuitively,
the increase in the uncertainty level implies that there are more good states with positive
marginal prot, thus the expected marginal prot conditional on zi > bzi increases, hence
it is optimal to produce a higher quantity (note that increasing z also means that there are
states of the world with more negative marginal prot, but equityholders do no care about
these states of the world, unless the rm is all equity nanced). Figure 2.4 illustrates the
impact of increasing the uncertainty level on the expected marginal equity.
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Figure 2.4: When z increases there is an increase in the expected marginal equity (area
in grey), which leads to an increase in the optimal quantity. This implies that the best
response functions of the two rms shift to the right when z increases.
Let us now study the impact of changes in parameters that a¤ect the two rms on the
output market equilibrium, for given Di and Dj.
Lemma 2.3 If Riizi > 0, for xed debt levels, an increase in the common parame-
ter , causes a change in rm is equilibrium quantity, qi , with the opposite sign of 
V
j
jjV
i
i   V
i
ijV
j
j

. Moreover, if rms are symmetric and V jjj < V
i
ij,
@qi
@
has the same sign
as V ii. Thus q

i increases if and only if the expected marginal equity value is increasing
with . The sign of V ii is ambiguous if  a¤ects in the same direction the prot and the
marginal prot, i.e., if Ri and R
i
i have the same sign. If R
i
 and R
i
i have opposite signs,
the sign of V ii is the same as the sign of R
i
i.
This result tells us that, when rms are symmetric, the impact of increasing  on rm i
equilibrium quantity depends on the way  inuences the expected marginal equity value,
i.e. depends on V ii, which is given by (see the proof of Lemma 2.3 in the appendix):
V ii =
zZ
bzi
Riif(zi)dzi +R
i
i(bzi)Ri(bzi)Rizi(bzi)f(bzi) (2.5)
Thus the sign of V ii depends both on the e¤ect of  on prot, R
i
, and the impact
of  on marginal prot Rii. If R
i
 and R
i
i have the same sign, the two terms in (2.5)
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have opposite signs since Rii(bzi) < 0. Thus, if Ri and Rii have the same sign, V ii has an
ambiguous sign. It should be noted that this is the most natural case. For instance, if
 is the average dimension of the market, in a model with linear demands, increases in
 lead to higher prot and to higher marginal prot, thus, Rii > 0 and R
i
 > 0. Since
Rii(bzi) < 0, the second term in (2.5) is negative while the rst is positive. Thus the sign of
V ii depends on which of these two e¤ects dominates. Figure 2.5 illustrates the two e¤ects
of changing  on the expected marginal prot, conditional on zi > bzi, when Rii > 0 and
Ri > 0. The rst e¤ect is represented in light grey, while the second e¤ect is represented
in dark grey. In the gure the rst e¤ect dominates (area in light grey is larger than area
in dark grey). Thus, in the case illustrated in the gure, an increase in  leads to an
increase in the equilibrium quantity levels.
It is interesting to explore a little bit further the two e¤ects when Rii and R
i
 have the
same sign. For a rm without debt, only the rst e¤ect is present and thus, when Rii > 0;
the optimal quantity increases. For an indebted rm, the equityholders only care about
good states of nature and consequently the rst e¤ect has a smaller magnitude. Moreover
the second term is negative, which implies that the impact of  is always lower for an
indebted rm than for a rm without debt. In addition, when the second e¤ect dominates,
the impact of changes in  on the equilibrium quantities is precisely the opposite of what
happens in standard oligopoly models. The second e¤ect is more likely to dominate when
the parameter changes have a big impact on the rm prot (Ri is larger) and when
uncertainty is higher (Rii(bzi) has a larger absolute value).
Finally, let us determine the change on the equilibrium quantities with changes in i.
Lemma 2.4 If Riizi > 0, for xed debt levels, an increase in rm is parameter i, causes
a change on rm is equilibrium quantity, qi , with the same sign as V
i
ii
and a change on
qj with the opposite sign of V
i
ii
. Thus qi increases (and q

j decreases) if and only if the
expected marginal equity value is increasing with i. The sign of V
i
ii
is ambiguous if i
a¤ects in the same direction the prot and the marginal prot, i.e., if Rii and R
i
ii
have
the same sign. If Rii and R
i
ii
have opposite signs, the sign of V iii is the same as the
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Figure 2.5: The impact of an increase in  on the expected marginal equity when Rii > 0
and Ri > 0. Since R
i
i > 0, an increase in  increases the expected marginal equity
(area in light grey). Since Ri > 0, bzi decreases, which leads to a decrease in the expected
marginal equity (area in dark grey).
sign of Riii.
The previous results implies that a change in rm is parameter, i, always has impacts
with opposite signs on qi and q

j .
One example where the previous results applies is when i is the marginal cost of rm
i. In this case, prot and marginal prot are both decreasing with the rms marginal cost.
Thus the impact of a change in marginal cost in the rm own production is ambiguous. On
the one hand the fact that expected marginal prot in good states of the world becomes
lower when the marginal cost increases, tends to decrease the optimal quantity. On the
other hand an increase in the marginal costs decreases the prot in all the states of the
world and thus it increases the critical state of nature bzi, which leads to a more aggressive
behavior by the rm. If the last e¤ect dominates, an increase in the marginal costs of rm
i leads to a higher qi (this case is illustrated in gure 2.6), which is the opposite of what
happens in standard oligopoly model where the limited liability e¤ect is not considered.
2.3.2 Equilibrium default probabilities
In this subsection we analyze the equilibrium default probabilities in the second stage of
the game and how they change with the nancial structure chosen in the rst stage of the
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Figure 2.6: Impact of an increase in i on the expected marginal equity when Rii < 0
and Riii < 0. Since R
i
ii
< 0, an increase in i decreases expected marginal equity (area
in light grey). Since Rii < 0, bzi increases, which leads to an increase in the expected
marginal equity (area in dark grey).
z D Di i j* ( , )
f z( )i
−z z^
Default
Probability
Figure 2.7: Equilibrium default probability for rm i considering the debt levels, Di and
Dj, chosen in the rst stage.
game, with the level of uncertainty and with common and rm specic parameters.
The default probability of rm i (illustrated in gure 2.7) is given by (for rm j
computations would be similar):
Pr
 
Ri(qi;qj;Di;; i) < Di

= Pr (zi < bzi) = bzi(qi;qj;Di;;i)Z
 z
f(zi)dzi = F (bzi(qi;qj;Di;; i))
where F (zi) is the cumulative density function. Thus, to compute the equilibrium default
probability one needs to know the equilibrium critical state of nature, bzi. To obtain bzi
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we just need to substitute the Nash equilibrium quantities in bzi(qi;qj;Di;; i):
bzi (Di;Dj; ; i; j; z) = bzi(qi (Di;Dj; ; i; j; z); qj (Di;Dj; ; i; j; z); Di; ; i) (2.6)
Consequently, the equilibrium default probability is given by:
(Di;Dj; ; i; j; z) = Pr(zi < bzi ) =
bzi (Di;Dj ;;i;j ;z)Z
 z
f(zi)dzi = F (bzi (Di;Dj; ; i; j; z))
Note that since F (zi) is increasing, the default probability is increasing with the equilib-
rium critical state of nature. Let us now analyze how this probability changes with Di
and Dj:
Proposition 2.5 If Riizi > 0, an increase in rm is debt, Di, causes an increase in the
equilibrium default probability of rm i, i , if and only if
 
Rii(bzi)V jjj  Rij(bzi)V jjiV iiDi +
V iiiV
j
jj V
i
ijV
j
ji > 0. Moreover, a su¢cient condition for
@i
@Di
to be positive is that Rii(bzi)V jjj 
Rij(bzi)V jji > 0. Finally, an increase in Dj causes an increase in i if and only if Rij(bzi)V iii >
Rii(bzi)V iij.
The previous result indicates that the e¤ect of changes in the debt level of a rm on the
equilibrium default probabilities is ambiguous. The intuition is that an increase in Di has
opposite e¤ects on the two rms equilibrium quantities as qi increases but q

j decreases,
which in turn have opposite e¤ects on the equilibrium default probability. However, the
sign of @

i
@Di
is very likely to be positive as a debt increase has a positive direct e¤ect on
the default probability and the impact of Di on the own rms quantity is expected to
have a larger magnitude than the impact of Di on the rivals quantity (this last e¤ect
is captured in the su¢cient condition, Rii(bzi)V jjj   Rij(bzi)V jji > 0). Thus, under standard
assumptions, when a rm increases its debt, its default probability increases.
The sign of @

i
@Dj
is harder to determine. In this case, there is no direct impact, so
everything depends on how Dj changes the equilibrium quantities, qj and q

i , and how
that a¤ects bzi. When Dj increases, rm j becomes more aggressive in the output market
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(produces more) whereas rm i becomes more conservative (produces less). The fact that
j increases its quantity implies a lower prot for rm i in every state of nature, thus
increasing the probability of default of rm i. However, rm i optimal response is to
produce less, which lowers its probability of default. Consequently, the impact of Dj on
i is ambiguous.
The sign of @

i
@Dj
depends on the marginal prots in the critical state of the world
(which depends on the level of uncertainty and rm i level of debt). In particular, for
small levels of uncertainty and/or large levels of debt, Rii(bzi) is close to zero, thus it is
very likely that Rij(bzi)V iii > Rii(bzi)V iij, in which case @i@Dj is positive. On the other hand,
for large levels of uncertainty and/or low levels of debt, jRii(bzi)j might be large enough to
imply that Rii(bzi)V iij > Rij(bzi)V iii and thus @i@Dj may be negative.
One can also analyze the impact of changes in the level of uncertainty (measured by z)
and the impact of changes in parameters  and i on the equilibrium default probabilities.
Proposition 2.6 If Riizi > 0 and rms are symmetric, for xed debt levels, an increase
in the level of uncertainty, z, causes an increase in the symmetric equilibrium default
probabilities.
This means that, for xed debt levels, if there is an increase in the level of uncertainty,
the default probability increases. The reason is that, in the second stage of the game,
rms behave more aggressively when uncertainty is higher, i.e., equilibrium quantities
are higher. This leads to an increase in the critical state of nature which consequently
increases the default probability.
Proposition 2.7 If Riizi > 0; for xed debt levels, an increase in the common parameter
, causes an increase in the equilibrium default probability of rm i, i ; if and only if
Rii(bzi)  V jjjV ii   V iijV jj + Rij(bzi)  V iiiV jj   V jjiV ii   Ri  V iiiV jjj   V iijV jji > 0. The impact
of  on i is ambiguous if R
i
 and R
i
i have the same sign. If R
i
 and R
i
i have opposite
signs the impact of  on i has the same sign as R
i
i.
Intuitively, when we analyze the impact of  on the equilibrium default probability
we need to consider both the direct impact of  on the critical state of nature, and the
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indirect e¤ects through the changes in the equilibrium quantities. The sign of the direct
e¤ect is straightforward: if  has a positive impact on prots, then this means that the
rm will be able to repay its debt for worse states of the world, bzi decreases, which leads
to a decrease in the default probability. However, since for most parameters the impact
on the prot and the impact on the marginal prot have the same sign, the indirect e¤ect
is ambiguous, as the e¤ect of  on the equilibrium quantities is ambiguous. Thus, the
total e¤ect of increasing  on the default probability is, in general, ambiguous.
Proposition 2.8 If Riizi > 0, for xed debt levels, an increase in rm is parameter
i causes an increase in the equilibrium default probability of rm i, 

i , if and only if
Rii(bzi)V jjjV iii  Rij(bzi)V jjiV iii  Rii  V iiiV jjj   V iijV jji > 0.
Like before, in order to analyze the impact of changes in i on the rms default
probability, we need to consider both the direct e¤ect of i on 

i and indirect e¤ects
through the equilibrium quantities. Since the indirect e¤ect has an ambiguous sign, the
impact of changing i on the rms default probability is, in general, ambiguous. However,
since i has opposite e¤ects on qi and q

j , it seems quite likely that the direct e¤ect
dominates as the two e¤ects through the equilibrium quantities tend to cancel each other.
If the direct e¤ect dominates the indirect e¤ects and parameter i inuences positively
the prot of rm i, Rii > 0, then an increase in i leads to a decrease in the default
probability i .
2.4 Subgame perfect equilibrium
2.4.1 Equilibrium debt levels
In the rst stage rms choose simultaneously their debt levels so as to maximize the value
of the rm. The value of the rm Y i(qi; qj; Di;z; ; i); is equal to the sum of the equity
value V i(qi; qj; Di;z; ; i) and the debt valueW i(qi; qj; Di;z; ; i), where the equity value
is dened by (2.1) and the debt value is equal:
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W i(qi; qj; Di;z; ; i) =
bzi(qi;qj;Di;;i)Z
 z
Ri(qi; qj; zi; ; i)f(zi)dzi + (1  F (bzi))Di
The rst term is the value that creditors receive in the worst states of the world (where
expected operating prot is not su¢cient to meet debt obligations). The second term is
the amount received in the good states of the world, zi > bzi.
Considering the equity and debt values, it is easy to show that the value of the rm
is equal to its expected operating prots:
Y i(qi; qj; Di;z; ; i) = V
i(qi; qj; Di;z; ; i) +W
i(qi; qj; Di;z; ; i)
=
zZ
bzi(qi;qj;Di;;i)
(Ri(qi; qj; zi; ; i) Di)f(zi)dzi +
bzi(qi;qj;Di;;i)Z
 z
Ri(qi; qj; zi; ; i)f(zi)dzi + (1  F (bzi))Di
=
zZ
 z
Ri(qi; qj; zi; ; i)f(zi)dzi
Taking into account the second stage Nash equilibrium, rm i chooses Di so as to
maximize the total value of the rm.
max
Di
zZ
 z
Ri(qi (Di;Dj; ) ; q

j (Di;Dj; ) ; )f(zi)dzi
The rst order condition, Y iDi = 0, is:
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24 zZ
 z
Rii(q

i (Di;Dj; ) ; q

j (Di;Dj; ) ; )f(zi)dzi
35 @qi
@Di
+
24 zZ
 z
Rij(q

i (Di;Dj; ) ; q

j (Di;Dj; ) ; )f(zi)dzi
35 @qj
@Di
= 0
which can also be written as:
Y iDi =
24 bziZ
 z
Rii(q

i (Di;Dj; ) ; q

j (Di;Dj; ) ; )f(zi)dzi
35 @qi
@Di
+
24 zZ
bzi
Rii(q

i (Di;Dj; ) ; q

j (Di;Dj; ) ; )f(zi)dzi
35 @qi
@Di
+
24 zZ
 z
Rij(q

i (Di;Dj; ) ; q

j (Di;Dj; ) ; )f(zi)dzi
35 @qj
@Di
= 0
By the rst order condition of the second stage game, the second term is equal to zero. The
rst term captures the impact of the second stage induced change in qi on the rms debt
value. Assuming Riizi > 0, R
i
i(z) is increasing and we already know that R
i
i(bz) < 0, hence
Rii(z) < 0 for all z < bz, which implies that the rst term is negative (since @qi@Di > 0).
A higher Di induces rm i to choose higher quantity levels in the second stage of the
game, which hurts debtholders. The third term is the strategic e¤ect of debt. When rm
i increases its debt that induces rm j to reduce its output in the second stage game,
@qj
@Di
< 0 . The reduction in qj benets rm i as R
i
j < 0. Thus, the strategic e¤ect is
positive.
To summarize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) debt choices are the
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solution of the system:
8<: Y iDi = 0Y jDj = 0 ,
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
24 bziZ
 z
Rii(q

i ; q

j ; )f(zi)dzi
35 @qi
@Di
+
24 zZ
 z
Rij(q

i ; q

j ; )f(zi)dzi
35 @qj
@Di
= 0264 bzjZ
 z
R
j
j(q

i ; q

j ; )f(zj)dzj
375 @qj@Dj +
24 zZ
 z
R
j
i (q

i ; q

j ; )f(zj)dzj
35 @qi
@Dj
= 0
(2.7)
In order to have a well behaved game, we assume that Y iDiDi < 0 (that is the rms
value function is concave in Di, which implies that the point that satises the rst or-
der condition is a maximum), that Y iDiDj < 0 and Y
i
DiDi
Y
j
DjDj
  Y iDiDjY
j
DjDi
> 0. Let
Di (z; ; i; j) and D

j (z; ; i; j) be the solution of this system.
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Brander and Lewis (1986) showed that, in the subgame perfect equilibrium, rms
choose a positive level of debt. In other words, Di and D

j , are strictly positive.
Let us now analyze the impact of changes in the parameters z,  and i on the SPNE.
We start by analyzing the impact of changes in the uncertainty level:
Lemma 2.9 If Riizi > 0 and rms are symmetric, an increase in the level of uncertainty,
z, causes a change on rm i equilibrium debt level, Di , with the same sign as Y
i
Diz
. Thus
Di increases if and only if the rms marginal value (with respect to its debt) is increasing
with z. The sign of Y iDiz is ambiguous.
It should be highlighted that, although in our general framework one cannot say
whether the equilibrium debt levels are decreasing or increasing with the uncertainty level,
in the linear demand case, with constant marginal costs, and z uniformly distributed, it
has been shown that the equilibrium debt levels are decreasing with the uncertainty level
(Franck and Le Pape, 2008; Haan and Toolsema, 2008). Intuitively, when the uncertainty
level increases, for given debt levels, rms tend to be more aggressive in the output market,
as expected demand conditional on zi > bzi is higher. Considering this, rms can get the
11We use two stars (**) to denote the subgame perfect equilibrium variables levels so as to distinguish
from the notation used for the second stage Nash equilibrium.
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same strategic e¤ect with a lower level of debt. Therefore rms act in a more conservative
manner in the debt market when uncertainty increases.
Let us now study the impact of changes in the common parameter, ; on the SPNE.
Lemma 2.10 If Riizi > 0 and rms are symmetric, an increase in the common parameter
, causes a change on the equilibrium debt level, Di , with the same sign as Y
i
Di
. Thus
Di increases if and only if the rms marginal value of debt increases with . The sign
of Y iDi is ambiguous.
For many common parameters, such as the average dimension of the market, the
impact of the parameter on prots and on marginal prots are likely to have the same sign.
Thus the parameter has an ambiguous inuence on the second period market equilibrium,
which in turn implies that the impact on the equilibrium debt levels is also ambiguous.
However it should be noted that the impact on the equilibrium debt levels is also inuenced
by the way the parameter a¤ects the rm marginal prot, Rii, as well as the way it
inuences the marginal e¤ect of the rival quantity, Rij. An increase in a parameter
with a positive impact on the marginal prots (like the average dimension of the market)
is quite likely to lead to higher equilibrium debt levels due to the direct impact of the
parameter on the marginal prots of the rm.
Lemma 2.11 If Riizi > 0, an increase in rm is parameter i causes a change on the
rm is equilibrium debt level, Di , with the same sign as Y
i
Dii
and a change on Dj with
the opposite sign of Y iDii. The sign of Y
i
Dii
is ambiguous.
One important feature of the impact of changes in rm is specic parameter, i, is
that the impact on the equilibrium debt level of the rm has always the opposite sign
of the impact on the equilibrium debt level of the rival rm. In the most likely case,
where parameter i a¤ects in the same direction the prot and the marginal prot of the
rm, the impact of changes of i on the second period market equilibrium quantities is
ambiguous, which also leads to an ambiguous impact of the parameter on the equilibrium
debt levels. However the way the parameter a¤ects the marginal prots is quite important
26
to determine the e¤ect on Di . An increase in a parameter with a negative impact on
the marginal prots (like the marginal cost of the rm) is quite likely to lead to a lower
equilibrium debt level by the rm and to a higher equilibrium debt level by the rival. Thus,
it seems likely that a less e¢cient rm (higher marginal cost) to be more conservative in
the debt market (having a smaller equilibrium debt level).
2.4.2 SPNE default probabilities
Considering the SPNE, the equilibrium critical state of nature, bzi , can be obtained by
substituting Di (z; ; i; j) and D

j (z; ; i; j) and the corresponding SPNE quantities
in bzi(qi;qj;Di;; i)
bzi (; i; j; z) = bzi(qi (Di ; Dj ; ; i; j; z); qj (Di ; Dj ; ; i; j; z); Di ; ; i) (2.8)
Consequently, the equilibrium default probability is given by:
(; i; j; z) = Pr(zi < bzi ) =
bzi (;i;j ;z)Z
 z
f(zi)dzi = F (bzi (; i; j; z))
Let us analyze the impact of changes in the level of uncertainty z and the impact
of changes in the parameters  and i on the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium default
probabilities.
Proposition 2.12 If Riizi > 0 and rms are symmetric, an increase in the level of un-
certainty, z, has an ambiguous e¤ect on the equilibrium default probability of rm i, i .
The impact of the uncertainty level on the default probability can be decomposed
on the impact of the uncertainty level on the second period market equilibrium and
the impact on the equilibrium debt levels, which in turn inuence the second period
equilibrium and the default probabilities. By proposition 2.8 the rst e¤ect is positive
whereas by lemma 2.9 the second e¤ect is ambiguous, which explains the previous result.
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It is interesting to notice that if @D

i
@z
< 0, the impact of z on the default probability
may be negative.12 The fact that there is larger uncertainty leads rms to behave in
a more aggressive manner in the output market for xed debt levels. This e¤ect tends
to increase the default probability. However, the greater uncertainty may lead rms to
be more conservative in the debt market, thus issuing less debt. A lower debt, lowers
the default probability directly and indirectly, through its inuence on the second period
equilibrium quantities. As a consequence we may obtain a counterintuitive result where
more uncertainty leads to lower equilibrium default probabilities. This result is explained
by the fact that, rms behave less aggressively in the debt market when uncertainty is
higher, which leads to lower equilibrium default probabilities.
Similarly, in our general framework we cannot determine the sign of the impact of 
and i on the equilibrium default probability.
Proposition 2.13 If Riizi > 0, an increase in  has an ambiguous e¤ect on the equilib-
rium default probability of rm i, i . Similarly, an increase in i has an ambiguous e¤ect
on the equilibrium default probability of rm i, i .
Although we are unable to determine the sign of the e¤ects of changes in  and i
on the equilibrium default probabilities, we would like to emphasize the possibility of
having counterintuitive results. For instance, a rm with higher marginal costs, for xed
debt and quantities, has a higher probability of default, as prot decreases for all states
of nature, which increases the critical state of nature and thus the default probability.
However a less e¢cient rm may also have an incentive to issue less debt in equilibrium,
which leads to a less aggressive behavior in the output market and, eventually to a lower
default probability.
12In the linear demand case, with symmetric rms and constant marginal costs, it has been shown
numerically by Frank and Le Pape (2008) and Haan and Toolsema (2008) that increasing uncertainty
decreases the equilibrium default probability.
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2.5 Conclusion
This essay extends Brander and Lewis (1986) by analyzing the implications of nancial
structure decisions and output market decisions on the default probability and also by
studying the impact of changes in the parameters of the model on the equilibrium. This
analysis is done both for the second stage Nash equilibrium (considering the nancial
structure as given but taking into account the impact on the output market decisions) as
well as for the subgame perfect equilibrium (i.e., taking into account the impact on the
nancial structure decisions as well as on the product market decisions).
By analyzing the second stage of the game we conclude that, under quite reasonable
conditions, increasing the level of demand uncertain has a positive e¤ect on the equilibrium
quantities; i.e., rms behave in a more aggressive way in the output market. In addition,
the impact of changing either common parameters or rm specic parameters on the
equilibrium quantities, for xed debt levels, is generally ambiguous and it depends on
how the parameter a¤ects both the prot and the marginal prot. Moreover, changing a
rm specic parameter always has e¤ects with opposite signs on the rm and the rivals
equilibrium quantities.
The analysis of the impact of changes in the model parameters on the second stage
equilibrium quantities revealed the possibility of some non-standard results. For instance,
it is possible that an increase in the marginal costs, for xed debt levels, leads to an
increase on the rms equilibrium quantity, which is the opposite of what happens in
standard oligopoly models where the limited liability e¤ect is not considered. The intuition
is that higher marginal costs imply that the set of states of the world where the rm is
able to repay its debt becomes smaller, which leads the rm to behave in a more aggressive
manner in order to maximize the expected equity value.
The analysis of the second stage equilibrium default probabilities also reveals some
interesting conclusions. First, the e¤ect of changes in the debt level of a rm on its equi-
librium default probability is very likely to be positive. This happens because increasing
debt has a positive direct e¤ect on the rm default probability and the positive indirect
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impact through the increase in the rms quantity is likely to outweigh the negative indi-
rect impact through the decrease in the rivals quantity. Second, the e¤ect of increasing
the debt level of a rm on the equilibrium default probability of the rival rm is ambigu-
ous. The intuition is that an increase in a rms debt has opposite e¤ects on the two
rms equilibrium quantities, which in turn have opposite e¤ects on the rivals equilibrium
default probability. Third, we show that increasing the level of demand uncertainty, for
xed debt levels, implies higher default probabilities as rms become more aggressive in
the output market. Finally, the impact of changes in the common parameter as well as
in the rm specic parameter on the default probabilities is generally ambiguous.
Considering our general framework, the sign of the impact of changes of the parameter
values on the subgame perfect equilibrium debt values and default probabilities cannot
be determined, which is a somewhat disappointing result. However the direct impact of
the parameter on the default probability and the indirect impact of the parameter on
the default probabilities through the equilibrium debt levels and the equilibrium quantity
levels may not all have the same sign. Consequently, one may obtain unexpected results,
when the indirect e¤ects outweigh the direct e¤ect. For instance, a less e¢cient rm may
have a lower probability of default than a more e¢cient one or default probabilities may
be lower in markets with higher uncertainty. Intuitively, although higher marginal costs
or higher uncertainty imply higher default risk, for xed debt and quantity levels, the rm
may have an incentive to decrease its debt level, which leads to less aggressive behavior
in the output market and a lower default probability.
In order to have a more complete analysis of the equilibrium default probabilities it
would be very interesting to extend the current model so as to incorporate default costs
as well as the impact of taxes on the analysis. We believe these extensions would provide
important insights for empirical work on default risk.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Applying the implicit function theorem to (2.2) we get:
@bzi
@
=  
Ri(bzi)
Rizi(bzi) ;
@bzi
@i
=  
Rii(bzi)
Rizi(bzi) :
Since Rizi > 0,
@bzi
@
and @bzi
@i
have the opposite signs of Ri(bzi) and Rii(bzi), respectively.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Applying the implicit function theorem to the system of
equations (2.4) that dene the Nash equilibrium, we get:
24 @qi@z
@qj
@z
35 =  
24 V iii V iij
V
j
ji V
j
jj
35 1 24 V iiz
V
j
jz
35
which is equivalent to:24 @qi@z
@qj
@z
35 =   1
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
24 V jjjV iiz   V iijV jjz
 V jjiV
i
iz + V
i
iiV
j
jz
35
Thus the sign of @q

i
@z
is:
sign

@qi
@z

= sign
 
 
V
j
jjV
i
iz   V
i
ijV
j
jz
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
!
We already assumed that V iiiV
j
jj V
i
ijV
j
ji > 0. Thus
@qi
@z
> 0 if and only if V jjjV
i
iz V
i
ijV
j
jz < 0,
which shows the rst part of the result.
If we consider a symmetric game and restrict our attention to symmetric Nash equi-
libria, we have V iiz = V
j
jz. Moreover if V
j
jj < V
i
ij the sign of
@qi
@z
is equal to the sign of
V iiz. However, in a symmetric equilibrium, V
i
iiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji > 0 implies that V
j
jj < V
i
ij, thus
the sign of @q

i
@z
is equal to the sign of V iiz. Looking at the V
i
i function, we see that z only
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appears in the upper integration limit. Thus, by Leibniz rule:
V iiz = R
i
i(qi; qj; z; ; i)f(z)
Since Riizi > 0, marginal prot (R
i
i) is positive at z. Hence V
i
iz is positive and consequently
@qi
@z
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Once again, if we apply the implicit function theorem to
(2.4), we get 24 @qi@
@qj
@
35 =  
24 V iii V iij
V
j
ji V
j
jj
35 1 24 V ii
V
j
j
35
which is equivalent to:24 @qi@
@qj
@
35 =   1
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
24 V jjjV ii   V iijV jj
 V jjiV
i
i + V
i
iiV
j
j
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Hence the sign of @q

i
@
is:
sign

@qi
@

= sign
 
 
V
j
jjV
i
i   V
i
ijV
j
j
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
!
Thus @q

i
@
has the opposite sign of V jjjV
i
i  V
i
ijV
j
j, which proves the rst part of the result.
Considering now the case where rms are symmetric, V ii = V
j
j and V
j
jj < V
i
ij, the
sign of @q

i
@
is the same than the sign of V ii. Noting that  appears both in the integrand
function and in the lower integration limit and applying Leibniz rule, we get:
V ii =
zZ
bzi
Rii(qi; qj; zi; ; i)f(zi)dzi  R
i
i(qi; qj; bzi; ; i)f(bzi)@bzi@
V ii =
zZ
bzi
Riif(zi)dzi +R
i
i(bzi)Ri(bzi)Rizi(bzi)f(bzi)
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As a consequence the sign of the impact depends both on the e¤ect of  on prot, Ri,
and the impact of  on marginal prot Rii. If R
i
 and R
i
i have the same sign, the two
terms will have opposite signs since Rii(bzi) < 0. Thus, if Ri and Rii have the same sign,
V ii has an ambiguous sign.
On the other hand if Ri and R
i
i have opposite signs, the sign of V
i
i is the same as the
sign of Rii, since the sign of R
i
i(bzi)Ri(bzi) is the same than the sign of Rii as Rii(bzi) < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. By the implicit function theorem we know that:
24 @qi@i
@qj
@i
35 =  
24 V iii V iij
V
j
ji V
j
jj
35 1 24 V iii
0
35
Which is equivalent to: 24 @qi@i
@qj
@i
35 =   1
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
24 V jjjV iii
 V jjiV
i
ii
35
Hence the sign of @q

i
@i
is:
sign

@qi
@i

= sign
 
 
V
j
jjV
i
ii
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
!
= sign(V iii)
while the sign of
@qj
@i
is:
sign

@qj
@i

= sign
 
V
j
jiV
i
ii
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
!
= sign(  V iii)
Noting that i appears both in the integrand function and in the lower integration limit
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of V ii and applying Leibniz rule, we get:
V iii =
zZ
bzi
Riii(qi; qj; zi; ; i)f(zi)dzi  R
i
i(qi; qj; bzi; ; i)f(bzi)@bzi@i
V iii =
zZ
bzi
Riiif(zi)dzi +R
i
i(bzi) RiiRizi(bzi)f(bzi)
As a consequence the sign of the impact depends both on the e¤ect of i on prot, Rii,
and the impact of i on marginal prot Riii. If R
i
i
and Riii have the same sign, the
total e¤ect of i on V ii will be ambiguous as R
i
i(bzi) < 0. On the other hand if Rii and
Riii have opposite signs, the sign of V
i
ii
is the same as the sign of Riii, since the sign of
Rii(bzi)Rii(bzi) is the same than the sign of Riii as Rii(bzi) < 0.
Proof of Preposition 2.1. By Leibniz rule @

i
@Di
is given by:
@i
@Di
= f(bzi ) @bzi@Di
@i
@Dj
= f(bzi ) @bzi@Dj
Since f(bzi ) > 0 the sign of these derivatives are equal to the sign of @bzi@Di and @bzi@Dj , respec-
tively. Applying the chain rule to (2.6) we get:
@i
@Di
= f(bzi ) @bzi@qi @q

i
@Di
+
@bzi
@qj
@qj
@Di
+
@bzi
@Di

(2.9)
@i
@Dj
= f(bzi ) @bzi@qi @q

i
@Dj
+
@bzi
@qj
@qj
@Dj

(2.10)
These expressions clearly indicate that the total impact ofDi on 

i includes a direct e¤ect,
given by f(bzi ) @ bzi@Di , and indirect e¤ects through the inuence of Di on the equilibrium
quantities which in turn a¤ect bzi. On the other hand, Dj does not inuence bzi directly
but it has indirect impacts as it a¤ects the equilibrium quantities. Considering the signs
of the partial derivatives computed before, we can immediately see that the rst term and
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the third term in (2.9) are positive while the second term is negative. Similarly, in (2.10)
the rst term is negative while the second term is positive. Thus we need to investigate
which e¤ect dominates.
@i
@Di
= f(bzi )
 
Rii(bzi)
Rizi(bzi) V
j
jjV
i
iDi
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
 
Rij(bzi)
Rizi(bzi) V
j
jiV
i
iDi
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
+
1
Rizi(bzi)
!
@i
@Dj
= f(bzi )
 
 
Rii(bzi)
Rizi(bzi)
V iijV
j
jDj
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
+
Rij(bzi)
Rizi(bzi) V
i
iiV
j
jDj
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
!
The sign of @

i
@Di
is positive if Rii(bzi)V jjjV iiDi+V iiiV jjj V iijV jji > Rij(bzi)V jjiV iiDi. Since V jjj < V jji,
V iiiV
j
jj V
i
ijV
j
ji > 0 and V
i
iDi
> 0, the previous condition is likely to be satised. A su¢cient
condition, for @

i
@Di
to be positive is Rii(bzi)V jjj > Rij(bzi)V jji. If this condition holds, an
increase in the debt of rm i increases the default probability of rm i.
On the other hand, the sign of @

i
@Dj
is positive if and only if Rij(bzi)V iii > Rii(bzi)V iij.
Proof of Preposition 2.2. The impact of changes in the level of uncertainty on the
default probability is (applying the chain rule to (2.6)):
@i
@z
= f(bzi )@bzi@z = f(bzi )

@bzi
@qi
@qi
@z
+
@bzi
@qj
@qj
@z

We have shown before that, if rms are symmetric, @q

i
@z
and
@qj
@z
are both positive and we
also know that @bzi
@q
i
> 0 and @bzi
@q
j
> 0. Thus, if rms are symmetric @

i
@z
is positive.
Proof of Preposition 2.3. When parameter  changes, the impact on the default
probability is:
@i
@
= f(bzi )@bzi@ = f(bzi )

@bzi
@qi
@qi
@
+
@bzi
@qj
@qj
@
+
@bzi
@

These expression clearly indicates that the total impact of  on i includes a direct
e¤ect, given by f(bzi )@ bzi@ , and indirect e¤ects through the inuence of  on the equilibrium
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quantities which in turn a¤ect bzi. The previous expression can be written as follows:
@i
@
= f(bzi )
"
Rii(bzi)
Rizi(bzi) V
j
jjV
i
i   V
i
ijV
j
j
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
+
Rij(bzi)
Rizi(bzi) V
i
iiV
j
j   V
j
jiV
i
i
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
 
Ri
Rizi(bzi)
#
Since Rizi(bzi) > 0 and V iiiV jjj   V iijV jji > 0 one concludes immediately that @i@ > 0 if and
only if
Rii(bzi)  V jjjV ii   V iijV jj+Rij(bzi)  V iiiV jj   V jjiV ii Ri  V iiiV jjj   V iijV jji > 0:
The rest of the result is a direct consequence of Lemma 2.3 and the fact that the direct
impact has the opposite sign of Ri.
Proof of Preposition 2.4. The impact of changes in i is given by:
@i
@i
= f(bzi )@bzi@i = f(bzi )

@bzi
@qi
@qi
@i
+
@bzi
@qj
@qj
@i
+
@bzi
@i

The total impact of i on 

i includes a direct e¤ect, given by f(bzi ) @ bzi@i , and indirect e¤ects
through the inuence of i on the equilibrium quantities (qi and q

j ) which in turn a¤ectbzi. Substituting the results that were obtained previously:
@i
@i
= f(bzi )
"
Rii(bzi)
Rizi(bzi) V
j
jjV
i
ii
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
 
Rij(bzi)
Rizi(bzi) V
j
jiV
i
ii
V iiiV
j
jj   V
i
ijV
j
ji
 
Rii
Rizi(bzi)
#
Since Rizi(bzi) > 0 and V iiiV jjj   V iijV jji > 0 one concludes immediately that @i@i > 0 if and
only if Rii(bzi)V jjjV iii  Rij(bzi)V jjiV iii  Rii  V iiiV jjj   V iijV jji > 0:
Proof of Lemma 2.5. Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (2.7)
which denes the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we get:
24 @Di@z
@Dj
@z
35 =  
24 Y iDiDi Y iDiDj
Y
j
DjDi
Y
j
DjDj
35 1 24 Y iDiz
Y
j
Djz
35
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which is equivalent to:24 @Di@z
@Dj
@z
35 =   1
Y iDiDiY
j
DjDj
  Y iDiDjY
j
DjDi
24 Y jDjDjY iDiz   Y iDiDjY jDjz
 Y jDjDiY
i
Diz
+ Y iDiDiY
j
Djz
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Let us evaluate the signs of these derivatives, taking into account that Y iDiDi < 0, Y
j
DjDj
<
0, Y iDiDj < 0 and Y
i
DiDi
Y
j
DjDj
  Y iDiDjY
j
DjDi
> 0: Assuming that
Y jDjDj  > Y iDiDj  and
considering that rms are symmetric, Y iDiz = Y
j
Djz
, the sign of @D

i
@z
is:
sign

@Di
@z

= sign
 
 
Y
j
DjDj
Y iDiz   Y
i
DiDj
Y
j
Djz
Y iDiDiY
j
DjDj
  Y iDiDjY
j
DjDi
!
= sign(Y iDiz)
Applying Leibniz rule, Y iDiz is given by (we need to consider all the impacts of z on YDi
except the ones through Di and Dj):24 zZ
 z
Riii(q

i ; q

j ; )
@qi
@z
f(zi)dzi +
zZ
 z
Riij(q

i ; q

j ; )
@qj
@z
f(zi)dzi +R
i
i(z)f(z) R
i
i( z)f( z)
35 @qi
@Di
+
24 zZ
 z
Riji(q

i ; q

j ; )
@qi
@z
f(zi)dzi +
zZ
 z
Rijj(q

i ; q

j ; )
@qj
@z
f(zi)dzi +R
i
j(z)f(z) R
i
j( z)f( z)
35 @qj
@Di
+
24 zZ
 z
Rii(q

i ; q

j ; )f(zi)dzi
35 @2qi
@Di@z
+
24 zZ
 z
Rij(q

i ; q

j ; )f(zi)dzi
35 @2qj
@Di@z
Consider the expression inside the rst parentheses. Since Riii < 0 and
@qi
@z
> 0, the
rst term is negative. Similarly, since Riij < 0 and
@qj
@z
> 0, the second term is also
negative. However, the third term, Rii(z)f(z)  R
i
i( z)f( z); is positive. Thus the sign
of the expression inside the rst parentheses is ambiguous (note that this expression is
multiplied by @q

i
@Di
> 0). Similarly, the sign of the expression inside the second parentheses
is also ambiguous as the two rst terms are negative whereas the last term is positive
(note that this expression is multiplied by
@qj
@Di
< 0). Finally, the sign of the last two
terms in the expression is also not clear as the terms inside parentheses are negative but
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the sign of @
2qi
@Di@z
and
@2qj
@Di@z
are not known. Therefore, without further restrictions, the
impact of z on the equilibrium debt levels is ambiguous.
Proof of Lemma 2.6. Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (2.7) we
get: 24 @Di@
@Dj
@
35 =  
24 Y iDiDi Y iDiDj
Y
j
DjDi
Y
j
DjDj
35 1 24 Y iDi
Y
j
Dj
35
which is equivalent to:24 @Di@
@Dj
@
35 =   1
Y iDiDiY
j
DjDj
  Y iDiDjY
j
DjDi
24 Y jDjDjY iDi   Y iDiDjY jDj
 Y jDjDiY
i
Di
+ Y iDiDiY
j
Dj
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Taking into account that Y iDiDi < 0, Y
j
DjDj
< 0, Y iDiDj < 0, Y
i
DiDi
Y
j
DjDj
  Y iDiDjY
j
DjDi
> 0,Y jDjDj  > Y iDiDj  and considering that rms are symmetric, Y iDi = Y jDj, the sign of @Di@
is:
sign

@Di
@

= sign
 
 
Y
j
DjDj
Y iDi   Y
i
DiDj
Y
j
Dj
Y iDiDiY
j
DjDj
  Y iDiDjY
j
DjDi
!
= sign(Y iDi)
Where Y iDi is given by24 zZ
 z
Riii(q

i ; q

j ; )
@qi
@
f(zi)dzi +
zZ
 z
Riij(q

i ; q

j ; )
@qj
@
f(zi)dzi
35 @qi
@Di
+
24 zZ
 z
Riji(q

i ; q

j ; )
@qi
@
f(zi)dzi +
zZ
 z
Rijj(q

i ; q

j ; )
@qj
@
f(zi)dzi
35 @qj
@Di
+
24 zZ
 z
Rii(q

i ; q

j ; )f(zi)dzi
35 @2qi
@Di@
+
24 zZ
 z
Rij(q

i ; q

j ; )f(zi)dzi
35 @2qj
@Di@
+
zZ
 z
Rii(q

i (Di;Dj; ) ; q

j (Di;Dj; ) ; )f(zi)dzi +
zZ
 z
Rij(q

i (Di;Dj; ) ; q

j (Di;Dj; ) ; )f(zi)dzi
In the symmetric case @q

i
@
=
@qj
@
and the sign of the expressions inside the rst and
the second parentheses have the opposite sign of @q

i
@
(note that the rst expression is
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multiplied by @q

i
@Di
> 0 whereas the second expression is multiplied by
@qj
@Di
< 0, thus the
rst and second line have opposite signs). By lemma 2.3 we know that if  a¤ects prots
and marginal prots in the same direction (Ri and R
i
i have the same sign) then
@qi
@
has
an ambiguous sign. This implies that the sign of Y iDi is also ambiguous. In addition
notice that the sign of Y iDi is also inuenced by the sign of R
i
i and the sign of R
i
j. If R
i

and Rii have opposite sign, the sign of
@qi
@
is the same sign as Rii. Thus the sign of the
expression inside the rst parentheses has the opposite sign of Rii. However the sign of
the second line and also the sign of the penultimate term is the same sign as Rii. Thus
the sign of Y iDi is ambiguous.
Proof of Lemma 2.7. Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (2.7), we
get: 24 @Di@i
@Dj
@i
35 =  
24 Y iDiDi Y iDiDj
Y
j
DjDi
Y
j
DjDj
35 1 24 Y iDii
0
35
which is equivalent to:24 @Di@i
@Dj
@i
35 =   1
Y iDiDiY
j
DjDj
  Y iDiDjY
j
DjDi
24 Y jDjDjY iDii
 Y jDjDiY
i
Dii
35
The signs of these derivatives, taking into account that Y jDjDj < 0 and Y
i
DiDi
Y
j
DjDj
 
Y iDiDjY
j
DjDi
> 0 is given by:
sign

@Di
@i

= sign
 
 
Y
j
DjDj
Y iDii
Y iDiDiY
j
DjDj
  Y iDiDjY
j
DjDi
!
= sign
 
Y iDii

sign

@Dj
@i

= sign
 
Y
j
DjDi
Y iDii
Y iDiDiY
j
DjDj
  Y iDiDjY
j
DjDi
!
= sign
 
 Y iDii

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Where Y iDii is given by:24 zZ
 z
Riii(q

i ; q

j ; )
@qi
@i
f(zi)dzi +
zZ
 z
Riij(q

i ; q

j ; )
@qj
@i
f(zi)dzi
35 @qi
@Di
+
24 zZ
 z
Riji(q

i ; q

j ; )
@qi
@i
f(zi)dzi +
zZ
 z
Rijj(q

i ; q

j ; )
@qj
@i
f(zi)dzi
35 @qj
@Di
+
24 zZ
 z
Rii(q

i ; q

j ; )f(zi)dzi
35 @2qi
@Di@i
+
24 zZ
 z
Rij(q

i ; q

j ; )f(zi)dzi
35 @2qj
@Di@i
+
zZ
 z
Riii(q

i (Di;Dj; ) ; q

j (Di;Dj; ) ; )f(zi)dzi +
zZ
 z
Riji(q

i (Di;Dj; ) ; q

j (Di;Dj; ) ; )f(zi)dzi
As proved in lemma 2.4, @q

i
@i
has the same sign of V iiiand
@qj
@i
has the opposite sign of V iii.
Moreover the sign of V iii is ambiguous if R
i
i
and Riii have the same sign, otherwise V
i
ii
has the same sign as Riii. When R
i
i
and Riii have the same sign, the sign of Y
i
Dii
is
ambiguous as the e¤ect of the parameter i on rm i and rm j equilibrium quantities is
ambiguous (note that the rst and second line have opposite signs). If Rii and R
i
ii
have
opposite sign, the sign of @q

i
@i
is the same than the sign of Riii. The two terms of the
expression inside the rst parentheses have opposite signs, but the sign of the expression
is the opposite sign of Riii as
@qi@i  > @qj@i . However the sign of the second line and
also the sign of the penultimate term is the same sign as Riii. Thus the sign of Y
i
Dii
is
ambiguous.
Proof of Preposition 2.5. The impact of changes in the level of uncertainty on the
SPNE default probability is:
@i
@z
= f(bzi )@bzi@z
where @bzi
@z
is equivalent to (applying the chain rule to (2.8)):

@qi
@Di
@Di
@z
+
@qi
@Dj
@Dj
@z
+
@qi
@z

@bzi
@qi
+

@qj
@Di
@Di
@z
+
@qj
@Dj
@Dj
@z
+
@qj
@z

@bzi
@qj
+
@bzi
@Di
@Di
@z
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The previous expression indicates that increasing the uncertainty has several e¤ects on
the default probability. On the one hand, increasing the uncertainty has a direct impact
on the second period equilibrium quantities, which a¤ects bzi:
@qi
@z
@bzi
@qi
+
@qj
@z
@bzi
@qj
By proposition 2.8 we know that this direct e¤ect leads to an increase in the probability
of default. On the other hand, an increase in the uncertainty level a¤ects the equilib-
rium debt levels, which in turn a¤ect the second period equilibrium quantities and the
equilibrium critical state:

@qi
@Di
@Di
@z
+
@qi
@Dj
@Dj
@z

@bzi
@qi
+

@qj
@Di
@Di
@z
+
@qj
@Dj
@Dj
@z

@bzi
@qj
+
@bzi
@Di
@Di
@z
By lemma 2.9 the signs of @D

i
@z
and
@Dj
@z
are ambiguous. Thus z also has an ambiguous
e¤ect on i .
Proof of Preposition 2.6. The impact of  and i on the equilibrium default
probability is given by:
@i
@
= f(bzi )@bzi@
@i
@i
= f(bzi )@bzi@i
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where @bzi
@
and @bzi
@i
are given by (applying the chain rule to (2.8)):
@bzi
@
=

@qi
@
+
@qi
@Di
@Di
@
+
@qi
@Dj
@Dj
@

@bzi
@qi
+
@qj
@
+
@qj
@Dj
@Dj
@
+
@qj
@Di
@Di
@

@bzi
@qj
+
@bzi
@Di
@Di
@
+
@bzi

@bzi
@i
=

@qi
@i
+
@qi
@Di
@Di
@i
+
@qi
@Dj
@Dj
@i

@bzi
@qi
+
@qj
@i
+
@qj
@Dj
@Dj
@i
+
@qj
@Di
@Di
@i

@bzi
@qj
+
@bzi
@Di
@Di
@i
+
@bzi
i
Each of the previous expressions can be rewritten as so as to separate the direct impact
of the parameter on the second period equilibrium quantities and default probability, and
the impact through the equilibrium debt levels, which in turn inuence the second period
equilibrium. For instance, @bzi
@
can be written as:

@qi
@
@bzi
@qi
+
@qj
@
@bzi
@qj
+
@bzi


+

@qi
@Di
@Di
@
+
@qi
@Dj
@Dj
@

@bzi
@qi
+
@qj
@Dj
@Dj
@
+
@qj
@Di
@Di
@

@bzi
@qj
+
@bzi
@Di
@Di
@
:
The analysis of the expressions presented above, allows us to conclude that the e¤ects
of the parameters  and i on the equilibrium default probability are ambiguous, both
because the direct impact on the equilibrium quantities is ambiguous and because the
impact on the equilibrium debt levels is also ambiguous.
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Chapter 3
Default Costs, Financial and Product
Market Decisions and Default Risk
3.1 Introduction
In the last decades, the nancial literature has addressed the issue of default and default
risk. Considering its negative social and economic impact on the economy, it is not
surprising that the existing literature has focused mainly on the best form to predict
default and default risk (for a survey of the empirical literature see Balcaen and Ooghe,
2006). However, despite of the vast empirical literature, there is a lack of theoretical
models aimed at understanding the factors that inuence the default probability. The
main objective of this essay is to provide a contribution in this direction.
The essay examines analytically and numerically, how the market structure inuences
nancial decisions and product market decisions and, consequently, the default risk, con-
sidering the existence of default costs. Our objective is to study the impact of changes
in the level of demand uncertainty, in the degree of product substitutability, in the asym-
metry between the two rms marginal production costs and in the direct (ex-post) and
indirect (ex-ante) default costs parameters on the equilibrium default risk of the two
rms. Furthermore we also aim to analyze if the impact of the various parameters is the
45
same when rms have equal marginal production costs (symmetric duopoly) or when they
have di¤erent marginal costs (asymmetric duopoly).
The link between nancing and output market decisions began to emerge with the
pioneering work of Modigliani and Miller (1958).1 In their framework there is no rela-
tionship between nancial structure and output market decisions. Theories of capital
structure that followed (the trade-o¤ theory and the pecking order theory) support the
existence of an optimal capital structure, but they do not incorporate in their analysis
the interdependence of nancing decisions and output market decisions.
Riordans (2003) critical survey summarizes the existing literature on the interaction
between capital structure and output market. He argues that the existence of a link
between the nancial structure and output market decisions has been highlighted both on
the Corporate Finance literature and the Industrial Organization literature and begins to
emerge in the 80s. Brander and Lewis (1986) were the rst to examine this relationship.
They consider a two stage Cournot duopoly model with an uncertain environment. In
the rst stage, each rm decides the capital structure. In the second stage, taking into
account their previously chosen nancial structure, rms take their decisions in the output
market. The model focuses on the e¤ects of the limited liability in debt nancing. They
assume that the investment decision is taken before the capital structure decision. If this
assumption was not made, the debt-equity mix choice would inuence the investment
which would have further e¤ects on the output market.2 As pointed out by Brander
and Lewis (1986) one possible interpretation of the capital structure choice is that the
rm is initially equity nanced, when the loan is taken the borrowed money is fully
distributed among shareholders. The authors conclude that debt tends to encourage a
more aggressive behavior by the indebted rm in the output market, while the competitor
1The authors argue (see their propositions I and II, where they consider an economy without taxes)
that in a perfect capital market, the capital structure is irrelevant in determining the rm value, the
important thing is the value created by the assets. In 1963 Modigliani and Miller, restated propositions I
and II considering an economy with taxes, they claim that a rm reaches its maximum value when fully
indebted as it is when it gets the maximum tax benet.
2This happens in Clayton (2009) where the investment is made to reduce the marginal cost of pro-
duction.
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tends to produce less. Thus, rms have an incentive to use their nancial structure for
strategic purposes. Maksimovic (1988) conrms the ndings of Brander and Lewis (1986)
regarding the aggressiveness of indebted rms in the output market and argues that this
e¤ect is due to the existence of limited liability. Nevertheless the author considered a
model with multiple periods of interaction and shows that debt is a barrier for rms to
be able to maintain collusive outcomes.3
One of the criticisms directed at the previously mentioned work, is the fact that it
does not consider the agency problems arising between creditors and shareholders. This
issue is considered in Clayton (2009) who shows that when rms have an investment
option, leverage leads to a less aggressive output competition behavior and this is due
to the existence of agency problems. Similarly, Grimaud (2000) follows the formalization
of Brander and Lewis (1986), but incorporates the choice of the nancial contract as
a strategic variable. According to the author, the existence of asymmetric information,
between borrowers and lenders, has an important role in the relationship between nancial
decisions and the output market decisions. Grimaud (2000) shows that the increase in
debt leads to a more aggressive behavior but this is o¤set by the nancial costs.
Despite the vast literature on default probability, the existing literature is constituted
essentially by prediction models. In other words, there is a lack of theoretical models
to explain default probability. The default probability depends not only on the level of
debt, but also on operational factors that allows a rm to meet its obligations. The re-
lationship between the nancial structure decisions, the output market decisions and the
default probability has been analyzed theoretically by a small number of authors. Franck
and Le Pape (2008) and Haan and Toolsema (2008) are among these few authors. While
Brander and Lewis (1986) present a general model, without specifying whether products
are homogenous or di¤erentiated and whether uncertainty a¤ects demand or costs, Franck
and Le Pape (2008) and Haan and Toolsema (2008) have explored more specic models
and used numerical simulations to analyze the impact of demand uncertainty and the de-
3Some empirical papers, namely Campos (2000), Erol (2003) and Lyandres (2006) conrm that debt
incites a more aggressive behavior. Others, like Chevalier (1995b), Khanna and Tice (2000) and Zingales
(1998) argue that indebted rms tend to adopt a more conservative behavior.
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gree of product substitutability on the probability of default. The authors come to similar
conclusions: the probability of default is decreasing with the degree of product comple-
mentarity (when goods are complements) and it is increasing with the degree of product
substitutability (when the goods are substitutes). Moreover, the default probability is
decreasing with the level of uncertainty. Although these results are quite interesting,
they ignore the existence of default costs and do not consider the possibility of rms
having di¤erent degrees of e¢ciency. In this essay, our aim is to extend their results by
incorporating these two very important aspects of reality.
The existing literature that relates nancial and output market decisions usually
ignores the existence of default costs. However these costs can have a substantial ef-
fect on the nancial structure and output market decisions and they may constrain the
rms behavior (making it more or less conservative). The literature divides default costs
into two types: direct or ex-post costs (legal, accounting and administrative costs) and
indirect or ex-ante costs (reduced prots resulting from lower sales, in particular, due to
the reputation e¤ect).
The relevance of default costs was rst addressed by Kraus and Litzenburgers (1973),
who analyze the trade-o¤ between default costs and tax benets associated with debt.
Elkami, Ericsson and Parsons (2012) argue that the nancial distress costs can o¤set
the debt tax benets. Altman (1984) concludes that default costs may represent about
20% of the value of assets and the indirect costs can be high (other authors argue that
indirect costs are irrelevant). Kwansa and Cho (1995) report the importance of considering
indirect default cost since they a¤ect the capital structure decision. Among the studies
that analyze the link between nancial and output market decisions, Brander and Lewis
(1988) and Parsons (1997) take into account the default costs. Brander and Lewis (1988)
show that the default costs a¤ect nancial and output market decisions. The authors
present two alternative ways of modelling default costs: (i) xed default costs and (ii)
proportional default costs. They conclude that rms tend to be more aggressive when
more vulnerable. Parsons (1997) introduces a set of specications that are not considered
by Brander and Lewis (1988). He shows that rms tend to adopt a more conservative
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behavior as debt increases.
There are empirical studies that conrm that there is a relationship between debt and
default probability (Chacharat et al, 2010) and between debt, quantity or price, market
conditions (higher or lower concentration, industry performance) and default probability
(Borenstein and Rose, 1995, Evrensel, 2008 and Opler and Titman, 1994). The impact of
debt and market conditions on default probability is not so clear-cut.
The essay aims, using a two-stage duopoly model to analyze numerically and analyt-
ically, how the default risk changes with the demand uncertainty, the degree of product
substitutability and the asymmetry in the marginal costs of the two rms, considering the
existence of default costs. This is done in two stages: in the rst stage, each rm decides
the capital structure and in the second stage, taking into account their previously chosen
nancial structure, rms take their decisions in the output market. The main contribu-
tion of this work for the literature that explores theoretically the equilibrium default risk
is the analysis of the case where the two rms have di¤erent levels of e¢ciency and the
introduction of default costs in the analysis.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we present
the model. Section 3.3 analyzes the second stage of the game and the subgame perfect
equilibrium. Section 3.4 presents the results in the benchmark case of no default costs
whereas section 3.5 presents the results when there are default costs. Finally, section 3.6
summarizes the main conclusions of the study.
3.2 Model
This study considers a particular case of Brander and Lewis (1986) model, where the
duopolists produce di¤erentiated products, demand is linear, marginal costs are constant
and the uncertainty in the model is on the demand side.4 In the rst stage each rm
(rm i and rm j) decides the nancial structure, i.e., the level of debt and equity in the
4A similar model has been considered by other authors, such as Haan and Toolsema (2008) and
Wanzenried (2003). The di¤erences are that we do not assume that rms have the same marginal cost
and we introduce default costs in the analysis.
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1st
2nd
3rd
4th
Figure 3.1: Timing of the game: rst nancial decisions are taken, then output decisions
are taken. Output decisions are taken before the uncertainty is resolved.
capital structure. In the second stage each rm chooses the quantity to produce. Figure
3.1 shows the timing of the game.
The demand functions are derived from the solution of the consumers problem. Fol-
lowing Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984), we assume that the consumer utility
function is quadratic:
U(qi; qj; q0) = q0 + (i + zi ) qi + (j + zj ) qj  
1
2

iq
2
i + 2qiqj + jq
2
j

(3.1)
where qi and qj are the quantities consumed of rm i and rm j products, respectively,
and q0 represents the quantity consumed of all the other products (with a price normalized
to unit). The parameter , with  2 [0; 1], corresponds to the degree of substitutability
between the two rms products. When  = 0, products are completely di¤erentiated,
thus each rm can behave as a monopolist. When  = 1, the two products are perfect
substitutes. Parameter i and j represent the expected size of the market and i ; j ;
i and j are positive constants. The observed size of the market depends on the random
variable zi that represents the e¤ect of an exogenous demand shock, in other words, there is
uncertainty regarding the size of the market. It is assumed that this variable is distributed
in the interval [ z; z] according to the uniform density function, i.e., f(zi) = 12z . We
assume that zi and zj are independent and identically distributed. The random variable
zi represents the uncertainty in the output market, i.e., the deviation from the average
market demand (this deviation can be positive or negative). To simplify notation we
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assume that i = j = 1:
Let pi and pj be the prices of rm i and rm j products, respectively and let M be
the consumers income. The consumer chooses qi; qj and q0 so as to maximize U subject
to piqi + pjqj + q0 = M . The budget constraint can be written as q0 = M   piqi  
pjqj. Substituting this expression in the utility function, the consumers problem can be
rewritten as:
max
qi;qj
M   piqi   pjqj + (i + zi ) qi + (j + zj ) qj  
1
2

q2i + 2qiqj + q
2
j

The rst order conditions of this problem are:8<:  pi + i + zi   qi   qj = 0 pj + j + zj   qj   qi = 0 ,
8<: pi = i + zi   qi   qjpj = j + zj   qj   qi
The last system of equations, gives us the inverse demand functions of the two rms.
We assume that:
i = (1  ai
2
i )
where i represents the expected default probability and ai is a parameter that measures
the demand sensitivity to increases in the default probability. This assumption is intended
to capture the ex-ante default costs. Everything else constant, if consumers expect rm
i to have a higher default probability, their demand of rm i product decreases. In other
words, when default is likely and consumers are aware of that, there is a negative e¤ect on
the image that customers have about the rm, therefore causing a loss of reputation and a
decrease in demand. In our formulation, the reputational demand reduction is increasing
with the probability of default. Altman (1984) and Kim (1978) argue that the indirect
default costs occur when a potential buyer perceives that default is likely, we believe that
our way of modelling the ex-ante default cost is consistent with their denition.
Under the previous assumption, the inverse demand is given by:
pi = (1  ai
2
i )  qi   qj + zi (3.2)
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Hence, the operating prots (revenue less costs) are given by:
Ri =
 
(1  ai
2
i )  qi   qj + zi   ci

qi (3.3)
where ci is the constant marginal cost of rm i.
In the rst stage, rms simultaneously choose their debt levels so as to maximize the
value of the rm. We represent the debt obligation of rm i by Di. Note that Di is the
amount that rm i pays at the end of the game to bondholders, if operating prots are
high enough to do so. If the realized operating prots are lower than Di, all the operating
prots obtained will be used to pay bondholders, who become the residual claimants.
Let bzi be the critical state of the world such that the operating prot of the rm is
just enough for the rm to meet its debt obligations. This critical state of the world is
implicitly dened by:
  
1  ai
2
i

  qi   qj + zi   ci

qi  Di = 0 (3.4)
The default probability of rm i is given by:
i = Pr(Ri < Di) = Pr (zi < bzi) = bziZ
 z
f(zi)dzi =
bziZ
 z
1
2z
dzi
which is equivalent to:
i =
bzi   ( z)
2z
=
bzi + z
2z
The value of indirect default cost, IDCi, is given by:
IDCi = ai
2
iqi
In the second stage of the game the manager maximizes the expected equity value,
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which is given by:
V i =
zZ
bzi
   
1  ai
2
i

  qi   qj + zi   ci

qi  Di
 1
2z
dzi (3.5)
V i =
zZ
bzi
   
1  ai
bzi + z
2z
2!
  qi   qj + zi   ci
!
qi  Di
!
1
2z
dzi
It should be noted that the critical state of the world is inuenced by the quantity
choices of the two rms and by the rms debt level. This implies that bzi(qi;qj;Di) is
determined endogenously in the second stage of the game.
When the rm cannot meet its debt obligations in all the states of the world, it
will have a positive probability of default and thus positive default costs (direct and
indirect). If there are default costs, these are deducted from the expected value for
creditors. Considering the default probability and the default costs, the expected value
of debt is given by:
Wi = Pr(zi > bzi)Di + bziZ
 z
  
1  ai
2
i

  qi   qj + zi   ci

qi
1
2z
dzi   E(DDC) (3.6)
Note that Di is di¤erent from Wi. Di is the amount that rm i promised to pay at
the end of the game to bondholders, which includes capital amortization and interest. Wi
is the expected value of debt, which takes into account the probability of the rm not
paying in full Di, i.e., if this probability is positive Wi < Di. E(DDC) represents the
expected direct default costs.5 We assume that direct default costs are proportional to
the amount that the bondholders fail to receive.6 Let k be the direct costs proportionality
5Direct costs are costs that occur ex-post, which increase with default probability and they are sup-
ported primarily by debtholders because in bad states of nature, the remaining prot (after deducting
default costs) will be used to pay them. This is supported by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Kim (1978),
Brander and Lewis(1988), Parsons (1997) and Bris, Schwartz and Welch (2005).
6We follow the same formalization as Brander and Lewis (1988) and Parsons (1997).
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parameter.
E(DDC) = k
bziZ
 z
 
Di  
  
1  ai
2
i

  qi   qj + zi   ci

qi
 1
2z
dzi
Therefore, the expected value of debt is given by:
Wi = (1  i)Di + (1 + k)
bziZ
 z
  
1  ai
2
i

  qi   qj + zi   ci

qi
1
2z
dzi   kDii (3.7)
Note that the interest rate r is dened implicitly by Wi(1 + r) = Di.
As mentioned before, in the rst stage of the game the rms choose their debt levels
so as to maximize the value of the rm. The value of the rm is equal to the sum of the
expected equity value and the expected value of debt:
Y i(qi; qj; Di;z) = V
i(qi; qj; Di;z) +W
i(qi; qj; Di;z) (3.8)
=
zZ
bzi
   
1  ai
2
i

  qi   qj + zi   ci

qi  Di
 1
2z
dzi +
(1  i)Di + (1 + k)
bziZ
 z
  
1  ai
2
i

  qi   qj + zi   ci

qi
1
2z
dzi   kDii
The above expression can be written as:
Y i(qi; qj; Di; z) =
zZ
 z
  
1  ai
2
i

  qi   qj + zi   ci

qi
1
2z
dzi   (3.9)
k
bziZ
 z
 
Di  
  
1  ai
2
i

  qi   qj + zi   ci

qi
 1
2z
dzi
Thus the value of the rm is equal to the expected prots (which incorporate the
indirect default costs) minus the expected direct default costs.
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The welfare is given by:
Wel =
zZ
 z
zZ
 z
0@ M +   1  ai2i  + zi qi +   1  aj2j + zj qj
 1
2

q2i + 2qiqj + q
2
j

  ciqi   cjqj
1A 1
4z2
dzidzj +
 k
bziZ
 z
 
Di  
  
1  ai
2
i

  qi   qj + zi   ci

qi
 1
2z
dzi
 k
bzjZ
 z
 
Dj  
  
1  aj
2
j

  qj   qi + zj   cj

qj
 1
2z
dzj (3.10)
To better follow the model resolution, table 3.1 summarizes the variables used.
Table 3.1: Variables of the model
Variables Meaning
qi; qj Output of rms i and j
Di; Dj Debt obligation of rms i and j
Ri Operating prots of rm i
zi Random variable that represents the uncertaintybzi Critical value of zi
 Degree of substitutability
M Consumers income
 Expected size of the market
ai; aj Demand sensitivity (ex-ante default cost parameter) of rms i and j
ci; cj Marginal cost of production of rms i and j
i; j Default probability of rms i and j
k Direct default costs proportionality parameter (ex-post default cost parameter)
DDCi; DDCj Value of direct default cost of rms i and j
IDCi; IDCj Value of indirect default cost of rms i and j
Y i; Y j Firm value of rms i and j
V i; V j Expected equity value of rms i and j
W i;W j Expected value of debt of rms i and j
Wel Welfare
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3.3 Solving the model
Our game is a dynamic game with two stages, thus to determine the equilibrium nancial
and output decisions we need to solve the game using the concept of subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE). The game is solved backwards, that is, one starts by determining the
Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the game as a function of the debt levels chosen
by the rms in the rst stage. Then we solve the rst stage game. In this stage rms
make their nancial decisions, taking into account their impact on the output market
equilibrium, so as to maximize the value of the rm, thus determining, the SPNE.
3.3.1 Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the game
In the second stage of the game, rm i chooses its quantity, qi, so as to maximize the
equity value (3.5). Using the Leibniz rule, the rst-order condition of this maximization
problem is:
zZ
bzi
" 
1  ai
bzi + z
2z
2!
  2qi   2ai
bzi + z
2z

qi
@i
@qi
  qj + zi   ci
#
1
2z
dzi  
  
1  ai
bzi + z
2z
2!
  qi   qj + bzi   ci)qi  Di
!
1
2z
@bzi
@qi
dz = 0
However, taking into account the denition of bzi, the second term is equal to zero.
Thus, the rst-order condition is given by:
zZ
bzi
" 
1  ai
bzi + z
2z
2!
  2qi   2ai
bzi + z
2z

qi
@i
@qi
  qj + zi   ci
#
1
2z
dzi = 0
where
@i
@qi
=
1
2z
@bzi
@qi
=
1
2z

1  ai
  bzi+z
2z
2
  2qi   qj + bzi   ci 
ai
  bzi+z
2z2

  1

qi
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After integrating, the rst order condition can be written as:
2
  
1  ai
2
i

  2qi   2ai
bzi + z
4z2
  
1  ai
2
i

  2qi   qj + bzi   ci
ai
  bzi+z
2z2

  1
  qj   ci
!
+z+bzi = 0
The rst order condition for rm j is derived in a similar manner. Note that the
rst order conditions depend on the critical states of the world, bzi and bzj, which in turn
depend on qi and qj. This implies that, in order to get the Nash equilibrium of the second
stage game, we need to simultaneously solve the system of the two rst order conditions
and the two conditions that dene the critical states of the world. In other words, for an
interior solution (i.e., for  z < bzi < z), the Nash equilibrium is given by the solution of
the following system:
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
2
 
1  ai
2
i

  2qi   2ai
  bzi+z
4z2
 (1 ai2i ) 2qi qj+bzi ci
ai

bzi+z
2z2

 1
  qj   ci

+ z + bzi = 0
2
  
1  aj
2
j

  2qj   2aj
 bzj+z
4z2

(1 aj2j) 2qj qi+ bzj cj
ai

czj+z
2z2

 1
  qj   ci
!
+ z + bzj = 0 
1  ai
2
i

  qi   qj + bzi   ci)qi  Di = 0 
1  ai
2
j

  qj   qi + bzj   ci)qj  Dj = 0
This 4 equations system is equivalent to solving a polynomial equation of the fourth order,
which does not have a simple analytical solution. In fact, through substitution, it can
be shown that solving this system is equivalent to solving a polynomial equation of the
fourth order, which does not have a simple analytical solution.
It should be noted that, for some values of (Di; Dj) one or both of the critical states
of the world may be equal to  z or equal to z. In these cases the third and/or fourth
conditions need to be substituted by bzi =  z or bzi = z. A complete analysis of all the
possible Nash equilibria involves computing these corner solutions.
We developed a GAUSS code (presented in the Appendix) to solve the model numer-
ically. Considering the various types of possible equilibria, we ran simulations for many
values of the parameters  and z for the symmetric and asymmetric duopoly cases, so as
to analyze how the equilibrium changes with the parameter values. After that we analyze
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the equilibria for many values of the parameter k and ai = aj and for xed k values for
many values of ai and aj, considering xed values of  and z. For each set of parameter
values, we determine the Nash Equilibrium of the second stage game, for many possi-
ble combinations of the debt levels (Di; Dj). Let qi (Di; Dj), q

j (Di; Dj), bzi (Di; Dj) andbzj (Di; Dj) be the Nash equilibrium quantities and critical states of the world for given
debt levels (Di; Dj).
3.3.2 Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium
After computing the Nash equilibrium of the second stage game as a function of the debt
levels chosen by the rms in the rst stage we solved the rst stage game using backwards
induction. In this stage, rms take their nancial decisions, taking into account their
impact on the output market equilibrium, so as to maximize the value of the rm, thus
determining the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium ( SPNE).
As mentioned above, we developed a GAUSS code to solve the model numerically,
considering the various types of possible equilibria, for many values of the parameters
, z, k, ai and aj (so as to analyze how the equilibrium changes with the parameter
values). The program rst determines the Nash Equilibrium of the second stage game,
for given debt levels (Di; Dj), and then for each (Di; Dj) the equilibrium value of each
rm (Yi; Yj), is computed. This is repeated for many (Di; Dj) and the equilibrium values
of Yi and Yj are saved in two matrices. The equilibrium of the rst stage game is then
determined. We identify, for a given debt level of the other rm, the rms level of debt
that maximizes its value, thus determining the rms best response. The Nash equilibrium
of the debt game occurs when we nd a vector (Di ; D

j ) in such a way that the two rms
are simultaneously in their best responses. Thus (Di ; D

j ) denotes the SPNE levels of
debt. Finally, considering (Di ; D

j ) the corresponding SPNE quantities (q

i ; q

j ) of the
second stage game are computed as well as other equilibrium variables like the default
probabilities
 
i ; 

j

;the equilibrium interest rate (ri ; r

j ) and so on.
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The default probability is given by:
i =
bzi + z
2z
(3.11)
Calculating the integral in expression (3.7), the SPNE expected value of debt is given by:
W i = (1  

i )D

i   k

i D

i + (3.12)
(1 + k)
1
2z
(bzi + z)  1  ai2i   qi   qj   ci qi + qi2 (bzi   z)

The interest rate ri is dened implicitly by Wi(1 + ri) = Di so, in the SPNE:
ri =
Di
W i
  1 (3.13)
Calculating the integral in expression (3.5), the SPNE expected value of equity is given
by:
V i =
1
2z
(z   bzi )  1  ai2i   qi   qj   ci qi  Di + qi2 (z + bzi ) (3.14)
Similarly, calculating the integral in expression (3.10), the SPNE expected welfare level
is given by:
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The value of direct and indirect default costs are given by:
IDCi = ai
2
i q

i (3.16)
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There are certain combinations of the parameters  and z that originate multiple
equilibria. Such situation occurs mainly for  close to 0 and z < 0:8, so we do not
consider these parameter values. In the analytical resolution we need to set values of
some variables (; M; zmax). Since we are interested in isolating the impact of debt and
output market decisions on the default probability we chose parameter values that imply
positive operating prots even in the worst state of the world. This assumption implies
that a rm would never go bankrupt if it was fully equity nanced. We chose to use
 = 5, M = 10 and zmax = 2:
The next two sections present the results of the numerical simulations. Our study
is focused on the equilibrium of the whole game (the subgame perfect equilibrium).7
The next section presents the results assuming there is no default costs and compares the
results in a symmetric duopoly with the results when the two rms have di¤erent marginal
costs. The results in this section can be interpreted as a benchmark case which can be
used for comparison with the case where default costs are considered. Section 3.5 presents
the results of the model with default costs and once again both the symmetric duopoly
and asymmetric duopoly cases are analyzed. In both sections, we study the impact of
changes in the level of demand uncertainty (z) and in the degree of product di¤erentiation
() on the SPNE values of the endogenous variables.
3.4 Results without default costs
In this section we analyze the SPNE of the game considering that the default cost para-
meters are all nil; i.e., k = ai = aj = 0. In this setup we rst analyze how the equilibrium
7It should be noted that one could also analyze the Nash equilibrium of the second stage, which is
contingent on the debt levels chosen in the rst stage of the game, and study how it changes with the
level of debt.
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values of the variables change with the uncertainty level, z; and with the degree of product
substitutability, ; in a duopoly model where the two rms are equally e¢cient (symmet-
ric duopoly). Next we analyze how the equilibrium values of the variables change when
rms di¤er in their marginal production costs i.e., when we have an asymmetric duopoly
model. In addition, we explore how the equilibrium values change with a unilateral in-
crease in the marginal production cost of rm j. In other words we analyze what happens
as the asymmetry between the two rms e¢ciency levels increases.
3.4.1 Symmetric duopoly
In this subsection we consider a duopoly model where the two rms are equally e¢cient
and assume that the marginal costs are equal to zero, i.e. ci = cj = 0.8 The objective
in this subsection is to study how the equilibrium values of the variables change with the
uncertainty level, z; and with the degree of product substitutability, . The analysis was
performed for values of z 2 [0:8; 2] and  2 ]0; 1]. The gures presented in this section
show the impacts in a three dimensions graph (on the left) and in a two dimensions
graph (on the right). In the two dimensional graph,  is represented in the x-axis and
z is represented by four di¤erent curves, where the lower demand uncertainty level is
represented with dots and the higher demand uncertainty level with a continuous line.
It should be noted that the model studied in this subsection is the same than the one
analyzed by Francks and Le Papes (2008) and Haan and Toolsema (2008). Therefore, it
is not surprising that we obtain the same qualitative results.
Figure 3.2 shows the equilibrium levels of debt as a function of the degree of product
substitutability, , and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z. This gure
allow us to conclude the following:
Result 3.1 The SPNE level of debt obligations, D, is strictly positive and decreas-
ing with the level of demand uncertainty, z. On the other hand, the degree of product
substitutability does not have a monotonic impact on D. For small values of demand
8The use of null or positive constant marginal costs does not inuence the qualitative results obtained.
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Figure 3.2: SPNE debt obligation as a function of the degree of product substitubility
and the level of demand uncertainty without considering the default costs
uncertainty, D is decreasing with product substitutability. However, for higher values of
demand uncertainty, D initially increases with  but after a certain point follows a U
relationship with .
Figure 3.3 shows the equilibrium output level as a function of the degree of product
substitutability,  and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z. The gure
allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.2 The SPNE level output, q, is decreasing with the degree of product substi-
tutability,  and increasing with the level of demand uncertainty z. However, the impact
of demand uncertainty is relatively small.
To explain the e¤ect of increasing the demand uncertainty level, z; on the output
levels, one needs to consider two e¤ects. The rst one is the direct impact that increasing
uncertainty has on the equilibrium quantities, for a given debt level. The second one,
is the indirect impact through the changes in the equilibrium debt level, which in turn
inuences the equilibrium quantity levels. The direct impact of increasing the level of
uncertainty is positive. In other words, for xed debt level, rms have a more aggressive
behavior in the output market when uncertainty is higher. Intuitively, the increase in
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Figure 3.3: SPNE output level as a function of the degree of product substitutability and
the level of demand uncertainty without considering the default costs
the uncertainty level implies that there are more good states of the world with positive
marginal prots. Thus the expected marginal prots conditional on zi > bzi increases,
hence it is optimal to produce a higher quantity. It is noteworthy that increasing z also
means that there are more states of the world with more negative marginal prots, but
equity holders do not care about these states of the world, unless the rm is all equity
nanced.
However, the previous e¤ect also implies that rms can get the same strategic e¤ect in
the product market with a lower level of debt. Therefore, rms act in a more conservative
manner in the debt market when uncertainty increases. This explains why result 3.1
holds. However the fact that higher uncertainty leads to lower equilibrium debt levels
has an indirect impact in the equilibrium quantities, which also decrease. It turns out
that the direct positive impact of increasing uncertainty on the equilibrium quantities is
higher than the negative indirect impact, which implies that the equilibrium quantities
are increasing with the uncertainty level. The fact that the impact is very small, is related
to the fact that the direct and indirect e¤ects have opposite signs and they almost cancel
each other.
Figure 3.4 shows the equilibrium default probability as a function of the degree of
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Figure 3.4: SPNE default probability as a function of the degree of product substitutability
for various levels of demand uncertainty without considering the default costs.
product substitutability, , and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z. The
gure allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.3 The SPNE default probability, , is increasing with the degree of product
substitutability, , and it is decreasing with the level of demand uncertainty, z:
At the rst sight, the result that an increase in the level of uncertainty leads to lower
equilibrium default probabilities is very surprising. To interpret this result we need to take
into account three e¤ects. The rst e¤ect is the direct impact of increasing uncertainty
on the default probability, for given debt and quantity levels. This e¤ect is positive,
since an increase in the uncertainty level increases the default probability. However we
also need to consider two indirect e¤ects. The fact that there is larger uncertainty leads
rms to behave in a more aggressive manner in the output market. This e¤ect tends
to increase the default probability. However, the greater uncertainty also leads rms to
be more conservative in the debt market, thus issuing less debt. A lower debt decreases
the default probability, directly and indirectly, through its inuence on the second period
equilibrium quantities. Result 3.3 means that the last e¤ect dominates the rst two e¤ects.
Although uncertainty has a positive direct impact on the default probability, the fact that
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Figure 3.5: SPNE interest rate as a function of the degree of product substitutability and
the level of demand uncertainty without considering the default costs
rms behave less aggressively in the debt market when uncertainty is higher outweights
that impact and explains why the default probability is decreasing with uncertainty.
Figure 3.5 shows that the equilibrium interest rate depends of the degree of product
substitutability, , and on the level of demand uncertainty, z, as follows:
Result 3.4 The SPNE interest rate, r, is increasing with the degree of product substi-
tutability, , and with the level of demand uncertainty, z. The impact is more signicant
for higher values of  and for higher values of z.
The interest rate depends on how the promised payment to debtholders, Di, compares
with the expected value of debt, Wi which depends on the default probability associated
with Di. When uncertainty increases, Di and Wi both decrease, but Wi decreases pro-
portionally more. This is related with the fact that, for a given debt level, increasing
uncertainty leads to an increase in the default probability. Bondholders know that under
higher uncertainty, for a given Di, it is more likely that the rm is not able to full its
obligations, thus they require an higher interest rate.
Figure 3.6 shows that the equilibrium expected equity value depends on the degree of
product substitutability, , and it depends on the level of demand uncertainty, z. The
gure allows us to conclude the following:
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Figure 3.6: SPNE expected equity value as a function of the degree of product substi-
tutability for various levels of demand uncertainty without considering the default costs.
Result 3.5 The SPNE expected equity value, V , is decreasing with the degree of product
substitutability, , and it is increasing with the level of demand uncertainty, z:
The rst part of the result would be true if the rm was all equity nanced. As
the degree of product substitutability increases, the competition between the two rms
becomes tougher and the equilibrium prots decrease. The second part of the result is
due to the fact that equityholders only care about the good states of the world (zi > bzi)
and an increase in the uncertainty parameter, increases the good states of the world and
hence increases the expected value of equity (which is equal to expected prot net of debt
payments, conditional on zi > bzi).
Figure 3.7 shows the equilibrium expected debt value as a function of the degree of
product substitutability, , and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z. The
gure allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.6 The SPNE expected debt value, W , is decreasing with the level of demand
uncertainty, z: On the other hand, the degree of product substitutability does not have a
monotonic impact on W . For small values of demand uncertainty, W  is decreasing
with product substitutability. However, for higher values of demand uncertainty, W 
initially increases with  but after a certain point follows a U relationship with .
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Figure 3.7: SPNE expected debt value as a function of the degree of product substitutabil-
ity for various levels of demand uncertainty without considering the default costs.
The previous result combines the results regarding the impact of  and z on the
equilibrium debt obligations and on the equilibrium interest rate. The shape of the
expected debt value is very similar to the shape of the debt obligations, but W  is lower
and, for lower levels of uncertainty, it decreases at a higher rate with the increases on the
degree of product substitutability, due to the increase in the interest rate.
Figure 3.8 shows the equilibrium rm value as a function of the degree of product
substitutability, ; and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z. This gure
allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.7 The SPNE rm value, Y , is decreasing with the degree of product substi-
tutability, , and with the level of demand uncertainty, z: However, the impact of the level
of demand uncertainty, z; is relatively small.
The expected value of the rm is the sum of the expected equity value and the ex-
pected debt value. The fact that the expected value of the rm is decreasing with the
degree of product substitutability is quite obvious considering that the expected equity
value decreases very intensely with  and that, the expected debt level is also decreasing
with  for many parameter values and when it is not decreasing, the increases have a
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Figure 3.8: SPNE expected rm value as a function of the degree of product substitutabil-
ity and the level of demand uncertainty without considering the default costs.
much smaller magnitude than the decrease in the expected equity value. Another way
of interpreting this result is using the fact that the expected value of the rm is equal
to the expected prot of the rm. The higher is the degree of product substitutability,
the tougher is the competition among the two rms and hence the lower are the expected
prots. The uncertainty degree has a small impact on the rm expected value because it
has contradictory impacts on the expected equity value (which increases with z) and the
expected debt level (which decreases with z).
Figure 3.9 shows that the equilibrium welfare depends on the degree of product sub-
stitutability,  and it depends on the level of demand uncertainty, z. The gure allows us
to conclude the following:
Result 3.8 The SPNE welfare level, Wel, is decreasing with the degree of product sub-
stitutability, , and decreasing with the level of demand uncertainty, z. However the
impact of demand uncertainty is relatively small.
The social welfare increases with the degree of product di¤erentiation (which is higher,
the lower is ). A high product di¤erentiation increases consumer welfare because the
utility function is such that consumers value quality. Moreover, the higher is product
di¤erentiation (the closer to 0 is ) the higher are the two rms prot.
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Figure 3.9: SPNE welfare as a function of the degree of product substitutability for various
levels of demand uncertainty without considering the default costs.
After analyzing the results we conclude that in the symmetric case we conrmed the
results obtained by Toolsema and Haan (2008) and Franck and Le Pape (2008).
3.4.2 Asymmetric duopoly
In this subsection we consider that rms di¤er in their marginal production cost. Firm
i has a null production cost, ci = 0, while rm j has marginal cost cj. We study what
happens as rm j becomes less e¢cient by analyzing the SPNE as the marginal cost of
rm j, cj, varies between 0 (the symmetric case) and 0:5. It should be noted that the
upper limit on cj was chosen so that the more ine¢cient rm has positive operating prots
even in the worst state of the world. Thus default can only happen as a consequence of
having too much debt obligations.
We examine how the variables equilibrium levels (debt, output, implicit interest rates,
default probabilities, equity value, value of the rm and welfare) vary as the marginal cost
of rm j increases (cj is represented in the x-axis), considering three possible values for
the degree of product substitutability,  ( = 0:2;  = 0:6 and  = 1). Three graphs are
presented for each variable (the rst corresponds to z = 0:85; the second to z = 1:25 and
the third one to z = 1:85). This allows us to check if the behavior is stable with the level
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Figure 3.10: SPNE debt level of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the marginal costs
of the rival without considering the default costs.
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Figure 3.11: SPNE debt level of the more ine¢cient rm as a function of its marginal
costs without considering the default costs.
of demand uncertainty, z:
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the debt obligations of rm i and of rm j, respectively,
as a function of the marginal cost of production of the rm j, cj. These gures allow us
to conclude the following:
Result 3.9 The SPNE level of debt obligation of rm i, Di ; is increasing with the mar-
ginal costs of rm j, cj: The increase is more pronounced for high levels of demand uncer-
tainty, z: On the contrary, the SPNE level of debt obligation of rm j, Dj ; is decreasing
with the marginal cost of rm j, cj: The decrease is more pronounced for high levels of
demand uncertainty, z:
Therefore we can conclude that the less e¢cient rm behaves more cautiously in the
debt market whereas the more e¢cient rm behaves more agressively.
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Figure 3.12: SPNE output level of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the rivals
marginal costs without considering the default costs.
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Figure 3.13: SPNE output level of the more ine¢cient rm as a function of its marginal
costs without considering the default costs.
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 show the output level of the rm i and the output level of the
rm j as a function of the marginal cost of the rm j, cj. These gures allow us to conclude
the following:
Result 3.10 The SPNE level of output rm i, qi ; is increasing with the rivals marginal
cost, cj. On the contrary, the SPNE level of output of rm j, q

j ; is decreasing with the
rms marginal cost.
Regarding the e¤ect of the marginal production cost of rm j, cj on the debt obligation
and on the output level of the two rms, the results presented above show that as rm
j becomes less e¢cient (i.e., its marginal production costs increases), the rm adopts a
more conservative approach in the debt market and in the output market. The intuition
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for this result is that, an increase in the marginal production cost leads to a decrease in
the marginal prot which implies a decrease in the debt and output levels.
The more e¢cient rm has the opposite behavior, i.e. it becomes more aggressive in
the debt market and in the output market. These e¤ects are more pronounced for high
levels of uncertainty, which increases the volatility of marginal prot.
Figures 3.14 and 3.15 show the default probability of rm i and the default probability
of rm j as a function of the marginal cost of the rm j, cj. These gures allow us to
conclude the following:
Result 3.11 The SPNE default probability of rm i, i ; is increasing with the marginal
cost of rm j, cj. On the contrary, the SPNE default probability of rm j, 

j ; is decreasing
with the marginal cost of rm j, cj. The default probabilities are more sensitive to changes
in cj when the degree of product substitutability, , is high.
Note that the increase in the marginal cost of rm j has opposite e¤ects on the default
probability of the two rms. The default probability of the ine¢cient rms decreases while
the default probability of the e¢cient rm increases with cj.
In order to understand the impact of changes in the marginal cost of rm j on its
own default probability, one needs to consider both direct and indirect e¤ects. The direct
e¤ect is positive. For given debt and quantity levels, an increase of the marginal cost of
the rm j; increases its default probability. A rst indirect e¤ects results from the fact
that the increase in the marginal cost of rm j leads to a more conservative behavior
in the debt and output markets which implies a decrease in the default probability. A
second indirect e¤ect is related to the fact that the more e¢cient increases its quantity,
which hurts the ine¢cient rms prots and thus increases its default probability (this
indirect e¤ect is smaller in magnitude). Thus the total e¤ect of increasing cj on the
default probability of rm j may be positive or negative, depending on which of the
e¤ects dominates. We observe that the rst indirect e¤ect dominates the other two e¤ects,
leading to the counterintuitive result that as the ine¢cient rm becomes less e¢cient, its
default probability decreases.
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Figure 3.14: SPNE default probability of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the rivals
marginal costs without considering the default costs.
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Figure 3.15: SPNE default probability of the less e¢cient rm as a function of its marginal
costs without considering the default costs.
The explanation of the impact on the more e¢cient rm default probability is similar,
although in this case there is no direct impact and thus the ambiguity in the total impact
is due to the fact that marginal costs has opposite e¤ects on the quantities and debt of the
two rms. It should be highlighted that, under our assumptions, we are not considering
the default risk related to operational ine¢ciency as we are considering levels of cj that
imply positive operating prots for the more ine¢cient rm even in the worst state of
the world,  z. If this assumption was not made, one would expect that further increases
in cj would imply higher default risk, even if the rm does not issue debt. Such default
risk would be due exclusively to operational reasons, and the more ine¢cient the rm
becomes, the higher would this risk be.
Figures 3.16 and 3.17 show the interest rate of the rm i and the interest rate of the
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Figure 3.16: SPNE interest rate level of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the rivals
marginal costs without considering the default costs.
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Figure 3.17: SPNE interest rate level of the less e¢cient rm as a function of its marginal
costs without considering the default costs.
rm j as a function of the marginal cost of rm j, cj. These gures allow us to conclude
the following:
Result 3.12 For high levels of demand uncertainty, an increase in marginal cost of the
rm j, cj, leads to a decrease in the SPNE interest rate of rm i, r

i ; and to increases
in the SPNE interest rate of rm j, rj . The change (decrease or increase) is more
pronounced for high levels of the degree of product substitutability, . For intermediate or
low values of demand uncertainty, the SPNE interest rate of rm i, ri follows an inverted
U relation with cj whereas the SPNE interest rate of rm j, r

j follows a U relationship.
Figures 3.18 and 3.19 show the expected equity values of rm i and rm j, respectively,
as a function of the marginal cost of production of the rm j, cj. These gures allow us
to conclude the following:
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Figure 3.18: SPNE expected equity value of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the
rivals marginal costs without considering the default costs.
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Figure 3.19: SPNE expected equity value of the less e¢cient rm as a function of its
marginal costs without considering the default costs.
Result 3.13 The SPNE expected equity value of the rm i, V i ; is increasing with the
rivals marginal cost of production, cj: On the contrary, the SPNE expected equity value
of rm j, V j ; is decreasing with the rms marginal cost of production of the rm j, cj.
Figures 3.20 and 3.21 show the expected debt values of rm i and rm j as a function
of the marginal cost of production of rm j, cj. The gures allow us to conclude the
following:
Result 3.14 The SPNE expected debt value of rm i,W i ; is increasing with the marginal
cost of rm j, cj: On the contrary, the SPNE expected debt value of rm j, W

j ; is
decreasing with the marginal cost of rm j, cj:
Results 3.22 and 3.23 allow us to conclude the following:
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Figure 3.20: SPNE expected debt value of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the
rivals marginal costs without considering the default costs.
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Figure 3.21: SPNE expected debt value of the less e¢cient rm as a function of its
marginal costs without considering the default costs.
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Figure 3.22: SPNE expected rm value of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the
rivals marginal costs without considering the default costs.
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Figure 3.23: SPNE expected rm value of the less e¢cient rm as a function of its marginal
costs without considering the default costs.
Result 3.15 The SPNE expected value of rm i, Y i ; is increasing with marginal cost
of the rm j, cj: On the contrary, the SPNE expected value of rm j, Y

j ; is decreasing
with the marginal cost of rm j, cj:
The previous result is a direct consequence of the expected prot of a rm being
negatively related with its marginal costs and positively related with the rivals marginal
cost.
Figure 3.24 shows the welfare level as a function of the marginal cost of production of
rm j, cj. The gure allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.16 The SPNE of the welfare, Wel; is decreasing with the marginal cost of the
rm j, cj:
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Figure 3.24: SPNE expected social welfare as a function of less e¢cient rms marginal
costs without considering the default costs.
This result is expected since everything else constant, the society as a all is worse the
higher the marginal cost of production.
The result of the asymmetric duopoly reveal that the SPNE output decreases with the
degree of product substitutability and with the rms marginal cost of production and, on
the contrary, it is increasing with the rival rm marginal cost. These results are similar to
the ones obtained in traditional oligopoly models. Moreover, the equilibrium debt level
of the less e¢cient rm is decreasing with its marginal cost while the most e¢cient rm
has the opposite behavior. This is a quite interesting result as it tells us that the less
e¢cient rm is more cautious and nances less with debt while the more e¢cient rm
becomes «more aggressive» in the debt market. Another interesting result is that the
default probability of the ine¢cient rm decreases as the rm becomes less e¢cient. This
result is due to the existence of direct and indirect e¤ects. On the one hand, for the same
debt level, increasing the marginal cost of the rm is expected to lead to an increase on
the default probability. On the other hand, since a decrease in e¢ciency leads to lower
levels of debt obligations and output, this leads to a decrease on the default probability.
Our results reveal that the last e¤ect dominates, showing that a less e¢cient rm may
have a lower probability of default because it nances less with debt.
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3.5 Results with default costs
In this section we analyze the SPNE of the game considering that the default cost pa-
rameters are positive; i.e., k, ai and aj are positive. In the next subsection we analyze
how the equilibrium values of the variables change with the uncertainty level, z; and with
the degree of product substitutability, ; in a symmetric duopoly model. Comparing the
results with the ones in subsection 3.4.1 we can see how the existence of default costs
inuences the equilibrium. The next two subsections explore the impact of changes in
the default costs parameters. We start by analyzing the impact of higher direct and in-
direct costs, increasing k and a (assuming a symmetric increase for both rms) then we
examine the impact of asymmetric changes in the indirect costs parameter.The analysis
of the SPNE of the game considering default costs and asymmetry in production costs
is presented in the Appendix (the results are similar to the results obtained from the
analysis of the impact of cost asymmetry and the existence of default costs). The main
contribution of this section is the introduction of the default costs in the analysis, which
allows us to verify if the previous results continue to be valid. This part of the study
provides a major contribution to the existent literature as default costs were not included
in the previous numerical studies.
3.5.1 Symmetric duopoly with default costs
This section studies a model with default cost and two symmetric rms (ci = cj = 0). In
addition, we assume  = 5, zmax = 2; M = 10; k = 0:10; ai = aj = 0:05.9 The aim of this
section is to analyze if the impact of changes in the level of demand uncertainty, z; and
in the degree of product substitutability, , is di¤erent when default costs are considered.
Figure 3.25 shows the equilibrium levels of debt obligation as a function of the degree
9The assumed values of k, ai and aj are consistent with the literature. In fact, these values allow us
to obtain total indirect costs (IDCi) higher than direct costs (DDCi). The empirical literature in the
area concludes that bankruptcy costs can vary between 0% and 20% of the total value of the rm (see,
for instance, Altman (1964), Kwasa and Cho (1995) and Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006)). The percentages
assumed also ensure that the total value of bankruptcy costs are less than 20% of the rm value. We
opted for not considering very high percentages, because with higher values we would go into areas with
multiple equilibria.
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Figure 3.25: SPNE debt obligation as a function of the degree of product substitubility
and the level of demand uncertainty considering default costs
of product substitutability, , and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z,
considering default costs. This gure allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.17 The SPNE level of debt obligation, D, is strictly positive and decreas-
ing with the level of demand uncertainty, z: On the other hand, the degree of product
substitutability does not have a monotonic impact on D. For small values of demand
uncertainty, D is decreasing with product substitutability. However, for higher values of
demand uncertainty, D follows a U relationship with .
The most striking feature of the previous result is that it is qualitatively very similar
to the result obtained under the assumption of no default costs. In other words, rms
are less aggressive in the debt market when uncertainty increases and the relationship
of debt and product substitutability is not monotonic for higher levels of uncertainty.
However one also observes that, the optimal level of debt obligations is lower when there
are default costs and that, for lower levels of uncertainty, the equilibrium debt obligation
is more sensitive to changes in the degree of product substitutability when default costs
are considered.
Figures 3.26 shows the equilibrium output level as a function of the degree of product
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Figure 3.26: SPNE output level as a function of the degree of product substitutability
and the level of demand uncertainty considering default costs
substitutability,  and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z, when default
costs are considered. The gure allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.18 The SPNE level output, q, is decreasing with the degree of product substi-
tutability,  and increasing with the level of demand uncertainty z. However, the impact
of demand uncertainty is relatively small. Nevertheless, when considering default costs,
the impact is more pronounced than when they are not considered.
Like in the case of the debt obligation, the equilibrium output behaviour as a function
of  and z is very similar, in qualitative terms, to the one veried without default costs.
The main di¤erence is again the higher sensitivity to changes in the degree of product
substitutability and also to changes in the level of uncertainty. Like in the case of no
default costs case, when interpreting the impact of the uncertainty level on qi , one has to
consider both direct and indirect e¤ects. For a xed level of debt obligations, increasing
uncertainty increases the optimal quantity because there are more good states of the world
and hence the expected marginal equity is higher, which increases the optimal quantity.
However there is also the indirect e¤ect since increasing z implies a lower equilibrium
debt level, which then leads to a lower optimal quantity. These two e¤ects have opposite
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Figure 3.27: SPNE interest rate as a function of the degree of product substitutability
and the level of demand uncertainty considering default costs
signs but the rst dominates, which explains why the equilibrium quantity is increasing
with z.
Figure 3.27 shows that the equilibrium interest rate depends on the degree of product
substitutability, , and on the level of demand uncertainty, z, considering default costs.
These gures allow us to conclude the following:
Result 3.19 The SPNE interest rate, r, is increasing with the degree of product substi-
tutability, , and with the level of demand uncertainty, z:The impact is more signicant
for high values of  and z.
Once again we can see that the way the interest rate varies with changes in the degree of
product substitutability and with z is qualitatively very similar to the one observed under
no default costs. However, with default costs, the interest rate is higher and more sensitive
to changes in the uncertainty level. This result is expected because, for a given debt level,
the existence of default costs, decreases the expected prot net of debt obligations and it
enlarges the set of states of the world where default occurs, explaining why the debtholder
require an higher interest rate.
Figure 3.28 shows the equilibrium default probability as a function of the degree of
product substitutability, , and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z, when
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Figure 3.28: SPNE default probability as a function of the degree of product substitutabil-
ity and the level of demand uncertainty considering default costs.
default costs are considered. The gure allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.20 The SPNE default probability, , is increasing with the degree of product
substitutability, , and with the level of demand uncertainty, z.
Comparing the default probability when default costs are considered with default
probability when there are no default costs, one concludes that with default costs and
taking into account the values considered for the parameters, the probability of default is
much lower. Moreover, with default costs and increase in the level of uncertainty, z, has
the opposite e¤ect on the default probability than when there are no default costs. With
default costs, an increase in the level of uncertainty, leads to an increase in the default
probability.
The fact that the default probability is lower with default cost is a consequence of
the rm adopting a much more conservative attitude in the debt market. This e¤ect
overwhelms the negative direct impact of the default costs on the default probability.
Regarding the e¤ect of increasing the demand uncertainty level, z; on the default
probability, we have to take into account three e¤ects. The direct e¤ect is that, for
given debt and quantity levels, the increase in the uncertainty level increases the default
probability. Regarding the indirect e¤ects, the fact that there is larger uncertainty leads
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rms to behave in a more aggressive manner in the output market. This e¤ect also tends
to increase the default probability. However, the greater uncertainty leads rms to be
much more conservative in the debt market, thus issuing less debt. A lower debt, implies
a lower default probability, directly and indirectly, through its inuence on the second
period equilibrium quantities. We conclude that when default costs are considered the
rst and the second e¤ects dominate, i.e., the direct e¤ect of the increasing uncertainty
and the e¤ect of the more aggressive behavior in the output market dominate the negative
impact of having a reduced equilibrium level, which leads to higher equilibrium default
probabilities.
Figures 3.29 and 3.30 show that the equilibrium expected equity value and the equilib-
rium expected debt value depend on the degree of product substitutability, , and on the
level of demand uncertainty, z, considering default costs. The gures allow us to conclude
the following:
Result 3.21 The SPNE expected equity value, V , and the SPNE expected debt value,
W ; are both decreasing with the degree of product substitutability, . On the other hand,
V  is increasing with the level of demand uncertainty, z whereas W  is decreasing with
z. When default cost are considered  no longer has an ambiguous e¤ect on the expected
debt value.
It should be noted that, when default cost are considered,  no longer has an ambiguous
e¤ect on the expected debt value. But the remaining results are qualitatively very similar
to the ones obtained without default costs.
Figure 3.31 shows the equilibrium rm value as a function of the degree of product
substitutability, ; and as a function of the level of demand uncertainty, z, considering
default cost. This gure allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.22 The SPNE rm value, Y , is decreasing with the degree of product substi-
tutability, , and with the level of demand uncertainty, z: However, the impact of the level
of demand uncertainty, z; is relatively small.
84
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
z=0.85
z=1.25
z=1.65
z=1.85
z
iV
iV
Figure 3.29: SPNE expected equity value as a function of the degree of product substi-
tutability for various levels of demand uncertainty considering default costs.
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Figure 3.30: SPNE expected debt value as a function of the degree of product substi-
tutability for various levels of demand uncertainty considering default costs.
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Figure 3.31: SPNE expected rm value as a function of the degree of product substi-
tutability and the level of demand uncertainty considering default costs.
In qualitative terms, the previous result is very similar to the one when there are no
default costs. However it should be noted that the value of the rm is higher when there
is default costs. This counter-intuitive result is due to the fact that having default costs
leads the rms to reduce the equilibrium debt levels which ends up having a positive e¤ect
on the value of the rm, that outweighs the direct negative impact of the default costs.
Thus default cost may be benecial for the rms. However this result may depend on the
value of the default cost parameters. For higher values of these parameter the negative
direct impact of the default costs may be higher and dominate the strategic e¤ect through
the debt reduction.
Figure 3.32 shows that the equilibrium welfare depends on the degree of product
substitutability,  and it depends on the level of demand uncertainty, z, when default
costs are considered. The gure allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.23 The SPNE welfare level, Wel, is decreasing with the degree of product
substitutability, , and increasing with the level of demand uncertainty, z. However the
impact of demand uncertainty is relatively small. When default costs are considered, the
SPNE welfare level is higher than when they are not considered.
The previous result is interesting because it tells us that the social welfare is higher
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Figure 3.32: SPNE welfare as a function of the degree of product substitutability for
various levels of demand uncertainty considering default costs.
when there are default costs. This result happens because the default cost imply a more
cautious behaviour by the rms, which is welfare improving.
Figure 3.33 and 3.34 show that equilibrium of direct and indirect default costs depend
on the degree of product substitutability, , and on the level of demand uncertainty, z,
when default costs are considered. The gure allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.24 The SPNE of direct and indirect default costs, DDCi and IDC

i , are
increasing with the degree of product substitutability, , and with the level of demand
uncertainty, z:
For given values of the default cost parameter, the shape of the total direct default
costs and total indirect default cost depends very much on the shape of the default
probability. Therefore it is not surprising that they are increasing with the degree of
product substitutability and with the level of demand uncertainty.
In this section we analyzed the equilibrium when there are direct and indirect default
costs and rms are symmetric. It is interesting to note that most of the qualitative results
that were obtained with no default costs also hold when default costs are considered. For
instance, in both cases the equilibrium level of debt is decreasing with the uncertainty
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Figure 3.33: SPNE ex-post default costs as a function of the degree of product substi-
tutability and the level of demand uncertainty.
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Figure 3.34: SPNE ex-ante default costs as a function of the degree of product substi-
tutability and the level of demand uncertainty.
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level whereas the equilibrium quantity level is increasing with uncertainty. However with
default cost rms behave more cautiously in the debt market, by issuing less debt. This
strategic e¤ect explains why the existence of default cost may lead to higher rms value
and to higher social welfare. The negative impact of the default cost is outweighed by the
impact of a more cautious behavior by the rms.
One important di¤erence in the results is that, with default costs and taking into
account the values considered for the parameters, a higher uncertainty level leads to a
higher default probability, a result which does not hold without default costs. This result
is due to the fact that the direct impact of increasing uncertainty has a larger negative
direct impact when there are default costs.
The total direct and indirect default costs depend positively on the degree of product
substitutability and the level of demand uncertainty.
3.5.2 Impact of symmetric changes in the default cost parame-
ters
In this section we analyze the impact of increasing the default costs parameters in a
symmetric two stage duopoly model. In other words, we analyze how the equilibrium
values of the variables change with the parameter that captures the decrease in demand
due to the loss of reputation when a rm is likely to go bankrupt and the parameter
that measures the proportion of prots that bondholders lose when default occur because
they have to pay legal, accounting and administrative expenses related with the default
process.
In order to analyze the impact of changes at the level of direct (k) and indirect (ai)
default costs parameters on the equilibrium of the variables, we considered two symmetric
rms (ci = cj = 0). We also considered  = 5, zmax = 0:9;  = 0:6; M = 10 and ai = aj.
We analyzed the SPNE as a function of the indirect default cost, ai (represented in the
x-axis and we considered values between 0:05 and 0:15) and as a function of direct default
cost, k (we represent three k levels: k = 0:08; k = 0:12; k = 0:18).
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Figure 3.35: SPNE debt obligations as a function of direct and indirect default costs
parameters
Figures 3.35, 3.36, 3.37, 3.38 show the equilibrium levels of debt obligations, equilib-
rium output level, equilibrium interest rate, equilibrium default probability as a function
of the indirect default cost parameter, ai, and as a function of direct default costs para-
meter, k: These gures allow us to conclude the following:
Result 3.25 The SPNE level of debt obligation, D, of output level, q, of interest rate,
r and of default probability, , are strictly positive and decreasing with the indirect
default cost parameter, ai = aj, and with the direct default cost parameter, k:
Therefore, the rms tend to adopt a more conservative behavior in the debt market and
in the product market as the impact of reputation losses on demand increases and as the
losses incurred by bondholders when default occurs increase. The fact that rms behave
more cautiously is a quite natural result. If having a high expected default probability has
very negative consequence because demand is much lower due to a loss of reputation, rm
will try to avoid this reputational demand loss by having lower debt obligation and being
less aggressive in the output market. In the case of the direct default cost parameter, when
it increases and for given default probability, the interest rate goes up as bondholders will
only accept to nance the rm if they receive a compensation high enough to face the
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Figure 3.36: SPNE output level as a function of direct and indirect default cost parameters
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Figure 3.37: SPNE interest rate as a function of direct and indirect default costs parame-
ters
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Figure 3.38: SPNE default probability as a function of direct and indirect default costs
parameters
higher direct default costs in the event of a default. The best response of the rm to the
increase in k is a reduction in the debt obligations. This has a negative indirect impact
on the default probability which surpasses the positive direct e¤ect of increasing k. As a
result, the equilibrium interest rate also goes down due to the more cautious behavior of
the rms.
Figure 3.39 shows the equilibrium expected equity value depends of the indirect default
cost parameter, ai, and it depends on direct default cost parameter, k. The gure allows
us to conclude the following:
Result 3.26 The SPNE expected equity value, V , is increasing with the indirect default
cost parameter, ai, and with the direct default cost parameter, k:
Figure 3.40 shows the equilibrium expected debt value as a function of the indirect
default cost parameter, ai, and as a function of the direct default cost parameter, k. The
gure allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.27 The SPNE expected debt value, W , is decreasing the indirect default cost
parameter, ai, and with the direct default cost parameter, k:
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Figure 3.39: SPNE expected equity value as a function of direct and indirect default costs
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Figure 3.40: SPNE expected debt value as a function of direct and indirect default costs
parameters
93
The behavior of the expected debt value is very similar to the behavior of the debt
obligations. In other words, to a great extent the fact that the expected debt value is
decreasing with the direct and indirect cost parameters is due to to the fact that debt
obligations decrease with these parameter. The fact that the interest rate is also decreasing
with default cost parameters implies that Wi should have a smaller decrease than Di.
However, we cannot forget that the default cost parameters have a direct negative impact
of the expected value of debt. In fact, the higher are the default cost, the lower is the
amount received by bondholders if default happens10, which for a given interest rate and
given debt obligations, reduces the expected value of debt. It seems that the interest rate
e¤ect and the direct impact of the default costs tend to cancel each other, explaining why
Wi and Di have a so similar shape.
Figure 3.41 shows the equilibrium rm value as a function of the indirect default cost
parameter, ai; and as a function of the direct default cost parameter, k: This gure allows
us to conclude the following:
Result 3.28 The SPNE rm value, Y , is increasing with the indirect default cost pa-
rameter, ai, and with the direct default cost parameter, k:
When demand is more sensitive to the expected default probability (the reputational
e¤ect is higher) and the direct losses incurred by bondholders when default occurs increase,
we know that the expected value of equity increases whereas the expected value of debt
decreases. In other words, increases in the default costs change the capital structure of
the rm since the rm becomes more equity nanced. Furthermore, the additional value
received by the equity holders is higher than the reduction in the expected debt value,
which causes an increase in the rm value. Consequently, the increase in the default cost
parameters is benecial for the rm. This counter-intuitive result is explained by the fact
that, as a response to the higher default costs, in equilibrium rms behave more cautiously
in the debt market and in the product market.
10In the case of the direct default cost, the amount received by bondholders is lower because of the
default expenses that have to be paid. In the case of the indirect costs, the amount received by bondholders
is lower because operating prots are lower when demand is more sensitive to the rms reputation.
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Figure 3.41: SPNE expected rm value as a function of direct and indirect default costs
parameters
Figure 3.42 shows the equilibrium welfare as a function of the indirect default cost
parameter, ai, and as a function of the direct default cost parameter, k. The gure allows
us to conclude the following:
Result 3.29 The SPNE welfare level, Wel, is decreasing with the indirect default cost
parameter, ai, and increasing with the direct default cost parameter, k:
The previous result shows that the impact of increasing the direct default cost and
the indirect default cost parameters on social welfare is very di¤erent. While increases in
the direct default costs are welfare improving, increases in the indirect cost parameters
are welfare reducing. The explanation for the opposite impacts is related with the impact
on the consumer surplus. In our model consumers are clearly worse o¤ when a rm is
expected to fail. An increase in the indirect default cost parameter, has a direct negative
impact on the consumer surplus whereas an increase in direct default costs only inuences
the consumer surplus indirectly.
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Figure 3.42: SPNE welfare as a function of direct and indirect default costs parameters
3.5.3 Impact of asymmetric changes in the indirect default cost
parameters
In this section, the objective is to study the impact of asymmetric changes in the indirect
default cost parameters, ai and aj. One interpretation of this exercise is that the reputa-
tional demand loss may not be the same for the two rms. In other words, we consider
that rms can di¤er in their reputation e¤ect parameter, i.e. we can have ai 6= aj. We
consider two symmetric rms (ci = cj = 0) and  = 5, zmax = 0:9;  = 0:6 and M = 10:
We analyze the SPNE as a function of the indirect default cost parameter of rm i, ai
(represented in the x-axis) and as a function of the indirect default cost parameter of rm
j, aj (we represent three aj levels: aj = 0:05; aj = 0:08; aj = 0:10).
Figures 3.43, 3.44, 3.45, 3.46 show the equilibrium levels of debt, equilibrium output
level, equilibrium interest rate, equilibrium default probability as a function of the indirect
default cost parameter of rm i, ai and as a function of the indirect default cost parameter
of rm j, aj:
96
1.60
1.70
1.80
1.90
2.00
2.10
2.20
2.30
0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11
aj=0.05
aj=0.08
aj=0.10
ia
iD
Figure 3.43: SPNE debt obligation of rm i as a function of indirect default cost para-
meters of both rms
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Figure 3.44: SPNE output level as a function of indirect default cost parameters of both
rms
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Figure 3.45: SPNE expected interest rate of rm i as a function of indirect default cost
parameters of both rms
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Figure 3.46: SPNE default probability of rm i as a function of indirect default cost
parameters of both rms
98
These gures allow us to conclude the following:
Result 3.30 For rm i, the SPNE debt obligation, Di , the SPNE level of output, q

i ,
the SPNE level of interest rate, ri , and the SPNE level of default probability, 

i , are
strictly positive and decreasing with its indirect default cost parameter, ai, and increasing
with the indirect default cost parameter of the rival rm, aj:
Regarding the e¤ect of the indirect default cost of the rm i and indirect default cost of
the rm j, the previous result shows that the e¤ect of the increase in the reputation e¤ect
of the rm i; ai; leads to a more conservative behavior of the rm in the debt and in the
output market, which implies a decrease in the interest rate and in the default probability.
Therefore the strategic e¤ect outweighs the direct negative impact of increasing ai on the
default probability.
On the contrary, an increase in the demand sensitivity to the reputation of rm j, aj;
implies a more aggressive behavior in the debt market and in output market by rm i ,
which leads to an increase in the interest rate and in the default probability of rm i:
Figure 3.47 shows the equilibrium expected equity value as a function of the indirect
default cost parameter of rm i, ai and as a function of the indirect default cost parameter
of rm j, aj: The gure allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.31 The SPNE expected equity value of rm i, V , is increasing with the in-
direct default cost parameter of the rm, ai, and decreasing with the indirect default cost
parameter of the rival rm, aj:
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Figure 3.47: SPNE expected equity value as a function of indirect default cost parameters
of both rms
The gures 3.48 and 3.49 allow us to conclude the following:
Result 3.32 The SPNE expected debt value of rm i, W i , and the SPNE value of rm i,
Y i ; are decreasing with the indirect default cost parameter of the rm, ai, and increasing
with the indirect default cost parameter of rival, aj:
As a consequence, a unilateral increase in the indirect default cost parameter of rm
i, ai, is detrimental for the rm and benecial for the rival rm. As ai increases, the rm
nances less with debt and more with equity (the equity values increases while the debt
value decreases). Since the decrease in the debt value has a larger magnitude than the
increase in the equity value, the value of the rm decreases. Despite the more cautious
behaviour of rm i when ai increases, which leads to a reduction in the default probability,
the negative direct impact of the increase in the indirect default costs implies that the
total e¤ect on on the rms value is negative. On the contrary, unilateral increases in the
indirect default cost parameter of the rival rm, aj are benecial for rm i. The expected
value of rm i increases because the decrease in the demand of the rival rm, leads the
rival to produce less, which increases the expected prot of rm i.
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Figure 3.48: SPNE expected debt value as a function of indirect default cost parameters
of both rms
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Figure 3.49: SPNE expected rm value as a function of indirect default cost parameters
of both rms
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Figure 3.50 shows that the equilibrium welfare depends on the indirect default cost
parameter of rm i, ai and on the indirect default cost parameter of rm j, aj. The gure
allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.33 The SPNE welfare level, Wel is decreasing with the indirect default cost
parameter of the rm i, ai, and with the indirect default cost parameter of the rm j , aj:
When ai increases, rm i is worse o¤ while rm j is better o¤. But besides these
two contradictory e¤ects, an increase in aj also implies lower expected consumer surplus.
Therefore it is not surprising that social welfare decreases when the indirect default cost
parameters increase. The fact that consumers are uncertain regarding whether the rm
is going to survive or not and that because of that uncertainty buy less in this market
represents a real loss for society as consumer shift part of their expenditures to goods
with smaller utility (but without uncertainty).
Figures 3.51 and 3.52 show the equilibrium direct and indirect total default costs as
a function of the indirect default cost parameter of the rm i, ai, and as a function of
the indirect default cost parameter of the rm j, aj. The gure allows us to conclude the
following:
Result 3.34 The SPNE direct and indirect default costs of rm i, DDCi and IDC

i ,
are decreasing with its indirect default cost parameter, ai, and increasing with the indirect
default cost parameter of the rival rm, aj:
Regarding the e¤ect of the indirect default cost parameter of rm i, ai; on its own
total direct and indirect default costs, DDCi and IDC

i , we need to consider three
e¤ects. The rst e¤ect is the direct e¤ect (for given, output and debt levels). This direct
e¤ect is clearly positive, that is, higher ai implies higher default costs because a higher ai
leads to a lower demand, which decreases the operating prots and therefore increases the
default probability. Regarding the indirect e¤ects, the fact that there is a larger indirect
default cost parameter, ai, leads rm i to behave in a more conservative manner in the
debt market and in output market. This e¤ect tends to decrease the default probability
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Figure 3.50: SPNE welfare as a function of indirect default cost parameters of both rms
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Figure 3.51: SPNE direct default cost as a function of indirect default cost parameters of
both rms
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Figure 3.52: SPNE indirect default cost as a function of indirect default cost parameters
of both rms
and therefore decrease the direct and indirect default cost of the rm i. We conclude that
the indirect e¤ects dominate, i.e. rms behave less aggressively in the debt and output
market when the indirect default cost parameter of the rm i is higher, which leads to
lower total direct and indirect default costs. The opposite behavior is observed when we
analyze the increase in an indirect default cost parameter of the rival rm, aj.
3.6 Conclusion
The present work examined, analytically and numerically, how the market structure and
the default costs inuence nancial and product market decisions and, consequently, how
they a¤ect the default risk. We considered a two stage duopoly model. In the rst
stage, rms simultaneously decide the level of debt that maximizes the rm value and, in
the second stage of the game, rms simultaneously decide the quantity that maximizes
the equity value. To nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the model was solved
backwards. We rst determined the Nash equilibrium of the quantity competition game
and then determined the equilibrium levels of debt. Due to the complexity of the problem,
we had to solve the model analytically using GAUSS. We determined the equilibrium
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values of several variables: debt obligation, output, expected equity value, expected debt
value, expected value of the rm, implicit interest rates, default probabilities and social
welfare. The numerical model was run for many values of the parameter of the model in
order to allow us to study the impact of changes in the level of demand uncertainty, in
the degree of product substitutability, in the default costs and in the level of asymmetry
in marginal production costs on the equilibrium values of the previous variables and, in
particular, on the equilibrium default probability.
We studied two scenarios. In the rst one, we assume that there were no default costs.
In the second scenario we incorporated default cost into our analysis. We considered
two types of default costs: (i) Direct default costs, stemming from the legal, accounting
and administrative expenditures that have to be supported if default occurs. This direct
default costs are supported primarily by bondholders as they keep the rms prot when
default occurs and; (ii) Indirect default costs, related to the reputation e¤ect, i.e., to the
reduction in demand resulting from the fear that customers may have when the probability
of default is positive. In each scenario, we analyzed the case where the two rms have the
same marginal costs (symmetric case) and the case where rms di¤er in their marginal
cost of production (asymmetric case).
When default costs are not considered, we concluded that, in the symmetric model,
debt obligations decreases with uncertainty whereas the degree of product substitutability
does not have a monotonic impact on the equilibrium debt obligation. Moreover the
default probability is increasing with the degree of product substitutability and decreasing
with the level of uncertainty. This last result seems strange, but it is easy to explain. There
are direct and indirect e¤ect of the level of uncertainty on the default probability. It is true
that, for given debt level and quantity levels, increasing uncertainty leads to an increase in
the default probability. However, the increase in the uncertainty level also decreases the
equilibrium debt obligations and this leads to a decrease in the default probability (there
are also indirect e¤ects through the equilibrium quantity levels). It turns out that the
impact of the rm reducing its debt obligations outweights the direct impact of increasing
uncertainty, which explains the result.
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In our second setup we analyzed the impact marginal costs asymmetry. Regarding
the equilibrium output, the qualitative results are very similar to ones obtained in a
traditional oligopoly (without limited responsability): the equilibrium output decreases
whith the rms marginal cost and increases with the rival rms marginal cost. However
we also obtain the interesting result that as the rm becomes less e¢cient, in equilibrium
it issues less debt whereas the more e¢cient rm becomes «more aggressive» in the debt
market. As a consequence of this more cautious behavior, the default probability of the
ine¢cient rm decreases as the rm becomes less e¢cient. This is counter-intuitive result
happens because the impact of the more cautious behavior in the debt market outweight
the direct impact of an increase in the rms marginal costs, which obvioulsy increases
the default probability.
The analysis of the model with symmetric default costs shows that the impact of
changes in the level of uncertainty and changes in the degree of product substitutability
are, in general, quite similar to the ones veried when default costs were not considered, if
we just look at the qualitative. For instance, in both cases the equilibrium level of debt is
decreasing with the uncertainty level whereas the equilibrium quantity level is increasing
with uncertainty. There are however some di¤erences that should be highlighted. The
rst one is that with default cost rms behave more cautiously in the debt market, by
issuing less debt. This strategic e¤ect explains why the existence of default cost may lead
to higher rms value and to higher social welfare. This counter-intuitive results is due to
the fact that the negative direct impact of the default cost is outweighed by the positive
impact of a more cautious behavior by the rms. Another important di¤erence in the
results is that, with default costs and taking into account the values considered for the
parameters, a higher uncertainty level leads to a higher default probability, a result which
does not hold without default costs. With default costs, increasing uncertainty has a
much larger negative direct impact on the default probability and this e¤ect is not totally
compensated by the more cautious behaviour of the rm. In other words, with the default
costs, the direct e¤ect of increasing uncertainty dominates the indirect impact through
changes in the equilibrium debt levels. Finally, this section showed that the total direct
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and indirect default costs depend positively on the degree of product substitutability and
the level of demand uncertainty.
In the two last sections we analyzed the impact of changing the direct and indirect
default cost parameter. We considered rst symmetric changes in these parameter (i.e.,
the parameters change equally for the two rms) and next we explored what happens
when the reputation e¤ect parameter of rm increases unilaterally. When we considered
symmetric changes in the default cost parameters we concluded that rms behave in a
more conservative way both in debt market and in the output market. As a consequence
the default probabilities as well as the interest rates go down when default cost parameters
increase. Furthermore, the expected debt value decreases but the expected equity value
increase when the default costs parameters increasing. The additional expected equity
value is higher than the reduction in the expected debt value, which means that the
expected value of the rm goes up. This happens because the reduction in the default
probability has a positive impact on the expected prots that more than compensates the
decrease in the expected prots due to the increase in the default cost parameters. In
other words, symmetric increases in the default cost parameter lead to an increase in the
expected prots due to the more cautious behavior of the two rms. A similar reasoning
explains why, despite the increase in the default cost parameters, the total direct and
total indirect default costs go down. Finally, changes in the direct and indirect default
cost parameter have di¤erent e¤ects on the welfare. While increases in the direct default
cost parameter are welfare improving, increases in indirect default cost parameter reduce
welfare, which is due to the fact that the indirect default cost parameter have a direct
negative impact on the consumer surplus.
The last section reveals that unilateral changes in the indirect default cost parameter
have quite di¤erent impacts. A rm behaves less aggressively in the debt and in output
market when its indirect default cost increases, while the rival rm behaves more ag-
gressively. Moreover, as expected, a unilateral increase of a rm indirect default costs is
detrimental for the rm, but benecial for the rival rm.
Overall, our results suggest that the equilibrium default probability is greatly inu-
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enced by the nancial and product market decisions of the rms, who optimally adjust
their behavior to structural changes in the industry. Therefore a less favorable environ-
ment does not necessarily imply higher default probability, as the rm may respond by
nancing less with debt.
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 A- Asymmetric duopoly with default costs
In this appendix we study what happens when rm j becomes less e¢cient by analyzing
the SPNE as the marginal cost of rm j, cj; increases between 0 and 0:5. The aim is to
analyze if the impact of a unilateral increase in marginal production cost is di¤erent when
default costs are considered.
Figures 3.53 and 3.54 show the debt level of the rm i and the debt level of the rm
j as a function of the marginal cost of the rm j, cj, considering the default costs. These
gures allow us to conclude the following:
Result 3.35 The SPNE debt obligation of the rm i, Di ; is increasing with the marginal
cost of production of the rm j, cj: On the contrary, the SPNE debt obligation of rm j,
Dj ; is decreasing with the marginal cost of production of the rm j, cj:
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Figure 3.53: SPNE debt obligation of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the rivals
marginal costs considering default costs.
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Figure 3.54: SPNE debt obligation of the more ine¢cient rm as a function of its marginal
costs considering default costs.
Therefore the impact of increasing the marginal costs of rm j is qualitatively very
similar to what happens without default costs: the less e¢cient rm becomes more cau-
tious in the debt market by issuing less debt while the opposite happens for the more
e¢cient rm.
Figures 3.55 and 3.56 show the output level of rm i and the output level of rm j as
a function of the marginal cost of rm j, cj, when the default costs are considered. These
gures allow us to conclude the following:
Result 3.36 The SPNE level of output rm i, qi ; is increasing with the rivals mar-
ginal cost of production, cj. On the contrary, the SPNE level of output of rm j, q

j ; is
decreasing with the rms marginal cost of production.
109
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
1=γ6.0=γ2.0=γ
25.1=z 85.1=z85.0=z
Figure 3.55: SPNE output level of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the rivals
marginal costs considering default costs
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Figure 3.56: SPNE output level of the more ine¢cient rm as a function of its marginal
costs considering default costs.
110
Therefore, the impact of a unilateral increase in marginal cost of rm j has the same
sign than when default costs are not considered and the same sign that would occur in a
traditional duopoloy model (without limited liability).
Figures 3.57 and 3.58 show the interest rate of rm i and the interest rate of rm j as
a function of the marginal cost of rm j, cj, considering the default costs. These gures
allow us to conclude the following:
Result 3.37 The SPNE interest rate of rm i, ri ; is decreasing with the marginal cost
of rm j, cj: On the contrary, the SPNE interest rate of rm j, r

j ; is increasing with its
marginal cost, cj:
Comparing the previous gures to the ones when there are no default cost, the most
remarkable di¤erence is that interest rates are now much lower, which is a result of the
more cautious behavior of the two rms when default costs are present.
Figures 3.59 and 3.60 show the default probability of rm i and the default probability
of rm j as a function of the marginal cost of production of the rm j, cj, when default
costs are considered. These gures allow us to conclude the following:
Result 3.38 The SPNE default probability of rm i, i ; increases slightly with the mar-
ginal cost rm j, cj and the SPNE default probability of rm j, 

j ; is decreasing with its
marginal cost, cj. The default probabilities are more sensitive to changes in cj when the
degree of product substitutability is high.
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
1=γ6.0=γ2.0=γ
25.1=z 85.1=z85.0=z
Figure 3.57: SPNE interest rate level of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the rivals
marginal costs considering default costs.
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Figure 3.58: SPNE interest rate level of the less e¢cient rm as a function of its marginal
costs considering default costs.
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Figure 3.59: SPNE default probability of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the rivals
marginal costs considering default costs.
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Figure 3.60: SPNE default probability of the less e¢cient rm as a function of its marginal
costs considering default costs.
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This result shows that, in qualitative terms, the e¤ect of the increase in cj on the
default probabilities is very similar to the one without default costs. In particular, an
increase in cj has opposite e¤ects on the default probability of rm i and rm j. However
it should be emphasized that the default probabilities are much lower with default costs.
This is explained by the fact that, in equilibrium, both rms have lower debt obligations
as a consequence of the default costs.
Figures 3.61, 3.62, 3.63, 3.64, 3.65 and 3.66 show the expected equity values, expected
debt values and expected rm values of rm i and rm j, respectively, as a function of the
marginal cost of production of the rm j, cj; considering the default cost. These gures
allow us to conclude the following:
Result 3.39 The SPNE expected equity value of the rm i, V i , the SPNE expected debt
value of the rm i, W i ; and the expected value of the rm i, Y

i ; are increasing with the
rivals marginal cost of production: On the contrary, the SPNE expected equity value of
rm j, V j ; the SPNE expected debt value of the rm j, W

j ; and the expected value of
the rm j, Y j ; are decreasing with the rms marginal cost of production of the rm j,
cj .
The previous result reveals that the e¤ect of a unilateral increase in the marginal
cost of rm j on the two rms value (total value, value for shareholders and value for
bondholders) has the same sign than when no default costs were considered.
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Figure 3.61: SPNE expected equity value of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the
rivals marginal costs considering default costs.
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Figure 3.62: SPNE expected equity value of the less e¢cient rm as a function of its
marginal costs considering default costs.
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Figure 3.63: SPNE expected debt value of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the
rivals marginal costs considering default costs.
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Figure 3.64: SPNE expected debt value of the less e¢cient rm as a function of its
marginal costs considering default costs.
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Figure 3.65: SPNE expected rm value of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the
rivals marginal costs considering default costs.
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Figure 3.66: SPNE expected rm value of the less e¢cient rm as a function of its marginal
costs considering default costs.
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Figure 3.67: SPNE expected social welfare as a function of the less e¢cient rms marginal
costs considering default costs.
Figure 3.67 shows the welfare level as a function of the marginal cost of production
of rm j, cj, when default costs are considered. The gure allows us to conclude the
following:
Result 3.40 The SPNE of the welfare, Wel; is decreasing with the marginal cost of
production of the rm j, cj: When default costs are considered the SPNE welfare level is
higher than when they are not considered.
Figures 3.68, 3.69, 3.70 and 3.71 show the equilibrium of direct and indirect default
costs as a function of the marginal cost of production of rm j, cj, considering the default
costs. The gures allow us to conclude the following:
Result 3.41 The SPNE total direct and indirect default costs of the rm i, DDCi and
IDCi , is increasing with the marginal cost of rm j, cj. On the contrary, the SPNE of
direct and indirect default costs of the rm j, DDCj and IDC

j follows a U relationship
with the marginal cost of production of the rm j, cj. The change of behavior occurs for
intermediate levels of marginal cost of production of the rm j, cj:
After analyzing the results we conclude that when default costs are considered, the
impact of a unilateral increase in the marginal production cost is less pronounced in
the more e¢cient rm. For the less e¢cient rm we can conclude that when default
cost are considered, there are some e¤ects that are less pronounced and others that are
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Figure 3.68: SPNE ex-post default costs of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the
rivals marginal costs
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Figure 3.69: SPNE ex-post default costs of the less e¢cient rm as a function of its
marginal costs
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Figure 3.70: SPNE ex-ante default costs of the more e¢cient rm as a function of the
rivals marginal costs
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Figure 3.71: SPNE ex-ante default costs of the less e¢cient rm as a function of its
marginal costs
more evident. As direct and indirect default costs depend directly on the probability of
default, it is natural to present a similar relationship to a unilateral increase in marginal
production costs.
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3.7.2 B- Gauss Program
/*This program computes the SPNE of a model, considering linear demands with di¤erentiated*/
/* products, constant marginal costs which may be asymmetric, demand uncertainty with a */
/*uniform distribution of the uncertainty parameter and Cournot competition. We consider in */
/* our analysis the default costs. Subdivided into two types: a1 and a2 that represent the */
/* reputation e¤ect, i.e. a decrease in demand caused by consumers fear (indirect costs); the k */
/*su¤ered by bondholders when the probability of default is greater than zero (direct costs). */
/*Alpha is the e¤ect, represents the losses dimension of the market, gama is the di¤erentiation*/
/*parameter zbarra is the uncertainty parameter and c1 and c2 are marginal costs. The program */
/*determines rst the NE of the second stage game, for given debt levels (D1,D2) and for each */
/*(D1,D2) the equilibrium value of each rm, (Y1,Y2), is computed.This is repeated for many*/
/* (D1,D2) and the equilibrium values of Y1 and Y2 are saved in two matrices. Next the NE of */
/*the rst stage game is determined (D1eq,D1eq) and the corresponding NE of the second stage*/
/* game and equilibrium default probabilities are determined. This procedure is repeated for many*/
/* values of the parameter values so as to analyze how the equilibrium changes with changes in */
/* the parameter values. */
library co;
#include co.ext;
coset;
/****************************** Inicial parameters of the model *****************************/
alpha=5;/* expected size of the market*/
k=0.10; /* direct default cost: loss of pay su¤ered by creditors */
M=10; /* budget constraint*/
zbarmax=1.85; /* maximum value of the uncertainty degree */ ;
zbarmin=1.25; /* minimum value of the uncertainty degree */
c1=0; /* marginal cost of rm 1 */
c2=0.45; /* marginal cost of rm 2 */
a1=0.05; /* indirect marginal default costs of rm 1: reputation e¤ect*/
a2=0.05; /* indirect marginal default costs of rm 2: reputation e¤ect*/
gamamax=1; /* maximum the di¤erentiation parameter */
gamamin=0.2; /* minimum value of the di¤erentiation parameter */
zbarra=zbarmin; /* start value of uncertainty degree */
saltozbar=0.40; /* step size for the iterations on the uncertainty degree */
saltgama=0.40; /* step size for the iterations on the uncertainty degree */
niterzbar=int((zbarmax-zbarmin)/saltozbar)+1; /* number of iterations for uncertainty degree */
nitergam=int((gamamax-gamamin)/saltgama)+1; /*number of iterations for di¤erentiation */
parameter*/
/***Create matrices to keep the SPNE values of quantities, debt and default probabilities ***/
D1eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
D2eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
teta1eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
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teta2eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
q1eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
q2eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
zbarmat=zeros(niterzbar,1);
gamamat=zeros(1, nitergam);
w1eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
w2eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
v1eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
v2eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
y1eqpmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
y2eqpmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
r1eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
r2eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
welfeqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
idc1eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
idc2eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
ddc1eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
ddc2eqmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
numberENmat=zeros(niterzbar,nitergam);
/******* Start iterations of level of uncertainty (zbarra) and di¤erentiation level (gama) ********/
iterzb=1;
do while zbarra <=zbarmax;
gama=gamamin;
iterga=1;
do while gama <=gamamax;
/********************************************************************************
/*********** Finding the second stage NE for various levels of (D1,D2) and saving *************/
/********** the NE value of each rm in a matrix which will be use to nd SPNE **************/
/********************************************************************************/
/************** This is to obtain the lower and upper bounds for D1 and D2 ****************/
D1min=0;
D2min=0;
D1max=3; /* Debt cannot be higher than expected monopoly prots. Here we are using an */
D2max=3; /* weighted average of monopoly and duopoly prots as the upper bound of debt */
saltob=0.05; /* step size for the iterations on the debt levels */
niterD1=int((D1max-D1min)/saltob)+1; /* number of iterations for debt level of rm 1 */
niterD2=int((D2max-D2min)/saltob)+1; /* number of iterations for debt level of rm 2 */
y1mat=ones(niterD1,niterD2); /* create matrix to save the NE total value of rm 1 */
y1mat=y1mat*(-500);
y2mat=ones(niterD1,niterD2); /* create matrix to save the NE total value of rm 2 */
y2mat=y2mat*(-500);
D2mat=zeros(1,niterD2);
D1mat=zeros(niterD1,1);
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D1=D1min;
/*************************Start iterations of levels of D1and D2) *********************/
iterD1=1;
do while D1<= D1max;
D2=D2min;
iterD2=1;
do while D2<= D2max;
/*************************** Check if NE is interior for all 4 variables *****************/
x0 = {3, 3,0,0}; /* starting values of variables to be used in the constrained optimization routine*/
_co_IneqProc=&ineqlim; /* ineqlim is the procedure where the inequality constraints are dened*/
_co_MaxIters=100; /* maximum number of iterations in the constrained optimization */
{x,f,g,ret}=co(&fob,x0); /* this calls the routine to solve constrained optimization problem.
Objective function dened in procedure fob */
call coprt(x,f,g,ret);
if f<0.00001; /* if the optimal value of the objective function is very close to zero it means that we
found an interior NE */
goto nefound; /* if previous condition true can «jump» to the end of if cycles, since NE was already
found. Jump to line with level «nefound» */
else;
/************* Check if NE is z^1 = -zbar and z^2 = -zbar, q1 and q2 interior **********/
_co_IneqProc=&ineqlim1;
_co_MaxIters=100;
{x,f,g,ret}=co(&foD1,x0);
call coprt(x,f,g,ret);
if f<0.00001;
goto nefound;
else;
/************Check if NE is z^1 = -zbar and z2 interior, q1 and q2 interior ***********/
_co_MaxIters=100;
_co_IneqProc=&ineqlim2;
{x,f,g,ret}=co(&foD2,x0);
call coprt(x,f,g,ret);
if f<0.00001;
goto nefound;
else;
/************* Check if NE is z^1 interior and z2= -zbar , q1 and q2 interior **********/
_co_MaxIters=100;
_co_IneqProc=&ineqlim3;
{x,f,g,ret}=co(&fob3,x0);
call coprt(x,f,g,ret);
if f<0.00001;
goto nefound;
else;
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goto nefound2; /* If we arrive here it means that no NE was found in the feasible region
(z^1 and z^2 cannot be in the upper limit) */
endif;
endif;
endif;
endif;
nefound:
/********* Compute the NE total value of each rm and save it in the matrix **********/
y1=-k*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))*(D1-(((1-a1*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[1]-
gama*x[2]-c1+(x[3]-zbarra)/2)*x[1]))+((1-a1*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[1]-
gama*x[2]-c1)*x[1]; /* The NE value of rm 1 is equal to the equilibrium expected prot
(considering the NE values of q1 and q2) */
y2=-k*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))*(D2-(((1-a2*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[2]-
gama*x[1]-c2+(x[4]-zbarra)/2)*x[2]))+((1-a2*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[2]-
gama*x[1]-c2)*x[2]; /* The NE value of rm 2 is equal to the equilibrium expected prot
(considering the NE values of q1 and q2) */
y1mat[iterD1,iterD2]=y1; /* save the NE value of rm 1 in a matrix, where each row
corresponds to a value of D1, and each columnn to the value of D2 */
y2mat[iterD1,iterD2]=y2; /* save the NE value of rm 1 in a matrix, where each row
corresponds to a value of D1, and each columnn to the value of D2 */
nefound2:
D2mat[1,iterD2]=D2;
D2=D2+saltob;
iterD2=iterD2+1;
endo;
D1mat[iterD1,1]=D1;
D1=D1+saltob;
iterD1=iterD1+1;
endo;
/************************************************************************/
/******** The iterations for the NE of the second stage game end here *************/
/***************** Find the SPNE levels of D1 and D2 ***********************/
/**********************************************************************/
iterD1=1;
numberEN=0;
do while iterD1 <= niterD1;
iterD2=1;
do while iterD2 <= niterD2;
y1col=y1mat[.,iterD2];
y2row=y2mat[iterD1,.];
y2col=y2row;
if y1mat[iterD1,iterD2]==maxc(y1col) and y2mat[iterD1,iterD2]==maxc(y2col); /* this
checks if a given (D1,D2) is a NE */
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if y1mat[iterD1,iterD2]==(-500) or y2mat[iterD1,iterD2]==(-500); /* if we are in the
region where no NE of 2nd stage game was found, jump to line with level notane */
goto notane;
else;
D1eq=D1min+saltob*(iterD1-1); /* if NE is in feasible region, this gives us SPNE value of D1 */
D2eq=D2min+saltob*(iterD2-1); /* if NE is in feasible region, this gives us SPNE value of D2 */
print "SPNE is equal to" D1eq D2eq;
numberEN=numberEN+1;
else;
endif;
endif;
notane:
iterD2=iterD2+1;
endo;
iterD1=iterD1+1;
endo;
numberENmat[iterzb,iterga]=numberEN;
D1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=D1eq; /* save the SPNE of D1 in a matrix */
D2eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=D2eq; /* save the SPNE of D2 in a matrix */
D1=D1eq;
D2=D2eq;
/************************************************************************************/
/******Compute the SPNE levels of q1, q2, theta1, theta2. W1, W2, V1, V2, r1, r2 e welfare *****/
/*****This is done by compute NE of the 2nd stage game, for the SPNE value of (D1,D2) ******/
/************************************************************************************/
x0 = {3, 3,0,0}; /* starting values */
_co_IneqProc=&ineqlim;
_co_MaxIters=100;
{x,f,g,ret}=co(&fob,x0);
call coprt(x,f,g,ret);
if f<0.00001;
goto nefound1;
else;
_co_IneqProc=&ineqlim1;
_co_MaxIters=100;
{x,f,g,ret}=co(&foD1,x0);
call coprt(x,f,g,ret);
if f<0.00001;
goto nefound1;
else;
_co_MaxIters=100;
_co_IneqProc=&ineqlim2;
{x,f,g,ret}=co(&foD2,x0);
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call coprt(x,f,g,ret);
if f<0.00001;
goto nefound1;
else;
_co_MaxIters=100;
_co_IneqProc=&ineqlim3;
{x,f,g,ret}=co(&fob3,x0);
call coprt(x,f,g,ret);
if f<0.00001;
goto nefound1;
else;
goto nefound3;
endif;
endif;
endif;
endif;
nefound1:
teta1eq=(x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra); /* compute the SPNE of theta1 */
teta2eq=(x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra); /* compute the SPNE of theta2 */
teta1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=teta1eq; /* save the SPNE of theta1 in a matrix */
teta2eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=teta2eq; /* save the SPNE of theta2 in a matrix */
w1eq=(1-(1+k)*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra)))*D1+(1+k)*(1/(2*zbarra))*(x[3]+zbarra)*(((1-a1*((x[3]+zbarra)/
(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[1]-gama*x[2]-c1)*x[1]+(x[1]/2)*(x[3]-zbarra)); /* compute the SPNE of w1*/
w2eq=(1-(1+k)*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra)))*D2+(1+k)*(1/(2*zbarra))*(x[4]+zbarra)*(((1-a2*((x[4]+zbarra)/
(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[2]-gama*x[1]-c2)*x[2]+(x[2]/2)*(x[4]-zbarra)); /* compute the SPNE of w2*/
w1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=w1eq; /* save the SPNE of w1 in a matrix */
w2eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=w2eq; /* save the SPNE of w2 in a matrix */
v1eq=(1/(2*zbarra))*(zbarra-x[3])*(((1-a1*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[1]-gama*x[2]-c1)*x[1]-
D1+(x[1]/2)*(zbarra+x[3])); /* compute the SPNE of v1 */
v2eq=(1/(2*zbarra))*(zbarra-x[4])*(((1-a2*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[2]-gama*x[1]-c2)*x[2]-
D2+(x[2]/2)*(zbarra+x[4])); /* compute the SPNE of v2 */
v1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=v1eq; /* save the SPNE of v1 in a matrix */
v2eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=v2eq; /* save the SPNE of v2 in a matrix */
y1eqp=-k*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))*(D1-(((1-a1*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[1]-gama*x[2]-
c1+(x[3]-zbarra)/2)*x[1]))+((1-a1*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[1]-gama*x[2]-c1)*x[1];
/*computethe SPNE of y1 */
y2eqp=-k*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))*(D2-(((1-a2*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[2]-gama*x[1]-
c2+(x[4]-zbarra)/2)*x[2]))+((1-a2*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[2]-gama*x[1]-c2)*x[2];
/*compute the SPNE of y2 */
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y1eqpmat[ iterzb,iterga]=y1eqp; /* save the SPNE of y1 in a matrix */
y2eqpmat[ iterzb,iterga]=y2eqp; /* save the SPNE of y2 in a matrix */
r1eq=(D1/w1eq)-1; /* compute the SPNE of r1 */
r2eq=(D2/w2eq)-1; /* compute the SPNE of r2 */
r1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=r1eq; /* save the SPNE of r1 in a matrix */
r2eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=r2eq; /* save the SPNE of r2 in a matrix */
welfeq=M+(1-a1*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha*x[1]+(1-a2*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha*x[2]-
(1/2)*((x[1])^2+2*gama*x[1]*x[2]+(x[2])^2)-c1*x[1]-c2*x[2]-k*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))*(D1-((1-a1*((x[3]+
zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[1]-gama*x[2]-c1)*x[1]+(x[1]/2)*(zbarra-x[3]))-k*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))*
(D2-((1-a2*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[2]-gama*x[1]-c2)*x[2]+(x[2]/2)*(zbarra-x[4]));
/* compute the SPNE of welfare */
welfeqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=welfeq; /* save the SPNE of welfare in a matrix */
idc1eq=a1*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2*alpha*x[1]; /* compute the SPNE of lds1 */
idc1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=idc1eq; /* save the SPNE of lds1 in a matrix */
idc2eq=a2*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2*alpha*x[2]; /* compute the SPNE of lds2 */
idc2eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=idc2eq; /* save the SPNE of lds2 in a matrix */
ddc1eq=k*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))*(D1-((1-a1*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[1]-gama*x[2]-
c1)*x[1]+(x[1]/2)*(zbarra-x[3]));/* compute the SPNE of ddc1*/
ddc1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=ddc1eq; /* save the SPNE of ddc1 in a matrix */
ddc2eq=k*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))*(D2-((1-a2*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[2]-gama*x[1]-
c2)*x[2]+(x[2]/2)*(zbarra-x[4]));/* compute the SPNE of bcts2*/
ddc2eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=ddc2eq; /* save the SPNE of bcts2 in a matrix */
q1eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=x[1]; /* save the SPNE of q1 in a matrix */
q2eqmat[ iterzb,iterga]=x[2]; /* save the SPNE of q1 in a matrix */
nefound3:
gamamat[1,iterga]=gama;
gama=gama+saltgama;
iterga=iterga+1;
endo;
zbarmat[ iterzb,1]=zbarra;
zbarra=zbarra+saltozbar;
iterzb=iterzb+1;
endo;
/************************************************************************************/
/******************** Here end the iteractions for zbarra and gama **************************/
/************************************* Output Section **********************************/
/**********************************************************************************/
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnmatD1eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix D1eq*/
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outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print D1eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnmatD2eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix D2eq*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print D2eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnteta1eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix teta1eqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print teta1eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnteta2eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix teta2eqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print teta2eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnw1eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix w1eqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
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print w1eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnw2eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix w2eqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print w2eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnv1eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix v1eqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print v1eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnv2eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix v2eqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print v2eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresny1eqp.out reset; /* output le just the matrix y1eqpmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print y1eqpmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
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output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresny2eqp.out reset; /* output le just the matrix y2eqpmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print y2eqpmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnr1eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix r1eqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print r1eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnr2eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix r2eqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print r2eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnwelfeq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix */
welfeqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print welfeqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
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format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnq1eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix q1eqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print q1eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnq2eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix q2eqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print q2eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnidc1eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix welfeqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print idc1eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnidc2eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix welfeqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print idc2eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnddc1eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix welfeqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
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iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print ddc1eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnddc2eq.out reset; /* output le just the matrix welfeqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print ddc2eqmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
output o¤;
format /rdt 8,7;/* print number formatation */
output le=d:nDoutoramentongaussresnnumberEN.out reset;/* output le just the matrix
welfeqmat*/
outwidth 150;/* dimension of output print columns*/
iterzb=1;
do while iterzb <= niterzbar;
print numberENmat[iterzb,.];
iterzb= iterzb+1;
endo;
output o¤;
/************************** Procedures for the constrained optimization *******************/
/******************************* Procedures for an interior NE *************************/
/*** Procedure for objective function *****/
proc fob(x);
local x1,x2,x3,x4,y1,y2,y3,y4;
x1 = x[1];
x2 = x[2];
x3 = x[3];
x4 = x[4];
y1 = 2*((1-a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x1-2*a1*alpha*((x3+zbarra)/(4*(zbarra^2)))*
(((1-a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x1-gama*x2+x3-c1)/(a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra^2))*
alpha-1))-gama*x2-c1)+zbarra+x3;
y2 = 2*((1-a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x2-2*a2*alpha*((x4+zbarra)/(4*(zbarra^2)))*
(((1-a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x2-gama*x1+x4-c2)/(a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra^2))*
alpha-1))-gama*x1-c2)+zbarra+x4;
y3 = ((1-a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x1-gama*x2+x3-c1)*x1-D1;
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y4 = ((1-a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x2-gama*x1+x4-c2)*x2-D2;
retp (y1^2+y2^2+y3^2+y4^2);
endp;
/************************ Procedures for inequality constraints *************************/
proc ineqlim(x);
local limits;
limits=zeros(6,1);
limits[1]=x[1];
limits[2]=x[2];
limits[3]=x[3]+zbarra;
limits[4]=-x[3]+zbarra;
limits[5]=x[4]+zbarra;
limits[6]=-x[4]+zbarra;
retp (limits);
endp;
/********* Procedures for an z^1 = -zbar and z^2 = -zbar, q1 and q2 interior *********/
/******************* Procedure for inequality constraints *************************/
proc foD1(x);
local x1,x2,x3,x4,y1,y2,y3,y4;
x1 = x[1];
x2 = x[2];
x3 = x[3];
x4 = x[4];
y1 = 2*((1-a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x1-2*a1*alpha*((x3+zbarra)/(4*(zbarra^2)))*
(((1-a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x1-gama*x2+x3-c1)/(a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra^2))*
alpha-1))-gama*x2-c1)+zbarra+x3;
y2 = 2*((1-a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x2-2*a2*alpha*((x4+zbarra)/(4*(zbarra^2)))*
(((1-a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x2-gama*x1+x4-c2)/(a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra^2))*
alpha-1))-gama*x1-c2)+zbarra+x4;
y3 = x3+zbarra;
y4 = x4+zbarra;
retp (y1^2+y2^2+y3^2+y4^2);
endp;
/****************** Procedure for inequality constraints ***************************/
proc ineqlim1(x);
local limits;
limits=zeros(8,1);
limits[1]=x[1];
limits[2]=x[2];
limits[3]=x[3]+zbarra;
limits[4]=-x[3]+zbarra;
limits[5]=x[4]+zbarra;
limits[6]=-x[4]+zbarra;
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limits[7]=((1-a1*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[1]-gama*x[2]+x[3]-c1)*x[1]-D1;
limits[8]=((1-a2*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[2]-gama*x[1]+x[4]-c2)*x[2]-D2;
retp (limits);
endp;
/******** Procedures for an z^1 = -zbar and z2 interior, q1 and q2 interior ***********/
/******************** Procedure for objective function ****************************/
proc foD2(x);
local x1,x2,x3,x4,y1,y2,y3,y4;
x1 = x[1];
x2 = x[2];
x3 = x[3];
x4 = x[4];
y1 = 2*((1-a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x1-2*a1*alpha*((x3+zbarra)/(4*(zbarra^2)))*
(((1-a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x1-gama*x2+x3-c1)/(a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra^2))*
alpha-1))-gama*x2-c1)+zbarra+x3;
y2 = 2*((1-a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x2-2*a2*alpha*((x4+zbarra)/(4*(zbarra^2)))*
(((1-a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x2-gama*x1+x4-c2)/(a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra^2))*
alpha-1))-gama*x1-c2)+zbarra+x4;
y3 = x3+zbarra;
y4 = ((1-a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x2-gama*x1+x4-c2)*x2-D2;
retp (y1^2+y2^2+y3^2+y4^2);
endp;
/******************* Procedure for inequality constraints *************************/
proc ineqlim2(x);
local limits;
limits=zeros(7,1);
limits[1]=x[1];
limits[2]=x[2];
limits[3]=x[3]+zbarra;
limits[4]=-x[3]+zbarra;
limits[5]=x[4]+zbarra;
limits[6]=-x[4]+zbarra;
limits[7]=((1-a1*((x[3]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[1]-gama*x[2]+x[3]-c1)*x[1]-D1;
retp (limits);
endp;
/*********Procedures for an z^1 interior and z2= -zbar , q1 and q2 interior **********/
/****************** Procedure for objective function ****************************/
proc fob3(x);
local x1,x2,x3,x4,y1,y2,y3,y4;
x1 = x[1];
x2 = x[2];
x3 = x[3];
x4 = x[4];
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y1 = 2*((1-a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x1-2*a1*alpha*((x3+zbarra)/(4*(zbarra^2)))*
(((1-a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x1-gama*x2+x3-c1)/(a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra^2))*
alpha-1))-gama*x2-c1)+zbarra+x3;
y2 = 2*((1-a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x2-2*a2*alpha*((x4+zbarra)/(4*(zbarra^2)))*
(((1-a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-2*x2-gama*x1+x4-c2)/(a2*((x4+zbarra)/(2*zbarra^2))*
alpha-1))-gama*x1-c2)+zbarra+x4;
y3 = ((1-a1*((x3+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x1-gama*x2+x3-c1)*x1-D1;
y4 = x4+zbarra;
retp (y1^2+y2^2+y3^2+y4^2);
endp;
/****************** Procedure for inequality constraints ************************/
proc ineqlim3(x);
local limits;
limits=zeros(7,1);
limits[1]=x[1];
limits[2]=x[2];
limits[3]=x[3]+zbarra;
limits[4]=-x[3]+zbarra;
limits[5]=x[4]+zbarra;
limits[6]=-x[4]+zbarra;
limits[7]=((1-a2*((x[4]+zbarra)/(2*zbarra))^2)*alpha-x[2]-gama*x[1]+x[4]-c2)*x[2]-D2;
retp (limits);
endp;
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Chapter 4
Empirical Links Between Market
Structure, Capital Structure
Decisions and Default Risk
4.1 Introduction
Default and bankruptcy are areas that, in recent years, have undergone systematic analy-
sis by researchers. The growing interest of accountants, nancial analysts, managers,
creditors, regulators and the community in general has borne fruit to a set of studies aim-
ing to present the best default prediction model. As noted by Gepp and Kumar (2008),
timely knowledge enables various entities to avoid default. However, the prediction of
default is not the only relevant issue. It is also important to identify the factors that
inuence the probability of a rm not meeting its debt obligations.
Operational and nancial decisions are important pillars in the economic and nancial
sustainability of a rm. Nevertheless, there is a lack of empirical studies, which simul-
taneously relate the nancial decisions, the operational decisions and the default risk
(however, there are studies that connect two of these three areas). The study carried out
by Antunes, Mata and Portugal (2011) relates debt and default risk, whereas Opler and
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Titman (1994), Borenstein and Rose (1995) and Evrensel (2008) study the relationship
between operational decisions and default risk. The aim of this study is to analyze the
impact of rm and industry characteristics, including the degree of market concentration,
on the capital structure and on the nancial distress.
Since nancial and operational decisions are likely to depend on the countrys char-
acteristics, as concluded, for example, by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Booth
el al (2001), Bancel and Mitoo (2004) and Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008), our study
incorporates a sample of 11 OECD countries1 which have di¤erent economic and nan-
cial development levels, which allows us to test the statistical signicance of the variable
country. Moreover, the study contains data before (2007) and after (2013) the period of
nancial crisis in the early twenty-rst century (with a clear peak in 2008). According
to some studies after 2008 operating and nancial decisions have changed. Furceri and
Mourougane (2012) concluded that after the crisis the output level of the OECD members
decreased on average between 1.5% and 2.4%. Erkens Hung and Matos (2012) concluded
that after 2008 rms tended to use more equity. After 2008 and the Basel III (which
notably aimed stricter supervision and disclosure practices for risk reduction) an increase
of banking restrictions in granting credit was observed.
Reviewing the literature on capital structure and nancial distress, there are a set
of variables that appear in theoretical studies on the subject, but regarding which there
is a shortage of empirical testing. In particular, demand uncertainty and the degree of
product substitutability (which increases the degree of competition) were referred in a
theoretical model by Brander and Lewis (1986) and numerically by Haan and Toolsema
(2008) and Franck and Le Pape (2008) as well as in the two previous chapters of this
thesis. This essay aims to analyze the empirical signicance of the uncertainty and the
degree of market concentration (the reverse of the degree of competition) using a sample
of 11 OECD countries. The literature considers that default costs have an impact on
debt and on distress, however, the empirical testing of default cost relevance is mostly
conned to the direct costs (administrative costs and legal costs). The literature refers
1OCDE-Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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to the importance of indirect default costs (reputation e¤ect on prot). However, due to
the di¢culty in their estimation, they are rarely considered. In this study, using a proxy
suggested by Altman (1984), we consider the impact of the direct and indirect default
costs on debt and on default risk.
The theoretical and numerical models previously mentioned as well as the two previous
chapters of this thesis, suggest that debt is endogenously determined (rms choose the
equilibrium levels of debt). Therefore, when we wish to analyze the e¤ect of the capital
structure on default risk we need to address this potential endogeneity problem (this
issue was also noted by Zingales, 1998). In order to solve this problem we use a set of
instrumental variables.
The rst contribution of this study is to check how debt and default risk vary when
the degree of market concentration increases. A second contribution is the study of the
impact of uncertainty and default costs (direct and indirect) on debt and on default risk.
As a third contribution, we can highlight the wide sample of 11 OECD countries, over a
sampling period before and after a period of nancial crisis. Finally, the methodology used
to explain the default probability, takes into account that debt is an endogenous variable
and allows us to evaluate the direct and the total impact of the exogenous explanatory
variables on default risk.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 2 a literature review about
capital structure, nancial distress and the rm and industry e¤ects is elaborated. Section
3 presents the hypotheses to be tested whereas section 4 describes the data. In section
5, the main results are presented. Finally, section 6 summarizes the main conclusions of
this essay.
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4.2 Related work
4.2.1 Capital Structure
To operate and thrive rms need nancial resources and rely essentially on two major
sources: equity and debt. According to theory, the choice of the nancing form always
has two objectives: to maximize the rms value and to minimize the capital cost. This
theme has originated a large number of studies which have attempted to explain the
factors/determinants of capital structure and how these factors inuence decisions in this
area.
Theories of capital structure date back to the works of Modigliani and Miller (1958,
1963). In both papers there are two propositions, one dealing with the capital cost and the
other one with the rm value. Modigliani and Miller (1958) established a set of simplifying
assumptions, including: the absence of taxes, transaction costs and bankruptcy costs; the
equivalence in borrowing costs for rms and investors; and the existence of symmetric
market information. The main conclusion of the paper is that the capital structure is
irrelevant to the maximization of rm value. This happens because the value of a leveraged
rm has to be equal to the value of a non-leveraged rm. If it were not, it would be possible
for the investor to obtain risk free gains (arbitrage), by selling overvalued securities and
buying undervalued securities. In 1963, Modigliani and Miller rened their original model
considering the existence of taxes. The authors argue that the tax benet that comes from
debt implies that the maximum value is obtained when the rm is fully leveraged. Due
to the limitations of the previous models, new explanatory theories of capital structure
have emerged in recent years, including the trade-o¤ theory, the pecking order theory, the
signalling theory, the agency theory and the market timing theory.
According to Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) the trade-o¤ theory argues that there is
an optimal capital structure, which is the one that balances the e¤ects of debt on taxes and
the bankruptcy costs associated with leverage. Therefore, a rm increases its debt until
the point where the marginal tax benet is o¤set by the increase in the present value costs
of nancial distress. As can be seen in the work of Rajan and Zingales (1995), Bancel and
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Mittoo (2004) and Franck and Goyal (2007), this theory points to a positive relationship
between the tax rate and debt and a negative relationship between bankruptcy costs and
debt using the amount of tangible assets and growth (the higher the tangible assets, the
lower are the losses in the case of bankruptcy and the higher is growth, the bigger are the
losses in the case of bankruptcy) as proxies for bankruptcy costs.
Myers (1977,1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the pecking order theory
assumes that there is no target capital structure. The rms choose the capital structure
according to a preference order: internal nance, debt and equity. The authors claim
that the existence of transaction costs and asymmetric information between managers and
investors means that investments are preferably carried out with the rms internal funds.
Some studies conrm the predictions of the pecking order theory (Titman and Wessels,
1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Sunder and Myers, 1999; and Franck and Goyal, 2003)
while others do not (Brennan and Kraus, 1987; and Leary and Roberts, 2010).
The signalling theory was suggested by Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977). Firms
use internal funds in order to avoid adverse selection problems. The capital structure of a
rm can send quality signals to the market. Thus, the signalling theory and pecking order
theory are interconnected. The way to test the signalling theory is to nd the market
reaction when there is an increase or a decrease in debt.
The agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) analyzes the potential conicts of
interest that may arise among some stakeholders throughout the companys life, such as,
managers, shareholders and creditors. The occurrence of these conicts has costs that are
called agency costs. Empirically and according to this theory, the rms holding a higher
cash ow and protability tend to have higher debt.
The market timing theory, originally presented by Baker and Wurgler (2002) appeared
more recently. This theory argues that market timing is a determinant of capital structure,
which means the rm chooses the form of nancing taking into account the nancial
market value over time.
Table 4.1 presents the main determinants of the capital structure considered by the
existent empirical literature, indicating the sign of the impact of the determinants obtained
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in these studies, the way the variables have been operationalized and representative papers
in this literature.
The collateral (also known as tangibility) is expected to have a positive impact on
the debt level. This sign is predicted both by the trade-o¤ theory as well as the agency
costs theory. The larger the volume of tangible assets of a rm (collateral), the higher the
guarantee given to the lender, making it easier to resort to credit. In addition, a higher
guarantee reduces the agency problems between creditors and managers, and hence debt
increases (Harris and Raviv, 1990). The empirical studies conrm the expected theoretical
impact.
The non-debt tax shields, liquidity and income variability are all expected to have a
negative impact on debt. Tax deductions that come from depreciation and investment tax
credits can be seen as substitute for tax savings stemming from the nancial expenses.
Thus, according to the trade-o¤ theory the non-debt tax shields have a negative impact
on debt (DeAngelo and Masulis,1980). Moreover these tax benets not related with debt
reduce the cash outows, which leads to an increase of the internal funds. Therefore,
the negative impact of the non-tax shields is also predicted by the pecking order theory.
Liquidity is also expected to have a negative impact on debt, since, and according to
the pecking order theory, a rm prefers to use internal funds rather than external ones
(Myers and Majulf, 1984). Greater volatility of income means greater risk, a riskier rm
has greater di¢culty in obtaining credit and when it does it will have to pay a higher
interest rate. Thus it is expected that greater income volatility has a negative impact on
debt.
There are determinants that have an ambiguous impact on debt, including protability,
growth opportunities, size and age. According to the pecking order theory, the higher the
protability, the greater the internal resources generated, so the use of debt is lower
(Myers ,1984 and Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, according to the trade-o¤ theory,
the higher the protability, the higher the ability of the rm to full its commitments
quickly, so the higher the debt ratio (Jensen, 1986).
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Table 4.1: Determinants of the capital structure: expected impact, proxies used and
representative studies.
Variable
Expect
impact
Calculation Some References
Collateral
Tangibility
+
Fixed Assets
TA
Intagible Asset
Equity
Rajan & Zingales(1995); Berger, Ofek & Yermack
(1997); Lööf (2004); Pindado,Rodrigues & La
Torre(2006); Lyandres(2006) Margaritis &
Psillaki(2007); Ramalho & Vidigal(2009,2013);
Aggarwal & Kyaw (2010); Chakraborty (2010);
Serrasqueiro & Nunes (2010); Kayo & Kimura
(2011);Guney, Li & Fairchild(2011); Zhang(2012)
Non-debt
tax shields
- DepretiationTA
Berger, Ofek & Yermack(1997); Lööf(2004); Pin-
dado, Rodrigues & La Torre(2006) Ramalho &
Vidigal (2009,2013); Aggarwal & Kyaw(2010);
Chakraborty(2010); Guney, Li & Fairchild(2011)
Liquidity 
Working Capital
TA
Current Asset
Current Liability
Ramalho & Vidigal(2009,2013); Guney, Li &
Fairchild(2011)
Income
variability

Variance of Sales
Beta
Lööf(2004); Aggarwal & Kyaw(2010)
Protability +/
Operating Income
TA
Net Income
Equity
Rajan e Zingales(1995); Berger, Ofek & Yermack
(1997); Lööf(2004); Lyandres(2006); Margaritis
& Psillaki(2007); Ramalho & Vidigal(2009,2013)
Aggarwal & Kyaw(2010); Chakraborty (2010); Se-
rrasqueiro & Nunes (2010); Kayo & Kimura(2011);
Guney Li & Fairchild (2011); Zhang(2012)
Growth
opportunities
+/-
TAt TAt 1
TAt 1
OPt OPt 1
OPt 1
Tobin0s Q
Petersen & Rajan (1994), Lööf(2004);Pindado,
Rodrigues & La Torre(2006); Ramalho & Vidigal
(2009,2013); Aggarwal & Kyaw(2010); Chakra-
borty(2010); Serrasqueiro & Nunes(2010);Kayo
& Kimura(2011); Guney, Li & Fairchild(2011)
Size +/
ln(sales)
ln(asset)
ln(#employees)
Petersen & Rajan(1994), Rajan & Zingales(1995);
Berger, Ofek & Yermack(1997); Lööf(2004); Lyan-
dres(2006); Pindado Rodrigues and La Torre(2006);
Margaritis & Psillaki(2007); Ramalho & Vidigal
(2009,2013) Aggarwal & Kyaw(2010); Chakraborty
(2010); Serrasqueiro & Nunes (2010) Kayo & Kimu-
ra(2011); Guney et al(2011); Zhang(2012)
Age +/-
Years since
foundation
Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997);Petersen & Rajan
(1994); Ramalho & Vidigal (2009,2013)
Note:T-Total Asset;OP-operating Prot
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The expected impact of growth opportunities on debt is also ambiguous and, ac-
cording to some authors, non-linear. According to the signalling and the pecking order
theories, growth opportunities has a positive impact on leverage. The higher the growth
opportunities, the higher are the investment needs and thus more likely is that internal
funds are not enough, increasing debt nancing. On the other hand, according to the
trade-o¤ theory, the nancial distress has higher costs for rms that have higher growth
opportunitties. Thus the rm may be less willing to nance with debt in order not to
increase the probability of default. Finally, the agency theory argues that the impact of
growth opportunities can be either positive or negative depending on overinvestment and
underinvestment costs respectively (Stulz, 1990).
The e¤ect of the rms size on debt is also ambiguous. According to Rajan and Zingales
(1995), larger rms have less information asymmetry so there is greater use of equity.
However, according to Titman and Wessels (1988), larger rms are more diversied, which
reduces the probability of failure and thus increases the use of debt. The empirical
literature conrms the ambiguity of the impact of size on debt and suggests that the
sign depends on whether the dependent variable is a short-term debt ratio or a long-term
debt ratio.
Finally, according to the literature (Diamond, 1989 and Petersen and Rajan, 1994),
age also has an ambiguous impact. On the one hand, age can inuence debt positively
because the older is the rm the greater is its debt payment history and the corresponding
reputation of the rm. On the other hand, an older rm is expected to have more
accumulated retained earning, thus reducing the need for debt.
4.2.2 Financial Distress
Over the past few years, the scientic and business community has been researching into
the default risk and the best way to prevent situations of nancial distress. Several studies
have tried to present the best model to predict the default risk, so as to have a preventive
model of any default event. An anticipated knowledge of a default event is important in
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order to avoid the economic and social costs that a¤ect shareholders, creditors, suppliers,
customers and the community in general.
The models developed since the 60s can be classied into the classical systems of
default risk analysis in the Rating systems2 and Scoring Systems.3 In addition to these
systems, there are models which are based on the use of the interest rate term structure,
mortality rates and migration of credit measures and models that use the real option
theory. Sun et al (2014) present a survey of the most recently developed methodologies,
which are classied as: Articial Intelligence Single Methods, Hybrid Single Classier
Methods, Ensemble Methods and Dynamics Models.4
The literature highlights the use of Scoring Systems namely the univariate and multi-
variate analysis (discriminant, logit, probit and survival analysis). One of the pioneers in
the study of failure was Beaver (1966), who using the univariate analysis, studies thirty
nancial ratios separately and checks for values that can classify a rm with nancial dif-
culties, based on the industry average, the region or group of rms. Univariate analysis
assumes a linear relationship between the variables and the denition of default. This
model is criticized for studying the e¤ect of each ratio separately since the predictive
power increases when the ratios are considered together.
The use of multiple linear discriminant analysis arose from Altmans (1968) work, a
crucial milestone for the study of nancial distress. The Z-Score and Zeta models, devel-
2The Rating System or Credit Rating is a preventive system and consists of the credit rating classi-
cation (assigned by an entity), i.e. the probability of the issuer to pay the debt. This scale or rating aims
to transmit the ability to pay the debt. This system is used by rating agencies, which assign a rating
to the debt securities of the rm. The banks also use the rating system in loans, through methodologies
developed by analysts. One of the methodologies used is the 6 Cs system, which is used to assess the
person/rm requesting the loan in six areas: capacity, capital, collateral, conditions, and character. The
objective is to assist the analyst in the perception of the previously dened risk group that a specic rm
belongs to.
3The Scoring System or Statistical Single Classier Method is based mainly on the use of nancial
ratios. This system uses statistical techniques that allow us to select the ratios and their weighting,
estimating the default risk of a rm.
4In the 90s appeared new methodologies to measure the default risk based on the application of
articial intelligence, hybrid single classier, ensemble methods and dynamic models. According to the
literature this methodology is considered new and promising but the introduction of ratios is complex,
which hinders economic validation. Sun et al (2014) claim that this methodology presents, as a main
advantage, the fact that it is not subject to statistical assumptions. However, the single classiers
statistical methods can obtain a xed model structure in di¤erent times of training on a certain data set.
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oped by Altman (1968) and Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1977), respectively, are
the most discussed techniques in empirical studies. These techniques allows us to clas-
sify rms into bankrupt and non-bankrupt based on accounting and market information.
Through a linear combination of normally distributed independent variables, a multivari-
ate model establishes a cuto¤ point. The Z-score model was developed by Altman (1968)
and in this model twenty-two ratios are used, from which the ratios that measure liquidity,
protability, return on investment, market information and management e¢ciency stand
out. The Zeta model was developed by Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1997) and it
is based on an analysis of seven dimensions: return on investment, risk, interest coverage,
liquidity, market information, accumulated protability, and size. These models are often
criticized for assuming that the independent variables have a normal distribution and an
equal covariance matrix. Furthermore, it is assumed that the dependent variable (i.e. the
probability that the rm does not fulll its obligations) is continuous.
Ohlson (1980) developed a model of bankruptcy prediction based on the logistic analy-
sis (logit),5 a model also used later by Zavgren (1985). Zmijewski (1984) used the probit
model to estimate the probability of nancial distress. These models use a set of account-
ing variables to predict the probability of default, assuming that default may have two
possible values, zero or one. These models have the advantage that they can be applied
to binary variables and are not based on the assumption that the independent variables
follow a normal distribution and have an equal covariance matrix. However, the models
require that the independent variables do not have a linear relationship. These model use
ratios that assess protability, leverage, liquidity, activity and size.
Studies have shown that Z-Score, Zeta, logit and probit models have a high accuracy in
the classication of rms, and despite their limitations, the percentage of errors committed
is low.
Survival analysis is a more rened technique than the traditional discriminant analysis.
This technique uses time series and assumes that the default process is stable over time.
5Ohlson (1980) uses, among others, ratios that measure: size, nancial leverage, liquidity, protability,
return on investment and growth.
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Survival analysis was rst used by Lane, Looney and Wansley (1986), who applied the
model to 130 bankrupt banks and 334 nancially healthy banks during the period of 1979
to 1983. According to Gepp and Kumar (2008), survival analysis is not as popular nor as
used as discriminant analysis or logit, but it is starting to show some popularity.
Table 4.13, in the appendix, presents a summary of empirical studies that use the
aforementioned methodologies.
Table 4.2 presents the determinants of default risk that have been tested in the liter-
ature.
The literature points to a negative e¤ect of liquidity; protability, size and manage-
ment e¢ciency on the probability of default.
Liquidity reects the rms ability to liquidate its assets and settle the short-term
liabilities. When a rm has liquidity this means that it can easily sell its assets.
Protability indicates the rms ability to reward investors and it evaluates manage-
ment performance. A more protable rm can generate a higher return for investors (own
capital and borrowed capital) so the probability of the rm not meeting its obligations
decreases with protability. Therefore the expected impact of this variable is negative.
Management e¢ciency (measured by the asset turnover ratio) indicates the degree of
utilization of total assets. According to Altman (1968), this ratio measures the ability of
the rms assets to generate sales. The negative impact suggests that rms with a greater
ability to use their assets are less likely not to meet their obligation.
The impact of the rm size on the probability of default is ambiguous. On one hand,
the size variable is expected to have a negative impact on the default probability since,
according to the literature, larger rms are more diversied and, as a result, it is easier
for them to deal with di¢culties in a particular market, therefore they are less likely to
fail. On the other hand, other authors (Turetsky and McEwen, 2001; Chancharat et al,
2010) found a positive relationship between size and default. This result can be justied
by the higher di¢culty in managing and monitoring employees in a larger rm.
According to the literature, the variable leverage has an ambiguous expected impact
on the default probability. Leverage measures the capital structure of a rm, which
149
Table 4.2: Determinants of the default risk: expected impact, proxies used and represen-
tative studies.
Variable
Expected
impact
Calculation Some References
Liquidity 
Working Capital
TA
Current Asset
Current Liability
Beaver(1966); Altman (1968); Altman,Haldeman
& Narayanan(1977); Ohlson(1980); Kahya &
Theodossiou(1999) Turetsky & McEwen(2001);
Pindado & Rodrigues (2004) Gepp & Kumar
(2008); Chancharat et al(2010); Ng, Wong,
Zhang(2011) Dionne & Laajimi(2012) Wu, Gaunt
& Gray(2010) Sneideire & Bruna (2011) Ho,
McCarthy & Yang (2013);Tinoco & Wilson(2013)
Protability 
Operating Income
TA
Net Income
Equity
Altman(1968); Altman, Haldeman & Narayanan
(1977);Ohlson(1980); Kahya & Theodossiou(1999);
Turetsky & McEwen(2001); Pindado & Rodrigues
(2004); Beaver,Mcnichols & Rhie(2005); Gepp &
Kumar(2008); Chancharat et al(2010); Ng, Wong,
Zhang (2011); Ho, McCarthy & Yang(2013);
Johnstone et al,(2013)
Management
E¢ciency
- SalesAsset
Beaver(1966);Altman(1968);Turetsky & McEwen
(2001); Gepp & Kumar(2008); Chancharat et al
(2010);Ng, Wong Zhang (2011);Sneideire &
Bruna (2011)
Size +/-
ln(employees)
ln(sales)
ln(asset)
Altman, Haldeman & Narayanan(1977); Ohlson
(1980); Kahya & Theodossiou(1999);Turetsky &
McEwen(2001); Gepp & Kumar(2008) Wu, Gaunt
& Gray(2010); Pérez,Llopis and Llopis(2010);
Antunes, Mata & Portugal(2011);Ng, Wong,
Zhang (2011); Dionne & Laajimi(2012) Johnstone
et al,(2013) Tinoco & Wilson(2013)
Age +/-
Years since
foundation
Chancharat et al(2010), Pérez, Llopis & Llopis
(2010) Antunes, Mata & Portugal (2011)
Leverage +/-
Long term debt
TA
Debt
TA
Short term debt
TA
Beaver(1966); Altman (1968); Ohlson(1980);
Kahya &Theodossiou(1999); Campos(2000)
Turetsky & McEwen(2001);Pindado & Rodrigues
(2004) Beaver Mcnichols & Rhie (2005) Gepp &
Kumar(2008); Chancharat et al(2010); Dionne &
Laajimi(2012) Wu, Gaunt & Gray(2010)
Sneideire & Bruna (2011) Ho, McCarthy &
Yang(2013);Tinoco & Wilson(2013)
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represents the proportion of liabilities and equity capital. Most studies point to a positive
correlation between leverage and default probability. A more leveraged rm has higher
debt obligations and hence, maintaining constant the rm protability, the higher is the
probability of the rm not being able to meet its obligations. However, a more leveraged
rm is subject to greater supervision, leading it to invest in lower risk projects, which
may reduce the default probability. Another important issue reported in the literature
is the strategic impact that debt can have on decisions in the product market and its
indirect impact on the probability of default. According to the literature, the relationship
between capital structure and product market decisions can be divided into two types of
models: the ones that emphasize the role of limited liability and the ones which are based
on predatory behavior. In the rst type of models, an increase in debt leads the rm to
be more aggressive in the output market, i.e. when rms have limited liability they tend
to produce more. This may lead to a positive direct impact on the probability of default.
The models of predatory behavior defend the opposite, i.e., the most indebted rms tend
to adopt a more conservative approach, while rms without nancial constraints tend to
be more aggressive in the product market. Thus, if this theory holds, more debt may lead
to a negative impact on the probability of default.
With regard to age, some studies suggest a non-linear relationship. Young rms are
protected by the resources initially placed and thus for some time are unlikely to fail. The
literature suggests that the probability of default start being increasing with age, reaching
a maximum after a given period and decreasing thereafter, in other words the impact of
age on the default probability follows an inverted U shape (Geroski,1995; Fichman and
Levinthal, 1991; and Pérez, Llopis and Llopis, 2010).
4.2.3 Firm and Industry Variables
There are rm specic variables that a¤ect not only the capital structure of a rm, but
also the default probability which were not mentioned in the previous subsection because
there is a lack of empirical analysis testing their statistical signicance. This includes
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uncertainty and default costs.
The results of the nancial and operating decisions depend on the context in which
rms operate. Moreover, the events/shocks that inuence these decisions also have a
direct e¤ect on the rms survival probability. The analysis of the uncertainty e¤ect on
the nancial and operational structure of a rm was analyzed theoretically, for example,
by Brander and Lewis (1986), Franck and Le Pape (2008), Haan and Toolsema (2008).
The authors concluded that an increase in the demand uncertainty reduces the debt
ratio. Moreover, regarding the e¤ect on default probability, Haan and Toolsema (2008)
conclude that uncertainty has a negative e¤ect on the default risk. Similarly, Franck and
Le Pape (2008) claim that the indirect e¤ect through the decrease in the debt outweighs
the direct e¤ect of uncertainty on default risk. These results as well as the analytical
and numerical results obtained in the two previous chapters of this thesis suggest that it
is important to distinguish between the e¤ect of uncertainty on default for a given debt
level and the total impact which also incorporates the fact that uncertainty decreases
debt, which in turn inuences the default probability. Thus in our empirical results it is
very likely that the sign of the direct e¤ect of the variable uncertainty may di¤er from
the sign of the total e¤ect. Moreover our numerical results suggest that the total e¤ect is
ambiguous. In particular, the sign of the total impact depends on the default costs and
their magnitude. The empirical analysis regarding the impact of uncertainty is limited
to its e¤ects on nancial and operating decisions (Chevalier, 1995b; Showalter, 1999;
and Khanna and Tice, 2000). The empirical literature points to a negative relationship
between uncertainty and debt. Thus, it is also important to analyze empirically what
is the e¤ect of uncertainty on the default risk. Uncertainty has been considered either
through the standard deviation of log-changes in sales or by considering a sample period
that has a certain shock.
Lastly, the relevance of default costs was rst highlighted by Kraus and Litzenburger
(1973). They analyze the trade-o¤ between default costs and the debt tax benets.
Elkami, Ericsson and Parsons (2012) argue that the nancial distress costs can o¤set the
tax benets of debt. Literature divides default costs into two types: direct or ex-post
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costs (legal, accounting and administrative costs) and indirect or ex-ante costs (reduced
prots resulting from lower sales, in particular, due to the reputation e¤ect).
In the capital structure empirical literature, when the impact of nancial distress costs
is analyzed, most often only the direct default costs are considered. To analyze the direct
cost, studies incorporate the value of legal, accounting and administrative costs. There
are some studies that use direct cost proxies, including a percentage (between 1% and
23%) of the rms value (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; Warner, 1977; and Singhal and Zhu,
2013), whereas others consider as a proxy the percentage of intangible assets (Jonh, 1993;
Hwang et al, 2009; and Dionne and Laajimi, 2012). In the event of liquidation, there is
greater di¢culty in the adaptation of workers to other functions (Titman and Wessels,
1988) and greater di¢culty in selling its assets when a rm has a high proportion of
intangible assets. Therefore the bankruptcy costs are higher. The literature that uses
this proxy is not clear about which type of costs is being captured by this proxy. But the
di¢culty mentioned above arises after default occurred (ex-post), and it will be a cost
borne by creditors in settlement.
There are very few studies that incorporate indirect costs in their analysis. Pindado,
Rodrigues and La Torre (2008) consider that these costs are directly proportional to the
default probability and analyze the e¤ect of these costs on investment. Altman (1984),
Opler and Titman (1994) and Kwansa and Cho (1995) interpret the indirect costs as lost
prots.
Most studies consider default costs as a dependent variable, but by considering them
an explanatory factor, it is expected that the default costs (direct and indirect) will have
a negative impact on debt and a positive impact on default risk. However, when we look
at the total e¤ect, default costs can have a negative impact on the probability of default.
According to the literature, the default cost inuences negatively the amount of debt
(rms behave more cautiously when default costs are higher). This lower level of debt
may imply that the total e¤ect of increasing default costs on the default probability may
be negative.
Despite the strong role of the rms specic variables we must not forget that the rm
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belongs to a certain sector/industry and country. According to Gepp & Kumar (2008)
some studies use industry indicators but most of them treat the industry and country
e¤ect as a dummy variable. However, Gungoraydinoglu & Öztekin (2011) concluded that
there is a large percentage of leverage variation that is explained by specic factors of the
industry and the country. Thus, the capital structure and the likelihood of a rm not
meeting its obligations is not explained only by factors specic to the rm, but also by
industry and country e¤ects.
The industry e¤ects have been incorporated in the empirical Industrial Organization
literature. In particular, in the study of the impact on the rms protability, explanatory
variables such as industry concentration, entry barriers and product di¤erentiation have
been introduced. In most studies on capital structure and default risk, industry has been
incorporated in the analysis by introducing dummies. However, according to Brander
and Lewis (1986), Evrensel (2008), Haan and Toolsema (2008) and Franck and Le Pape
(2008), competition in the product market (competition in quantities or prices) inuences
debt and default risk. Opler and Titman (1994), Zingales (1998), Campos (2000), Erol
(2003) and Lyandres (2006) empirically concluded that there is a correlation between
debt and product market concentration. The degree of market concentration is measured
in literature by the HerndahlHirschman Index, Tobins Q and the market share of the
largest four rms in the industry. With regard to the degree of product di¤erentiation, the
literature uses the degree of advertising intensity in the industry and denes advertising
expenses as a percentage of sales as proxy.
Some studies have analyzed the impact of the industry/sector on debt. We can high-
light the work of Degryse, Goeij, and Kappert (2012) which studies the impact of rm
and industry characteristics on small rms capital structure. The work of Kayo and
Kimura (2011) analyzes the inuence of time, rm, industry and country-level determi-
nants on capital structure. The works of Lyandres (2006) and Margaritis and Psillaki
(2007) are also very relevant. The rst studies the connection between the sector compet-
itiveness and indebtedness and the second investigates the relation between rm e¢ciency
and leverage, where rm e¢ciency is measured by the distance from the industrys best
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practice production frontier.
In the literature, the impact of the degree of product market concentration on the
capital structure, is ambiguous and, eventually, non-linear. In the Brander and Lewis
(1986) framework, if there was a monopoly, it would not get nancing through debt
because, in that framework debt is used because of its strategic impact in the product
market, and under monopoly, the strategic e¤ect is non-existent. With a oligopoly, the
strategic e¤ect is present and in equilibrium rms have a positive amount of debt. Finally,
in a more competitive market, the strategic e¤ect is also low as it each rm has a very small
capacity to a¤ect the others. Consequently debt is expected to be higher for intermediate
degrees of concentration. To summarize, in the Brander and Lewis (1986) framework we
expect debt to have an inverted U relationship with the degree of market concentration.
Note, however, that if we exclude the monopoly case, the more concentrated is the market,
the higher is the expected level of debt. On the other hand, a younger and/or smaller rm
in a concentrated market may opt to use less debt so as to be less vulnerable to predation.
Market concentration will have a direct and an indirect impact (through debt) on the
probability of default. When the degree of concentration in the product market increases,
a decrease in the probability of default is expected since there are fewer competitors.
However, according to the limited liability theory, and ignoring the monopoly case, when
the level of market concentration increases the strategic e¤ect of debt increases and, as
explained before, leverage may have a positive or negative e¤ect on default probability.
Despite the limited empirical testing, table 4.3 summarizes the expected impact of
uncertainty, default costs and market concentration. Note that the expected impat on
default risk is subdivided into direct impact and total impact (taking into account the
impact on debt).
4.3 Hypotheses
Our empirical study is divided into two parts. In the rst part we analyze the deter-
minants of the capital structure. In the second part we study the determinants of the
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Table 4.3: Expected impact of main explanatory variables.
Expected impact on debt Expected impact on default risk
Direct impact Total Impact
Uncertainty - + +/-
Default Costs - + +/-
Market Concentration +/- - +/-
default probability, including the capital structure as an endogenous explanatory variable.
Obviously, in our sample, we are interested in analyzing the impact of the variables that
have already been tested in the literature. But, we want to give a special emphasis to the
variables that have not been studied before, in particular in the default risk literature. In
addition, we also want to test if there is a structural di¤erence before and after 2008.
The collected sample allows us to analyze the impact of the global nancial crisis
which culminated in 2008. Our rst set of hypotheses is:
H1a: There is a statistically signicant di¤erence of the impact of the various deter-
minants on debt before and after 2008.
H1b: There is a statistically signicant di¤erence of the impact of the various determi-
nants on default risk before and after 2008.
The aim is (estimating the models in 2007 and 2013) to analyze if there are di¤erences
in the signicance and impact of determinants on debt and on default risk. According
to some studies there is a change in nancial and operational decisions after 2008, which
will a¤ect the impact of the debt and default determinants.
As discussed numerically by Haan and Toolsema (2008) and Franck and Le Pape
(2008) and as analyzed in the two previous chapters of this thesis, uncertainty a¤ects the
decisions regarding capital structure and the default risk. Considering the literature, it
is expected that the impact of uncertainty on debt is negative. When rms go through
a greater uncertainty period, they tend to adopt a more conservative nancial behavior.
The previous chapters suggest that the total impact of uncertainty on the default risk
is ambiguous. The greater the uncertainty, the more likely rms are not to meet their
debt obligations (for a given debt level). However, the total impact can be negative since
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uncertainty leads to a more conservative behavior. Therefore we intend to empirically
test the following two hypotheses:
H2a: Uncertainty has a negative impact on debt.
H2b: Uncertainty has an impact on default risk.
The literature recognizes the importance of the default costs in determining the capital
structure. However, the measurement of the indirect default costs and the analysis of its
e¤ect on the risk of default is not widespread. The literature in the area (in particular,
the trade-o¤ theory) argues that default costs have a negative impact on debt. The higher
the default costs, the more expensive it is for the rm to borrow money. However the total
e¤ect of the default costs on the default probability is ambiguous. On one hand, there
is the direct impact of the costs (the higher the costs, the greater the probability of rm
not meeting its obligations). On the other hand, there is also an indirect e¤ect through
debt which decreases which in turn decreases the probability of default. An important
question to be tested is the signicance of these costs for determining the debt level and
the default probability, since the literature that studies the impact of these costs is not
consensual. Thus, our third set of hypotheses is:
H3a: Default costs (direct and indirect) have a negative impact on debt.
H3b: Default costs (direct and indirect) have an impact on default risk.
According to Opler and Titman (1994), Zingales (1998), Campos (2000), Erol (2003)
and Lyandres (2006), the degree of competition in the product market and the capital
structure are related. As explained above the impact of the degree of market concentration
on the debt level is ambiguous. The Brander and Lewis (1986) framework leads us to
predict and inverted U relationship between the degree of market concentration and debt
since the strategic e¤ect of debt is stronger for intermediate levels of competition (under
monopoly and under perfect competition the strategic e¤ect is nil). However, in a more
concentrated market the entrants are more exposed to predation by the incumbents if they
are indebted. Thus it is expected that younger rms in concentrated markets nance less
with debt. With regard to the default risk, the expected sign of the impact of market
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concentration is also ambiguous. On the one hand, the higher is the degree of market
concentration (i.e., the lower the degree of competition) the higher are the expected
prots and therefore the lower is the probability of default. On the other hand, younger
rm are more exposed to predation, by established incumbent rms, in concentrated
market. Note however that these younger rms are expected to nance less with debt and
hence the total impact of market concentration on default risk is ambiguous. Therefore
the impact of market concentration on the default risk is not clear cut. Thus our fourth
set of hypotheses is:
H4a: Market concentration has impact on debt.
H4b: Market concentration has impact on default risk.
4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Sample and Variables
To achieve the objectives of the study we used four sources of information: Datas-
tream,Wordscope, OECD and World Bank. The data collected relates to listed rms
from 11 OECD countries.6 The collected data covers the years of 2007 and 2013. How-
ever for the calculation of the indirect default costs, which are proxied by the loss of
prots relatively to the expected prots (see details in the appendix), it was necessary to
collect information from 1997 to 2013. The number of rms is not the same in 2007 and
2013 (the sample contains 9023 rms in 2007 and 7937 in 2013). The sample contains
rms belonging to 8 sectors according to the Standard Industrial Classication (SIC).
The Financial, Insurance, Real Estate and Public Administration sectors (due to di¤er-
ent accounting treatment) and rms which had data for a period of less than two years
were excluded from the analysis.
Table 4.4 shows the number of rms in the sample by country and sector, for the two
years considered.
6The countries included are: Canada, Germany, Greece, Israel, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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Table 4.4: Number of rms by country and sector in 2007 and 2013.
Country Year Total Agric. Mining Const. Manuf. Transp. Wholesale Retail Services
Canada 2007 1857 37 1174 29 277 125 46 29 140
2013 2082 40 1367 29 285 133 47 33 148
Germany 2007 664 12 7 40 187 174 111 22 111
2013 514 11 6 33 157 129 89 18 71
Greece 2007 181 20 2 25 45 20 28 8 33
2013 183 20 2 23 46 26 25 9 32
Israel 2007 277 14 16 23 106 33 41 5 39
2013 242 12 18 22 91 25 39 5 30
Poland 2007 297 23 5 58 77 40 44 9 41
2013 199 19 6 44 43 27 29 5 26
Portugal 2007 42 6 1 9 3 6 5 1 11
2013 37 5 1 8 2 5 4 1 11
Spain 2007 98 13 3 14 24 15 10 3 16
2013 96 11 2 14 24 15 12 3 15
Switzerland 2007 160 12 1 12 69 20 15 6 25
2013 144 12 0 12 66 18 10 5 21
Sweden 2007 308 13 20 13 100 45 31 17 69
2013 203 10 14 12 70 25 23 11 38
UK 2007 980 27 183 38 188 145 82 39 278
2013 980 26 189 38 188 149 74 37 279
US 2007 4159 137 378 141 1342 754 394 234 779
2013 3257 112 268 116 1066 593 313 203 586
Total 2007 9023 314 1790 402 2418 1377 807 373 1542
2013 7937 278 1873 351 2038 1145 665 330 1257
The sample consists of countries with di¤erent levels of development, di¤erent legal
structures and, as we can see in table 4.4, the sectorial structure of rms listed in each
country is also di¤erent. Canada and UK have a larger number of rms belonging to the
Mining sector, Portugal has many rms in the construction sector and, in the remaining
countries the manufacturing sector is predominant.
The study is divided into two parts. In the rst part, the explained variable is leverage
and in the second part the explained variable is default risk. In the rst part the long
book debt ratio is used. In the second part, default is measured by a dummy variable
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following the works of Wruck (1990), Asquith, Getner and Scharfstein (1994), Andrade
and Kaplan (1998) and Pindado, Rodrigues and La Torre (2008). Table 4.5 shows the
dependent variables an how they are calculated in each part of the study.
Table 4.5: Dependent variables.
Part Dependentvariable Calculation
I LEV LEV = long term debtdebt+book equity value
II DEF DEF=

1 With Financial distress
0 Without Financial distress
Default is measured by a binary variable. A rm is considered to be in nancial
distress if cumulatively it presents the two following conditions for two consecutive years:
(1) EBITDA is lower than the nancial obligations (2) The market value decreases as
dened by Asquith, Getner and Scharfstein (1994); Pindado, Rodrigues and La Torre
(2004) and Tinoco and Wilson (2013).
Figure 4.1 shows the average leverage ratio in 2007 and in 2013. As it can be observed,
in 2007 and 2013 the most indebted country is Greece. Canada is the lowest indebted
country. All countries show an increase in their average debt ratio from 2007 to 2013
except Greece, Israel, Portugal and the UK.
When analyzing the nancial structure by sector, we can conclude that the sectors with
the greatest long-term debt are agriculture, forestry, shing and construction. Mining is
the sector with the lowest leverage ratio. All sectors increased the average debt ratio from
2007 to 2013.
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Figure 4.1: Average leverage ratio by country and sector.
Figure 4.2 shows the percentage of rms that are in default by country and sector in
2007 and in 2013. Analyzing the gure, one can concluded that all countries have a higher
number of rms in default in 2013 compared to 2007 (except the US). The most signicant
increase is in Canada. When analyzing the percentage by sector, the sectors that increased
the number of rms in default were agriculture, forestry, shing, mining, construction and
retail trade. The sector with the highest percentage of default rms is the mining sector.
The data also reveals that there is a substantial number of rms with zero leverage ratio.
In 2007 this percentage is around 38% while in 2013 it is 39%. According to table 4.6
and analyzing the average debt, there is a considerable increase in the leverage ratio both
when we consider the whole sample as well as when analyzing only rms with a positive
debt ratio. One interesting feature is that the average debt is lower for rms that are
in nancial distress. This suggest that many rm that are in nancial distress did not
nance with long-term debt and they are in nancial distress due to operational reasons
and not because of an excessive use of debt. The average indebtedness increased from
2007 to 2013, but decreased for default rms. The percentage of rms in default increased
from 2007 to 2013 whereas in the case of the indebted rms the percentage decreased.
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of rms in nancial distress by country and by sector.
Table 4.6: Average leverage and proportion of rms in nancial distress.
Dependent All Sample Lev >0 Default=1 Lev>0 and Default=1
Variable 2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013
Leverage Ratio (%) 40.79 42.40 66.90 68.55 33.37 14.53 67.90 46.62
Default rms (%) 5.92 8.33 2.90 2.60 - - - -
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The analysis will be divided into two parts. In the rst part the aim is to test hypothe-
ses H1a, H2a, H3a and H4a regarding the impact on debt, therefore debt is the dependent
variable. The independent variables used in the rst model are: uncertainty, direct default
cost, indirect default cost, market concentration and the square of market concentration.
The control variables used are: non-tax-shield, protability, expected growth, square of
expected growth, collateral, size, age, and the set of sectorial and country dummies.
In the second part the objective is to test hypotheses H1b, H2b, H3b and H4b regard-
ing the impact on the default probability, and to test the impact of debt on the default
risk. Thus, the default probability is used as the dependent variable and the main in-
dependent variables used in the second model are: leverage, uncertainty, direct default
cost, indirect default cost, market concentration and square of market concentration. The
control variables used are: management e¢ciency, size, age, squared of age, and the set of
sectorial and country dummies. The last model considers debt as an endogenous variable,
using the following instrumental variables: non-tax-shield, expected growth, square of
expected growth and collateral.7
Table 4.7 summarizes the variables used (references are presented in the Appendix).
Table 4.8 shows some descriptive statistics of the main variables and table 4.9 presents
the correlation between the main variables. According to table 4.9 there is a negative
correlation between leverage and default. The variables uncertainty and direct default
costs do not have the same correlation with debt and default. Indirect default costs and
market competition are negatively related to debt and default.
4.4.2 Econometric Models
In order to test the hypotheses mentioned in section 4.3, the econometric analysis will be
divided into three models. Each of these models will analyze data from 2007 and 2013.
The aim is to understand whether there are di¤erences in the impact of the variables
before (2007) and after (2013) the nancial crisis.
7The square of the variables market concentration, growth and age were introduced due to their
possible non linear e¤ect.
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Table 4.7: Independent Variables
Variables Notation Calculation
Uncertainty UNCi Standard deviation of log-changes in sales
Indirect Default Cost IDCi Di¤erence between prots and estimated prots (see Altman 1984)
Direct Default Cost DDCi R&D expenses to total asset
Market Competition HHIi Sum of the squares of the percentage market shares
Squared Market Competition HHI2i Square of Market Competition
Leverage LEVi Long book debt ratio
Leverage Transformed LEVTi Transformation of fractional variable for continuous variable
Non-Tax Shields NTAXSHIi Depreciation to total asset
Protabilty PROFi Operating prot to total asset
Growth opportunities GROWTHi Percentage change in total asset from previous to current year
Squared growth opportunities GROWTH2i Square of growth opportunities
Collateral COLLi Fixed assets to total asset
Age Agei Years since foundation
Squared Age Age2i Square of age
Management E¤ciency MANEFFICi Sales to asset
Size SIZEi ln (total asset)
Country COUNTRYiz Dummy variables, equal to 1 if rm i belongs to country z
Sector SECTORij Dummy variables, equal to 1 if rm i belongs to sector j
* The Appendix presents references that use these variables and explains the calculation of IDC.
The rst model aims to analyze the impact of uncertainty, direct and indirect default
costs and market concentration on debt. Most studies that analyze the nancial leverage
decisions use linear regression models, however the variable debt ratio has two important
characteristics: it is a limited variable between 0 and 1 and there may be many rms that
do not use debt. To address this reality some authors use the logistic transformation or
other non-linear transformation so as that the transformed variable takes values between
0 and innity or such that the transformed variable can take any real value. However,
the two aforementioned characteristics of the leverage ratio can be taken into account
using a two-part fractional regression model (as indicated by Papke and Wooldridge,
1996; Ramalho and Silva, 2009; Ramalho and Ramalho, 2010; Ramalho, Ramalho and
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Table 4.8: Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables.
All Sample LEV + Default LEV+ and Default
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Obs Mean Std.Dev Obs Mean Std.Dev Obs Mean Std.Dev
LEV 16960 0.416 0.430 10412 0.677 0.351 1194 0.230 0.382 468 0.585 0.406
DEF 12909 0.093 0.290 8283 0.057 0.231 1194 1.000 0.000 468 1.000 0.000
UNC 14746 0.433 0.538 10140 0.361 0.460 798 0.722 0.709 422 0.666 0.685
DDC 12953 0.254 13.30 8018 0.061 0.389 1014 0.174 0.719 398 0.125 0.405
IDC 7155 0.364 13.78 5603 0.387 15.51 245 0.288 1.693 176 0.181 0.718
HHI 16960 218.6 193.4 10412 221.0 203.9 1194 200.9 156.6 468 197.9 184.4
HHI2 16960 85173 175549 10412 90391 184487 1194 64854 148480 468 73103 73104
Table 4.9: Correlation between variables.
LEV DEF UNC DDC IDC HHI HHI2
LEV 1.0000
DEF -0.0241 1.0000
UNC -0.1564 0.1230 1.0000
DDC -0.1317 0.0839 0.2382 1.0000
IDC -0.0274 -0.0030 0.0866 0.0961 1.0000
HHI -0.0692 -0.030 0.0421 -0.0233 -0.0073 1.0000
HHI2 -0.0422 -0.0088 0.0225 -0.0238 -0.0059 0.9374 1.0000
Murteira, 2011; and Ramalho and Silva, 2013).
By using a two-part model for a variable that is between 0 and 1 and with a non-
neglible proportion of zeros, in the rst part the aim is to analyze the use or not of debt
(a binary choice), i.e., the probability of the debt ratio being positive. The use of leverage
variable, LEV , is dened as follows:
LEV  =
8<: 0 if LEV = 01 if LEV 2 (0; 1] (4.1)
The rst part is modelled as follows:
Pr (LEV  = 1jX) = Pr (LEV 2 (0; 1] jX) = F (X) (4.2)
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WhereX is a vector of explanatory variables and  is the vector of coe¢cients and F () can
be the Cauchy (Cauchit), Logistic (Logit), Standard normal (Probit), Extreme maximum
(Loglog) or Extreme minimum (Complementary loglog) distribution function and can be
estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML) using the whole sample.
The second part of the model aims to analyze the non-zero leverage, i.e., aims to study
the impact of the determinants of the debt ratio. The second part is modelled as follows:
E (LEV jLEV  = 1;X) = G(X) (4.3)
Where  is the vector of coe¢cients and G() can be the Cauchy (Cauchit), Logistic
(Logit), Standard normal (Probit), Extreme maximum (Loglog) or Extreme minimum
(Complementary loglog) distribution function and can be estimated by Quasi-Maximum
Likelihood (QML) using observations with positive leverage ratio. Note that, the vector
of coe¢cients  and  may be di¤erent since the factors that inuence resorting or not
to debt may be di¤erent from the factors that inuence the amount of debt.
In order to analyze the impact of a variable on the expected leverage ratio, one needs
to take into account its e¤ect on the probability of the debt being positive and its e¤ect
on the debt ratio given that leverage is positive. In other words, the conditional expected
leverage ratio, E(LEV jX); is given by:
E (LEV jX) = E (LEV jLEV  = 1;X)  Pr (LEV  = 1jX) = F (X) G(X) (4.4)
In our case, the X is a vector composed by the following variables: uncertainty, UNC,
direct default cost, DDC, indirect default cost, IDC, the Herndahl-Hirschman Index,
HHI, the square of the Herndahl-Hirschman Index, HHI2, non-tax-shield, NTAXS,
protability, PROF , expected growth, GROWTH, square of expected growth, GROWTH2,
collateral, COLL, size, SIZE, age, AGE and the set of sectorial and country dummies.
Considering the next model, it is useful to decompose vectorX into two vectors: X1 which
includes the variables that also inuence directly the default risk and Z which is formed
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by the variables that inuence debt but do not directly inuence the default probability.
The second model aims to test the impact of debt and the e¤ect of the independent
variables on the default probability. Since the dependent variable, DEF , is dichotomous
we need to use an estimation method that takes into account the binary nature of the
variable. Moreover, considering the potential endogeneity of the leverage variable we need
to use a method such as instrumental variables. Therefore we decided to use instrumental
variables probit model (ivprobit in STATA). However this model assumes that the en-
dogenous variable is a continuous and non-limited variable. To solve this issue we used a
transformation of the leverage ratio that takes values between minus innitum and plus
innitum. The transformation is the following:8
LEV Ti = ln

LEVi
1  LEVi

= ln

long term debt
equity

The estimated model is:
Pr (DEF1i = 1jLEV T;X1;X2) = (0 + 1LEV Ti;+2UNCi + 3DDCi +
4IDCi + 5HHIi + 6HHI
2
i + 7MANEFi +
8SIZEi + 9AGEi + 10AGE
2
i +
7X
j=1
jSECTORij +
10X
k=1
kCOUNTRYik) (4.5)
where  is the cumulative normal distribution and X1 and X2 are vectors of exogenous
variables that inuences the default probability, where X2 are the variables that do not
inuence leverage. The instrumental variables used were the set of variables in vector Z,
which includes non-tax shields, collateral, growth and growth squared.9
Another model that can be estimated is the reduced form of the default probability
8The transformed variable can only be calculated for observations with a positive debt ratio. Therefore,
the estimation of the default probability is only done for leveraged rms.
9Note that the variable protability was not introduced neither as an explanatory variable of the
default risk nor as an instrumental variable. The reason is that protability is used to identify the rms
under nancial distress, and thus it is likely to be correlated with the errors in the default regression.
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equation, where LEV T is substituted by its expected value conditional on X1 and Z. In
order words, to estimate the probability of the rm being in nancial distress as a function
of all exogenous variables, X1;X2 and Z:
Pr (DEF2i = 1jX1;X2;Z;LEV > 0) = (0 + 1UNCi + 2DDCi + 3IDCi +
4HHIi + 5HHI
2
i + 6NTAXSi + 7GROWTHi +
8GROWTH
2
i + 9COLLi + 10AGEi +
11AGE
2
i + 12MANEFi + 13SIZEi +
7X
j=1
jSECTORij +
10X
k=1
kCOUNTRYik) (4.6)
It worthwhile to related the two previous estimations with the models analyzed in the
two previous chapters. Equation (4.5) corresponds to estimating the default probability
in the second stage of the game (i.e., for a given debt level) and it allows us to study the
impact of debt on the default probability as well as the impact of the exogenous variables,
considering debt as xed. Therefore the impacts estimated with this regression do not
take into account the indirect impact of the variable on the default probability through
the induced changes on debt. However, it should be noted that indirect e¤ects through
the more or less aggressive behavior in the product market (for a given debt level) are
captured with this regression.
On the other hand, equation (4.6) is related to the solution of the whole game in the
previous chapters, i.e. the subgame perfect equilibrium default probability. The partial
e¤ects of this equation measure the total impact of the explanatory variable on the default
risk because it includes the direct impact of the variable, given by the partial e¤ects of
equation (4.5), as well as the indirect impact through the impact of the explanatory vari-
able on debt which in turn inuences default probability. Therefore, with the estimation
of these 2 equations we are able to distinguish between the direct and total impact of each
explanatory variable.
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4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Main ndings of the leverage model
In Table 4.10 the results of the estimation of the two-parts fractional model are pre-
sented.10 The left part of the table presents the results regarding the decision on whether
to nance with debt or not. The right part of the table presents the results regarding the
decision of the debt ratio (for the rms that have a positive leverage). We present the
results including the observations of the two years, the results with 2007 observations and
the results with 2013 observations. To facilitate interpretation, the table also presents the
expected impact of each variable.11
According to the RESET test there seems to be a correct adequacy of both models
to the data. In addition, the Pseudo R2 values are similar to the values reported in the
literature in this topic. The Chow-type statistic (for the test of structural break) was
carried out to check if the variables have a di¤erent e¤ect on the two years (2007 and
2013). The null hypothesis was rejected for a 1% level of signicance. Therefore it can
be concluded that there is a structural break since the variables have di¤erent e¤ects in
2007 and 2013. Considering this result, it is more adequate to look at the results for each
year, than to interpret the regression with observations of the two years.
An overall look at the signs and statistical signicance of the coe¢cients in the two
regressions (observations of 2007, observations of 2013) reveals that the results tend to be
consistent with each other. There are however cases where a variable only has a statistical
signicant impact in one regression and where the sign is not the same (but when this
happens one of the coe¢cients is not signicant, hence the change in sign is not really
relevant).
With regard to the decision of a rm nancing with debt (binary model) we can
10For reasons of space the results regarding the coe¢cients of the sectorial and country dummies were
omitted. However the results of the tests carried out to test their signicance is presented (LR/LM Tests).
11The review of the literature presented above is based primarily on determining the amount of the
debt, hence it is more related with the second part in the two-part model. Thus the expected impact of
variables has been placed on the right side of table 4.10.
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conclude that direct default costs (DDC), collateral (COLL) and size (SIZE) are all
statistically signicant in the two years under analysis. The signs obtained for these
variables are the ones that are expected according to the theory. Higher direct default
costs decrease the probability of a rm nancing with debt. On the contrary, the higher
is the collateral and the larger is the rm, the more likely is that the rm decides to use
debt as a nancing alternative.
Besides the previous variables, we observe that in 2013 the protability (PROF ) has
a negative impact on the likelihood of a rm nancing with debt. This result is consistent
with the pecking order theory. Note that, after the crisis, banks started being more careful
in the evaluation of credit applications and thus it started being more di¢cult for a rm
to obtain debt if it desired to do so. This may be a reason for an increasing reliance on
internal funds for nancing. This is a potential reason why the variable is only signicant
after the crisis.
On the other hand, the variables age (AGE), uncertainty (UNC), indirect default
cost (IDC) and square of HHI (HHI2) are only signicant in 2007. The variable AGE
has a positive impact on the probability of the rm nancing with debt. This result is
consistent with the idea that a older rm already build a reputation and it is better know
in the debt market, making it easier to resort to debt nancing. The fact that the variable
is not signicant in 2013, may be related with the fact that the restriction on bank credit
were so high that even older rms had di¢culties in obtaining credit. In other words,
the reputational advantage was not so important as before the crisis. The impacts of
UNC and IDC are both positive. These are an unexpected result, which are not easy to
explain. In the case of the indirect default costs, it may be related with the way they are
measured.
Analyzing the amount of debt (second part of the model) we can see that the only
variables that have a signicant impact in the two years are COLL, SIZE and AGE.
The two rst variables inuence positively the debt ratio and therefore they have the
same impact on both parts of the two-parts model. On the contrary the variable AGE
has a negative impact on the debt ratio, which can be explained by the fact that older
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rms are likely to have higher accumulated retained earnings, and therefore need a lower
amount of debt. Note that while the decision to use debt seems to be more inuenced by
the reputation story, the amount of debt seems more related with retained earnings.
In addition to the previous variables, the DDC, HHI, PROF and GROWTH2 are
all signicant in 2007 whereas UNC and IDC are signicant in 2013. Note that the
impact of uncertainty, direct default costs and indirect default costs on the debt ratio, is
the expected one, as these three variables lead to a lower debt ratio. Moreover a higher
market concentration implies higher leverage, which is consistent the larger strategic e¤ect
of debt in more concentrated markets (except, the limit case of a monopoly, which does
not occur in our dataset). The control variables protability and growth also have the
expected signs.
The coe¢cients shown in table 4.10 allows us to analyze the sign and the signicance
of the coe¢cients but we cannot evaluate the e¤ect of the variables on the debt (due to
the non-linearity of the function F and G). Table 4.11 shows the estimated partial e¤ects
for each variable (considering the average of the partial e¤ects for all observations).
Taking into account the results mentioned above and the hypotheses postulated in
section 4.3, we can conclude that the result support the hypotheses H1a, H2a, H3a, and
H4a.
First, there is a statistically signicant di¤erence in the determinants impact on debt
before and after 2008 as veried in the Chow test, and as observed in tables 4.10 and 4.11
there are some variables which have di¤erent statistically e¤ects in 2007 and 2013. We
can, therefore, state that the determinants have a di¤erent impact before and after the
peak of the crisis. This di¤erence is signicant both in probability of using debt (binary
model) and the amount of debt (fractional model). For instance, the indirect default costs
has a negative e¤ect on the debt ratio in 2013 (considering the rms that nance with
debt) but does not have a signicant impact on the debt ratio before the crisis.
Second, uncertainty a¤ects negatively the debt ratio (however the result is only sta-
tistically signicant in 2013). According to the theoretical literature in the area (Brander
and Lewis, 1986; Franck and Le Pape, 2008; Haan and Toolsema, 2008) a negative im-
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Table 4.10: Results of the two-parts regression to estimate leverage.
Independent Part I Binary model Part II: Fractional regression model
Variable All All Exp
Sample 2007 2013 Sample 2007 2013 sign
UNC 0.1451** 0.4073*** -0.0040 -0.1138* -0.0611 -0.1549* -
(0.0661) (0.1316) (0.0823) (0.0632) (0.0934) (0.0819)
DDC -0.7467*** -0.6417* -1.1327*** 0.0140 -0.7875* 0.4824 -
0.2158 0.3481 0.2797 0.2635 0.4242 0.3233
IDC 0.0180*** 0.0199*** 0.0028 -0.0020*** -0.0050 -0.0012*** -
(0.0066) (0.0099) (0.0023) (0.0006) (0.0081) (0.0005)
HHI -0.0008** -0.0012 -0.0007 0.0005 0.0005*** 0.0005 +/-
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0004)
HHI2 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 +/-
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
NTAXS 0.6933* 0.3496 0.7203* 0.1379 1.2116 -0.0604 -
(0.3914) (1.1947) (0.4217) (0.3947) (0.9398) (0.4473)
PROF -0.0001 0.0210 -0.2990*** -0.2641** -0.9042*** -0.0402 +/-
(0.0031) (0.0735) (0.0788) (0.1277) (0.2137) (0.1107)
GROWTH 0.1005** 0.1494 0.0774 -0.0179 0.1009 0.1239 +/-
(0.0444) (0.1024) (0.0738) (0.0535) (0.1029) (0.1051)
GROWTH2 -0.0012 -0.0045 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0132*** -0.0010 +/-
(0.0011) (0.0106) (0.0044) (0.0009) (0.0069) (0.0018)
COLL 1.1498*** 1.4080*** 1.0857*** 0.6050*** 0.7733*** 0.5020*** +
(0.1051) (0.2314) (0.1214) (0.0916) (0.2133) (0.1024)
SIZE 0.2479*** 0.2211*** 0.2714*** 0.2479*** 0.2497*** 0.2520*** +/-
(0.0105) (0.0185) (0.0134) (0.010) (0.0173) (0.0127)
AGE 0.0020 0.0103*** -0.0012 -0.0167*** -0.0220*** -0.0157*** +/-
(0.0019) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0039) (0.0023)
CONSTANT -2.0511 0.0795 -0.1358 -1.6976 -1.7864 -1.7450
(0.2706) (63.109) (67.066) 0.1996 (0.3681) (0.2357)
# of obs 5920 1844 4076 4593 1445 3148
Pseudo R2 0.2141 0.2122 0.2300 0.3725 0.3213 0.4122
RESET test 0.672 0.683 0.715 0.625 1.755 0.661
Chow test 75.804 25.003
LR/LM sector 42.261 13.385 29.331 16.786 8.4010 10.179
LR/LM country 62.268 36.727 52.402 423.82 91.052 336.48
Notes: The statistics reported are obtained through Stata (version 13.1) Below the coe¢cients we report
standard deviation in parentheses; for the test statistics we report p-values; ***, ** and * denote
coe¢cients which are statistically signicant at 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. For the binary model,
the joint signicance of the sector and country dummies was tested using a standard LR statistic,while
the pseudo R2 and the RESET and heteroskedasticity tests were computed as Ramalho, Ramalho and
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Table 4.11: Partial e¤ects of the two-parts leverage model.
Independent Probability of use debt Proportion of debt Total E¤ect
Variable All Sample 2007 2013 All Sample 2007 2013 All Sample 2007 2013
UNC 0.036 0.098 -0.001 -0.022 -0.012 -0.029 0.008 0.060 -0.023
DDC -0.184 -0.155 -0.272 0.003 -0.154 0.091 -0.124 -0.230 -0.115
IDC 0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000
HHI -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
HHI2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NTAXS 0.170 0.085 0.173 0.027 0.237 -0.011 0.137 0.245 0.109
PROF -0.000 0.005 -0.072 -0.051 -0.177 -0.008 -0.039 -0.135 -0.0547
GROWTH 0.025 0.036 0.019 -0.003 0.020 0.023 0.014 0.041 0.0306
GROWTH2 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.0002
COLL 0.283 0.340 0.261 0.116 0.151 0.095 0.284 0.358 0.2503
SIZE 0.061 0.053 0.065 0.048 0.049 0.048 0.079 0.358 0.0809
AGE 0.001 0.003 -0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.023 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0025
pact of the uncertainty on the debt level was expected as rms behave more cautiously
when uncertainty is higher. Thus our result support the hypothesis H2a when we con-
sider leveraged rms. However, as mentioned before, uncertainty positively a¤ects the
probability of a rm borrowing (binary model), although the coe¢cient is only signicant
in 2007. This indicates that, before the crisis, the probability of a rm opting for debt
was higher when uncertainty was higher. One possible explanation, following the logic
of the pecking order theory, is that when uncertainty is higher the rm is more likely to
face liquidity problems and has a higher probability of having to use debt to face those
liquidity problems. Another potential explanation is that greater uncertainty may be cor-
related with greater information asymmetry. For these two reasons the rm may prefer
to resort to borrowing than to issue new equity. However, after the crisis the uncertainty
variable ceased to have statistical signicance and this may be explained by the increased
constraints on borrowing making it more di¢cult to resort to debt to nance liquidity
problems.
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The default costs (direct and indirect) have a negative impact on the debt ratio (however
for the direct default costs the e¤ect is statistically signicant only in 2007 whereas for
the indirect default costs the impact is statistically signicant only in 2013). This result
is consistent with the trade-o¤ theory, since the higher are the default costs, the higher
are the costs of holding debt and therefore the lower is the optimal debt ratio. Moreover
it is also consistent with the model presented in the previous chapter. It should be noted
that our results reveal that direct default costs also inuence negatively the probability
of rm nancing with debt, which was expected. More di¢cult to explain is the fact that
in 2007, higher indirect default costs, increase the probability of the rm using debt. As
mentioned above this may be related with the way indirect default costs are measured.
They are evaluated by the prot loss with respect to the expected prot. However that
prot loss may be related with a negative demand shock (in that particular period the rm
had a unusually low demand) and not to a reputation loss associated with the probability
of the rm meeting its obligations. This negative shock may lead the rm to face liquidity
problems, that increase the need for nancing.
Market concentration has an impact on the debt ratio (however the impact is signicant
only in 2007). Regarding the 2007 regression, it can be seen that the degree of market
concentration has a positive e¤ect on the debt ratio. Note that if we ignore the monopoly
case (which actually does not occur in our data) the more concentrated is the market,
the higher will be the strategic e¤ect of debt and, therefore, the higher is the equilibrium
debt level (in the Brander and Lewis (1986) type of models).
It should also be highlighted that the signicant control variables have the expected
signs. However there are some variables that were signicant before the crisis but not
signicant after the crisis and variables for which the reverse is true. This suggests that,
after the crisis, some of the debt determinants may have changed and that it may be wise
to test the relevance of other variables.
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4.5.2 Main ndings of the default model
In table 4.12 the results of default estimation are presented.12 We present the results
including the observations of the two years, the results with 2007 observations and the
results with 2013 observations. To facilitate interpretation, the table also presents the
expected impact (direct and total) of each variable. To estimate the direct impact instru-
mental variable probit model was used (ivprobit in Stata) while for the estimation of the
reduced form of the model we used a Probit model.
The exogeneity tests (Durbin 2, Wu- Hausman F and Wald Test) presented in the
Appendix were conducted and conrm the correlation of the variable debt with the resid-
uals for the all sample and for 2013, which suggests that it is appropriate to use the
instrumental variables method. The Pseudo R2 values presented are in accordance with
the values reported in the literature in the area.13 In general, the instrumental variables
have statistical signicance according to the t test for a level of signicance of 10%. The
Chow-type statistic (for the test of structural break) was carried out to check if the vari-
ables have di¤erent e¤ects on the two groups (2007 and 2013). The null hypothesis was
rejected for a 1% level of signicance. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a
structural break since the variables have di¤erent e¤ects in 2007 and 2013. Considering
this result, it is more appropriate to look at the results for each year, than to interpret
the regression with observations of the two years.
Analyzing the signs and the signicance of the variables, one observes some di¤erences
between 2007 and 2013, with the coe¢cient of some variables changing their sign and
signicance. Similarly, there are some di¤erences between the direct and total e¤ects,
which is expectable.
The impact of debt on the default probability is not signicant in 2007, but it is
negative and signicant in 2013. One explanation for this results is that more indebted
rms tend to behave more cautiously in the product market, with this e¤ect dominating
12For reasons of space the results regarding the coe¢cients of the sectorial and country dummies were
omitted. However the results of the tests carried out to test their signicance is presented (LR/LM Tests).
13The RESET test suggests a change in the functional form. There was no time to explore the functional
form of the model.
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the fact that more debt increases the probability of default (maintaining constant the
product market behavior), as defended by predation theories. However the fact that the
variable is only signicant in 2013 suggests another explanation. After the crisis there
has been an increase in the credit constraints and banks are only willing to give loans to
rms which o¤er a high guarantee of meeting their obligations. Thus only the best rms
with less risky projects are able to get nancing. This screening mechanism implies that
debt and default probability are negatively related.
An increase on the uncertainty leads to an increase in the default probability in the
two years (although in 2013 the direct e¤ect is not signicant). This result is consistent
with the numerical results in the previous chapter, where with default costs, the direct
and the total impact of uncertainty are both positive.
Regarding the default costs, in our regressions only the total e¤ect of the indirect
default costs in 2013 is signicant, which gives only a very mild support to H3b. In 2013,
the total impact of the indirect default costs on the debt probability is negative, which is
consistent with the numerical results of the previous chapter.
Similarly, the impact of the degree of market concentration is only signicant in 2013.
Since the coe¢cients ofHHI andHHI2 are both signicant, we can conclude that impact
of the degree of market concentration is non-linear. In particular, the result suggest
that the higher is the market concentration the lower is the default risk (the coe¢cient
associated with HHI is negative), but the decrease in the default risk is progressively
smaller (the coe¢cient associated with HHI2 is positive, suggesting a relationship in
U, but the coe¢cient is extremely small, hence the impact reaches a minimum for very
high concentration values). This result is consistent with what we expected as prots
are expected to be higher in more concentrated markets, and although debt may also be
higher, the probability of default is lower.
Regarding the control variables, in 2013 management e¢ciency (MANEF ) has a di-
rect negative impact on the probability of default, which is consistent with the expected
sign. The size variable has a direct positive impact on the default probability but a neg-
ative total impact on the default probability (although the total impact is not signicant
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in 2013). In other words, considering the total e¤ect, the larger is the rm, the less likely
it is to fail.
In 2007, since the coe¢cient associated with AGE is positive while the coe¢cient
associated with AGE2 is negative, one can conclude that the total e¤ect of the variable age
on the default probability follows the inverted U shape relationship previously identied
in the literature. In other words, the default probability increases till a certain age and
decreases thereafter. However, for a given debt level the result show that the default risk
is decreasing with age. This can be explained by the presence of learning by doing and
acquired experience e¤ects which, for a given debt level, imply a reduction in the default
probability as the rm becomes older.
Taking into account the results mentioned above and the hypotheses postulated in
section 4.3, we can conclude that the result support hypotheses H1b, H2b, H3b, and H4b
although the support for H3b is relatively mild.
First, there is a statistically signicant di¤erence in the determinants impact on de-
fault risk before and after 2008 as veried in the Chow test and, as can be seen in table
4.12, where some variables have a di¤erent statistical e¤ect in 2007 and 2013. Therefore
we can conclude that the determinants have a di¤erent impacts before and after the peak
of the crisis. This may indicate that the 2008 nancial crisis may have altered the de-
terminants of the default probability. For instance, the indirect default costs, the market
concentration and the management e¢ciency are only signicant in 2013.
Second, uncertainty has an impact on default risk since the default probability is
increasing with uncertainty. The results conrm what is suggested by the numerical
analysis performed in the previous chapter.
However, there is only a relative mild support for hypothesis H3b because only the
indirect default costs in 2013 inuence the default risk (considering the total e¤ect). This
negative impact of the indirect default costs was expected since higher default costs lead
to the adoption of a more conservative behavior in the debt market and also in the output
market, hence default probability decrease. However we expected the result to hold in
the two years and for both direct and indirect default costs, which did not occur.
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Table 4.12: Results of the default risk regressions.
Independent Exp sign All Sample 2007 2013
variables Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total
LEVT +/- -0.3749 - -0.1909 - -0.3789 -
(0.0162) (0.0800) (0.0069)
UNC + +/- 0.1105 0.4454 0.6189 0.5879 -0.0606 0.3172
(0.1018) (0.0982) (0.2199) (0.1583) (0.0808) (0.1479)
DDC + +/- -0.2189 0.1937 0.1199 0.4406 0.1251 -0.4866
(0.2399) (0.3173) (0.4775) (0.5869) (0.2524) (0.4050)
IDC + +/- -0.0019 -0.0031 -0.0706 -0.0262 -0.0014 -0.0016
(0.0030) (0.0013) (0.0462) (0.0262) (0.0016) (0.0006)
HHI - +/- -0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0004 -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0019
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0004) (0.0009)
HHI2 + 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
MANEF - -0.0950 -0.0430 -0.0876 -0.0874 -0.1022 -0.0009
(0.0279) (0.0601) (0.0844) (0.1073) (0.0306) (0.0696)
SIZE +/- 0.1620 -0.0601 0.0091 -0.0920 0.1759 -0.0262
(0.0502) (0.0207) (0.0340) (0.0345) (0.0120) (0.0266)
AGE +/- -0.0208 0.0173 0.0512 0.0685 -0.0262 0.0093
(0.0093) (0.0179) (0.0314) (0.0352) (0.0094) (0.031)
AGE2 +/- -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0016 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0004)
NTAXS - 0.2938 - -0.5789 - 0.2150
(1.0136) (2.7430) (1.1080)
GROWTH - -0.5598 - -0.3920 - -1.0339
(0.2287) (0.2244) (0.3323)
GROWTH2 - 0.0081 - 0.0191 - 0.0166
(0.0034) (0.0195) (0.0050)
COLL - -0.5474 - -0.4993 - -0.5703
(0.2079) (0.4538) (0.2513)
CONSTANT 0.5517 -0.5849 -6.3168 -4.9103 -1.2395 -0.9213
(0.2523) (0.4117) (944.85) (0.8088) (0.2779) (0.4882)
# of obs 3864 3864 1046 1050 2686 2686
Pseudo-R2 - 0.1099 - 0.1903 - 0.0860
Wald Test 7.14 - 0.48 - 38.0 -
exogeneity
RESET test 227.60 2.9397 849.05 1.0581 2.967 1.4676
Chow test 745.45 56.650 - - - -
LR/LM sector 37.056 6.3519 19.311 3.5608 30.517 6.2754
LR/LM country 1354.2 30.033 849.05 21.158 1109.3 17.034
Notes: Results using Stata (version13.1). Below the coe¢cients we report standard deviation in paren-
theses; for the test statistics report p-values; ***, ** and * denote coe¢cients which are statistically
signicantly 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively. Direct impacts were estimated using IVProbit whereas total
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Market concentration has an impact on default risk (however the impact is signicant
only in 2013). The impact obtained is the expected one.
4.6 Conclusion
The determinants of capital structure and default probability have been research areas
attracting lots of attention. However after reviewing the literature we came to the con-
clusion that there are a set of variables whose importance is admitted but, so far, with
limited empirical testing. In particular, the level of uncertainty, the degree of market
concentration and the default costs have been little explored, especially in the default
risk literature. The indirect default costs, due to their di¢cult measurement have been
even more ignored. The main purpose of this chapter was to test the signicance of this
set of variables on the leverage ratio and on the default probability. In addition, and
considering that the two previous chapters suggest that debt is endogenously determined,
our estimation of the default probability used a instrumental variables approach.
Our estimations used data of listed rms from 11 countries belonging to the OECD in
2007 and in 2013. This allowed us to estimate the e¤ects of the variables before (2007)
and after (2013) the peak of the nancial crisis in 2008. The results showed that the
determinants of capital structure and probability of default were di¤erent before and
after 2008. After 2008, obtaining credit become more di¢cult and only rms with a
sustainable capacity to meet their obligations were able to get credit as banks become
more selective in approving credit applications.
To analyze the factors that inuence the capital structure we used a two-part fractional
model to take into account the specicities of the debt variable. That allowed us to analyze
which determinants a¤ect the decision on whether to nance with debt or not and which
a¤ect the decision of the debt ratio. To analyze the default risk, an instrumental variable
probit model (to estimate the direct impact) and a Probit model (to estimate the total
impact) were used. The potential endogeneity of the debt variable, was conrmed in 2013
but not in 2007.
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Regarding our main independent variables, we concluded that uncertainty a¤ects neg-
atively the debt ratio and positively the probability of default. In addition, direct and
indirect default costs have a negative impact on the debt ratio, conrming the idea that
higher default costs lead the rm to behave more cautiously in the debt market. Similarly,
the result of the default probability regressions suggest that in order to avoid the loss of
reputation, the rm are less aggressive in the product market, reducing the probability
of default. Finally, there is also some support to the hypotheses that the degree of mar-
ket concentration inuences debt and probability of default and that the later e¤ect is
non-linear.
Time constraints did not allow us to study some additional aspects. One of them
would be to explore new ways of measuring the indirect default costs. The results ob-
tained, namely regarding the impact on debt, suggest that the current measure may be
capturing idiosyncratic negative shocks, which reect uncertainty but not necessarily a
reputation loss. It would be worthwhile to explore new ways of measuring the indirect
default costs, so that the measurement is more aligned with the reputation loss. Another
interesting extension would be to include advertising as a measure of the degree of prod-
uct di¤erentiation (the reverse of the degree of product substitutability in the theoretical
framework of the second essay). Finally, it would be interesting to see the e¤ect of the
competitors indebtedness on the rm default probability.
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Appendix
Indirect Default Cost (IDCi)
The estimation of indirect costs follows Altmans (1984) methodology and corresponds
to the di¤erence between prots and estimated prots (Altman 1984 and Kwansa and Cho
1995)
We rst estimated the rms sales as a function of the industry sales. To this end,
rm and industry data were used 10 years before the date of the estimation. For the 2007
estimation, we used data from 1997 to 2006. To estimate the 2013 sales, data from 2003
to 2012 were used The parameters a and b were estimated for each rm.
Si;j;t = a+ bSj;t
where Si;j;t denotes the sales of rm i, in industry j at time t and Sj;t denotes the
aggregate sales of industry j at time t. In other words, Sj;t =
Pnj
i=1 Si;j;t where nj is the
number of rms in industry j. and t = t   10; t   9; ::; t   1 (i.e., for each period we
consider the 10 previous years).
The second step was to insert 2007 and 2013 aggregate industry sales so as to estimate
the rm sales in ach of these years:
bSi;j;t = a+ bSj;t
with t = 2007 and 2013
The third step was to calculate the average of historical prot margin of each rm and
multiply it by the estimated sales, so as to calculate the expected prot.
bPi;j;t = PM i  bSi;j;t
where bPi;j;tis the estimated prot of rm i, in industry j at time t and PM i is the average
historical prot margin of rm i.
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The last step allows us to calculate the di¤erence between the actual prot and the
estimated prot. When this di¤erence is negative it is interpreted as the lost prot. Thus
the lost prot is:
LOi;j;t = Pi;j;t   bPi;j;t if Pi;j;t < bPi;j;t
For consistency with the calculation of the direct default costs,we considere the prot
loss in relative terms (as a percentage of the total assets). That the indirect default costs
are given by:
IDCi;j;t =
LOi;j;t
Total Assetsi;t
Table 4.13: Methods used in default risk studies.
Author(s)
Univariate
analysis
Multiple linear
discriminant
analysis
Logit/ Probit
analysis
Survival
analysis
Beaver (1966) X
Altman (1968) X
Deakin (1972) X X
Edmister (1972) X
Blum (1974) X
Altman, Haldeman & Narayanan(1977) X
Ohlson (1980) X
Zmijewski (1984) X
Zavgren (1985) X
Aziz, Emanuel & Lawson(1988) X X
Kaya and Theodossi (1999) X
Turetsky and Mceween (2001) X
Pindado & Rodrigues (2004) X
Beaver (2005) X
Gepp and Kumar (2008) X X X
Chacharat et al (2010) X
Pérez, Llopis & Llopis(2010) X
Wu, Gaunt & Gray (2010) X X X
Zhang, Altman, Yen(2010) X
Ng, Wong & Zhang(2011) X
Seneidere and Bruna (2011) X X
Tinoco and Wilson (2013) X
Ho,McCarthy & Yang(2013) X
Huang and Lee (2013) X
Singhal and Zhu (2013) X
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Table 4.14: References of independent variables
Notation References
UNCi Dechow and Dichev (2002); Kothari, Laguerre and Leone (2002); Stock and Watson( 2002)
Zhang (2006); Banker, Byzalov and Plehn-Dujowich(2014)
IDCi Jonh(1993); Dionne and Laajimi(2012)
DDCi Altman (1984); Kwansa and Cho(1995)
HHIi Spnaos, Zaralis and Lioukas(2004); Guney, Li and Fairchild(2011); Kayo and Kimura(2011);
Valta(2012)
HHI2i Guney, Li and Fairchild(2011)
LEVi Beaver(1966); Altman(1968); Ohlson(1980); Zingales(1998); Kahya and Theodossiou(1999);
Turetsky and McEwen(2001); Beaver et al (2005); Gepp and Kumar(2008); Chancharat et
al(2010); Wu, Gaunt and Gray(2010); Dionne and Laajimi(2012); Ho, McCarthy and
Yang(2013); Johnstone et al(2013); Tinoco and Wilson(2013)
NTAXSHIi Berger, Ofek and Yermack(1997); Lööf (2004); Pindado, Rodrigues and La Torre(2006);
Ramalho and Silva (2009); Aggarwal and Kyaw(2010); Chakraborty(2010); Guney, Li
and Fairchild (2011)
PROFi Rajan and Zingales(1995); Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997); Lyandres (2006); Ramalho and
Silva (2009); Aggarwal and Kyaw(2010); Chakraborty(2010); Kayo and Kimura(2011);
Guney, Li and Fairchild(2011); Zhang(2012)
GROWTHi Rajan and Zingales(1995); Lööf(2004); Ramalho and Silva(2009); Chakraborty(2010); Guney,
Li and Fairchild(2011)
GROWTH2i Bhaduri,(2002); Chen(2004); Serrasqueiro and Nunes(2010)
COLLi Rajan and Zingales(1995); Berger, Ofek and Yermack(1997); Lööf (2004); Pindado, Rodrigues
and La Torre(2006); Kayo and Kimura,(2011);Lyandres(2006); Chakraborty(2010); Kayo and
Kimura(2011); Margaritis and Psillaki(2007); Ramalho and Silva (2009, 2013); Aggarwal and
Kyaw(2010); Guney, Li and Fairchild,(2011)
AGEi Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997); Petersen and Rajan (1994); Ramalho and Silva (2009,2013);
Chancharat et al(2010); Pérez, Llopis and Llopis (2010); Antunes, Mata and Portugal (2011)
AGE2i Geroski 1995 Stinchcombe(1965); Fichman and Levinthal(1991); Pérez, Llopis and Llopis(2010)
MANEFFICi Beaver(1966); Turetsky and McEwen (2001); Gepp and Kumar(2008); Chancharat et al(2010);
Ng, Wong, and Zhang,(2011); Sneideire & Bruna (2011)
SIZEi Rajan and Zingales(1995); Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997); Lööf (2004); Lyandres (2006);
Pindado, Rodrigues and La Torre (2006); Margaritis and Psillaki (2007); Ramalho and
Silva (2009,2013); Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010); Chakraborty (2010); Kayo and Kimura (2011)
Guney,Li and Fairchild (2011); Zhang (2012)
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Table 4.15: Endogeneity test
All Sample 2007 2013
Statistic P-value Statistic P-value Statistic P-value
Durbin 2 3.360 0.0668 0.351 0.5534 12.651 0.0004
Wu- Hausman F 3.338 0.0678 0.343 0.5584 12.514 0.0004
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis presented three interconnected essays that study how several market structure
parameters inuence nancing and output market decisions and the default risk.
The rst essay further developed the ideas of Brander and Lewis (1986) by analyzing
the implications of nancial structure decisions and output market decisions on the default
probability and also by studying the impact of changes in the parameters of the model
on the equilibrium. This analysis is done both for the second stage Nash equilibrium
(considering the nancial structure as given but taking into account the impact on the
output market decisions) as well as for the subgame perfect equilibrium (i.e., taking into
account the impact on the nancial structure decisions as well as on the product market
decisions).
The second essay analytically and numerically examined how market structure para-
meter (such as the level of uncertainty and the degree of product substitutability) and
the default costs inuence nancial and product market decisions and, consequently, how
they a¤ect the default risk. We considered a two stage duopoly model. In the rst stage,
rms simultaneously decide the level of debt that maximizes the rm value and, in the
second stage of the game, rms simultaneously decide the quantity that maximizes the
equity value. To nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the model was solved back-
wards. We rst determined the Nash equilibrium of the quantity competition game and
then determined the equilibrium levels of debt. Due to the complexity of the problem, we
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had to solve the model analytically using GAUSS. We determined the equilibrium values
of several variables: debt obligation, output, expected equity value, expected debt value,
expected value of the rm, implicit interest rates, default probabilities and social welfare.
The numerical model was run for many values of the parameter of the model in order to
allow us to study the impact of changes on the level of demand uncertainty, on the degree
of product substitutability, on the default costs and on the level of asymmetry in marginal
production costs on the equilibrium values of the previous variables and, in particular, on
the equilibrium default probability.
The last essay aimed to test empirically the relevance of uncertainty, market concen-
tration and direct and indirect default costs on the nancing decisions and on the default
probability. Therefore, we tested whether debt (considering both the probability of a rm
nancing with debt and, when it does, the amount of the debt) vary with uncertainty,
the direct and indirect default costs and the degree of market concentration. To do this,
a sample of 11 OCDE countries was used and regressions were run for 2007 and 2013,
allowing us to examine whether there is a signicant di¤erence before and after the peak
of the nancial crisis that occurred in 2008.
An important conclusion from the rst essay, is that the impact of a change in parame-
ter may be di¤erent depending on whether we assume that nancing decisions are xed or
not (i.e., depending on whether we are looking at the second stage of the game or looking
at the whole game). The results in this essay conrm the importance of considering both
direct and indirect impacts (through the changes in the equilibrium nancing and output
decisions) on the default probability. For instance, an increase in a rm marginal cost,
has a positive direct e¤ect on the default probability (if the marginal cost increases, the
default probability increases, for xed debt and quantity levels), however the increase in
marginal costs also leads the rm to behave more cautiously in the debt and product
markets, which decreases the default probability.
The results in the second essay conrm the importance of considering both direct and
indirect impacts (through the changes in the equilibrium nancing and output decisions)
on the default probability. For example, we conrm numerically that an increase in the
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marginal costs of a rm, reduce its default probability whereas the reverse happens for
the rival rm. This counter-intuitive result can be explained by the fact that as the
rm becomes more ine¢cient, it tends to become more cautious in the debt and in the
product market. As consequence, the probability of default decreases because the previous
indirect impact through the changes in the behavior of the rm outweigh the direct e¤ect
of increasing marginal cost on the default probability. Moreover, the second essay also
allowed us to conclude that direct and indirect default costs are extremely relevant in the
rm nancing decision, as rms decrease their debt level when the default costs increase.
In addition the impact of changes in other parameter may be di¤erent when default
costs are considered. For instance, without considering default cost, an increase in the
uncertainty level leads rms to behave more cautiously in the debt market and this implies
a decreased probability of default (the indirect e¤ect through debt dominates). However,
when the default costs are considered and taking into account the values considered for
the parameters, an increase in the uncertainty level leads to an increase in the default
probability, i.e. the direct impact of the variable prevails. The empirical analysis is in
line with these ndings since the impact of uncertainty on debt is negative and on the
default probability is positive.
With regard to the changes in degree of product substitutability (analyzed in the
second essay), it was concluded that it increases the default probability but that its impact
on the capital structure is not monotonic. On the other hand, the third essay shows
that the degree of market concentration inuences the default probability. Moreover, the
default costs are an important determinant of debt, as it leads rms to take more cautious
positions and such behavior leads to a decreased probability of default.
Like any other study, this thesis has some limitations, which open opportunities for
further extensions of this study. At a theoretical level an obvious extension would be
to consider taxes in our model, thus allowing us to incorporate the tax benets of debt,
which would to some extent balance the default costs. In principle, this modication
would lead to higher equilibrium debt levels than the ones obtained in our second essay.
Other obvious extensions of the theoretical model would be to consider n rms instead of
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two rms and to study a model where rms compete in prices in the second stage of the
game. However, one can also think of less obvious extensions. An important one would
be to abandon the assumption that the nancing decisions are taken after the investments
decisions were already taken. If the nancing decisions were taken before the investment
decisions, we would need to consider other strategic e¤ects, which would increase the
complexity of the model but would increase its realism. We believe this is an important
extension that should be explored in the future.
At the empirical level, the estimated model would also benet with some additional
renements. One of them would be to explore new ways of measuring the indirect default
costs of default. In addition, it would be interesting to see the e¤ect of the competitors
indebtedness on the rm default probability. The last extension is particularly interesting,
because it is suggested by the theoretical framework proposed in this thesis.
Overall, our results suggest that the default probability is greatly inuenced by the
rms nancial and product market decisions, which optimally adjust their behavior to
structural changes in the industry. Therefore, a less favorable environment does not
necessarily imply higher default probability, as the rm may respond by nancing less
with debt.
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